Let me begin this award lecture with personal commonalities and differences, that is with selected features of the biography of William James (e.g., Wulf, 1997, ch. 10) and my own. Commonalities include: (1) the oldest son of a college-educated seeker of a personal worldview; (2) studies in England, France, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States; (3) initially a scientific education, then later in life activity in the psychology of religion; (4) a growing awareness of the uncertainties of the teachings of science and religion, leading to attempts to formulate a worldview which nevertheless takes both into account; (5) a preference for studying reality in its concreteness, also bringing in personal experience; (6) a sympathetic insight into what other people are thinking; (7) openness and educability; (8) a spirit of adventure into the unknown, and a youthful enthusiasm, even beyond the age of 60. The main difference is of course that I do not see myself at James’s level of achievement; in fact, receiving this reward quite surprised me. Also, I more rarely express a personal outlook, a philosophy, a spirit, which, according to James Dittes ((1971, 1995, p. 17) characterized William James. Rather, I attempt to contribute to a common enterprise of accumulating scientific generalization, without, however, neglecting, let alone belittling, individuality, depth, richness of meaning as emphasized by James (ibid., p. 19).

James Fowler (1994), in his William James Award lecture of 1994 presented a notable analysis and assessment of James’s contribution to the psychology of religion. Since then we have had in particular the Struggle for Life, the companion volume to the Varieties edited by Donald Capps and Janet Jacobs (1995), which also contains David Wulf’s encompassing bibliography. As I could not possibly improve upon those outstanding contributions, let me simply concentrate on those aspects of William James’s work which are of direct relevance to my own. I share James’s views about a pluralistic universe, and his interest in context-sensitive complementarity. I deal with each in turn.

A Pluralistic Universe

Stimulated by Darwinism and statistical thermodynamics in the scientific field, by Marxism in the domain of ideology, by the American Civil War and by the conquest of the West in US life, James (1842-1910) developed his pluralistic position; this was in contrast to the monistic views of the vast majority of scientists in his youth (Croce, 1995), and the basically monistic religious views of his father (e.g., Browning, 1980, p. 238; Graham, 1992, ch. 1). He formulated a philosophy "that would use probabilistic thinking not to deride uncertainties of beliefs but to legitimate belief without certainty" (ibid., p. 10).

In the Varieties of Religious Experience (1902) — the title already expresses pluralism — James wrote in particular:

(Continued on page 2)
... popular or practical theism ... has ever been more or less frankly pluralistic, not to say polytheistic, and shown itself perfectly well satisfied with a universe composed of many original principles, provided we are only allowed to believe that the divine principle remains supreme, and that the others are subordinated (ibid., p. 131).

In 1907, toward the end of his life, James explicated his views on the pluralistic universe in the Hibbert Lectures at Manchester College, Oxford, England. John Dewey credited James with developing a "via medii" between natural science and the ideal interest of morals and religion" (Dewey, 1971, p. 95). Three concatenated quotations from the published version of the Hibbert lecture (James, 1909) will make clear what we are discussing.

...rationality has at least four dimensions, intellectual, aesthetic, moral, and practical; and to find a world rational to the maximal degree in all these respects simultaneously is no easy matter (p. 175, italics in the original)... The pluralistic world is ... more like a federal republic than like an empire or a kingdom. However much may be collected, however much may be reported as present at any effective center of consciousness or action, something else is self-governed and absent and unreduced to unity (p. 274). Pluralism lets things really exist in the each-form or distributively ... a thing may be connected by intermediary things, with a thing with which it has no immediate or essential connection. It is thus at all times in many connections which are not necessarily actualized at the moment (p. 275).

My views of a pluralistic universe have found its major expression in my work on religious development. The present situation in the psychology of religion regarding that development is diverse; it reaches from skepticism as to the very possibility of a comprehensive yet useful theory of religious development to

the enthusiastic construction of developmental theories which focus on certain (more or less limited) aspects (e.g., Reich, 1992). I have done two things in particular: (1) specified what a theory of pluralistic religious development needs to explain (Reich, 1992, pp. 151; 1993, p. 4); 1997, p. 109; Hay, Nye, & Murphy, 1996, p. 60; Palouczian, 1996, p. 112); and (2) what could be some of its elements (Reich, 1995; 1997). As by now both proposals have been (partly) reprinted and discussed in the literature (references just given and Hooi, Jr., Spilka, Hunsberger, & Gorsuch, 1996, p. 63–64; passim). I restrict myself to recalling the gist of them.

The ideal theory under discussion needs to explain both variational and transformational changes (e.g., Overton, 1997). It includes religious conversion as well as leaving religion behind (e.g., Reich, 1997). That theory envisions multiple developmental paths (cf. Compas, Hinder, & Gerhardt, 1995, pp. 271–275; Human Development, theme issue 1/1965; Stewart, 1967), and aggregated effects of an intellectual, emotional, volitional, and or pre-conscious/subconscious nature as well as bio-physical and socio-cultural influences.

**Context-sensitive Complementarity**

In chapter VIII of his first volume on The Principles of Psychology, William James (1890, pp. 202–205) analyzed the "split" consciousness of certain hysterics: the partial consciousnesses coexisted, but ignored each other. For instance, if one whispered a question behind the back of such a hysterical person while he or she was in conversation with another, and the hysterics had a pencil to hand, then he or she wrote down the answer without the "upper" consciousness which was involved in the conversation being aware of that writing. An awareness would only arise if the pencil came into the field of vision, which implies the context-sensitivity of the phenomenon. From such findings James drew the following conclusions:

It must be admitted, therefore, that in certain persons, at least, the total possible consciousness may be split into parts which coexist but
mutually ignore each other, and share the objects of knowledge between them. More remarkably still, they are complementary. Give an object to one of the consciousnesses, and by that fact you remove it from the others. Barring a certain common fund of information, like the command of language, etc., what the upper self knows the under self is ignorant of, and vice versa (ibid., pp. 206; italics in the original).

James does not define “complementary” in the same way as class logic. Barring that common fund, the total is split up in such a way that there is no duplication; a particular item belongs into one “bin” and not into the other, and vice versa. However, for a total understanding, the contents of all “bins” must be taken into account.

In the next chapter of the same volume, “The Stream of Thought”, James goes on to another aspect of complementarity: the constituent organism (although not using that term there). Referring to the breaks in the stream of thought that are produced by sudden contrasts in the quality of successive segments, James likens them to an alternation of a bird’s perching and flights. He calls the resting place, the perching, the “substantive” segment, and the flight the “transitive” segment of the stream of thought. In a presumed contrast to what happens in a bird’s case, according to James a person cannot become aware by introspection of the content of the transitive segment. Trying to do that would be like “trying to turn up the gas light quickly enough to see how the darkness looks” (ibid., pp. 243–244).

As will become clear shortly, clarifying and deepening the foregoing has been the center of my work for the last dozen years, in particular in relation to the psychology of religion. However, given my past as a physicist, I did not become aware of those issues by reading William James, but initially via the writings of the Danish physicist Niels Bohr. Incidentally, as a matter of interest, it seems probable that Bohr got his ideas from James among others (Holton, 1970, pp. 1034–1035; R. V. Jones, 1985, p. 520).

Before you label this part of my work as dealing with “complementarity”, let me clarify why I use that term sparingly these days. Clearly, libraries have been written on the complementarity principle, including its commonalities with Eastern philosophy (e.g., Kothari, 1985), and with Derrida’s deconstructionism (Plohn, 1994), and even on complementarity as a way of life (R. V. Jones, 1985); much of that provides helpful insights. However, in my usual human surroundings, first, if “complementarity” resonates with something, it is probably with a vague notion which signifies that certain entities, events, acts, etc. belong together, complete each other, together make a whole. Such a vague notion is not of much help when the potential usefulness of the term — if there is one — depends on the precision with which it characterizes the kinds of relationships between the constituent elements such as wave-like and particle-like behavior in quantum physics, or nature and nurture in human behavior. Second, for some persons, complementarity smacks of physics, and therefore acts as a barrier against a serious effort to get into the issues — even among physicists that term from the beginning provoked more frisson than light (e.g., Beller, 1992). Third, in psychology, complementarity has two distinct usages, which bear little resemblance to what was thereby understood so far. (1) In their psychology of communication, Paul Watzlawick, Janet Bavin, and Don Jackson (1967, subsection 2.6) label an interaction complementary when the participants stand in a hierarchical relation to each other, and symmetric, when the participants are at the same level of authority. (2) In family therapy, the therapist complementarity refers to a situation where simplified therapist and client are in opposition as regards independence vs. interdependence and in harmony as far as affect is concerned, whether positive or negative as long as it is the same for both (Laird & Vandenberg).

(Continued on page 4)
Coordination of Religious and Nonreligious Worldviews

The change of a person's worldview with growing up is a particularly informative developmental instance. Here worldview means the way a person pictures the origin of the universe, the way it evolved until the present time, the origin of life, etc. There exist purely religious, purely nonreligious, and mixed worldviews (Fetz, Reich, & Valentin, 1989, Reich, 1989). In a constructivist conception of cognitive development an individual as a rational agent constructs new and/or more dependable views on the basis of his or her own observations and reasoning (e.g., Reich, Oser, & Valentin, 1994). In the context of the present lecture it is of interest to consider how persons react to the worldviews of others, more precisely, what the developmental features of that reaction are.

We interviewed children, adolescents, and adults about statements from a scientist and from a church minister about their respective worldviews (Reich, 1989, 1996b). For the scientist the theories of the Big Bang and of Evolution explain all the important things. The minister recognizes these contributions to our worldview, but adds that for him God is still the ultimate explanation as to why there is a universe altogether. Also, he senses God in nature and in other human beings, and experiences him as his assistance when he has to make morally difficult decisions. The participants were invited to explain whose worldview was correct. Given the relative rarity of persons using highly developed forms of thought, the participants were chosen on the basis of perceived analytical competence, verbal fluidity, and general above-average knowledge; hence, they are not representative. From the answers, five developmental levels could be hypothesized:

**Level 1.** Only one worldview comes into the field of vision: "I believe that the minister is right," or "The scientist is right, he can prove it."

**Level 2.** Both views are tentatively put side by side: "I believe that animals and humans would not have come into existence without God." ["Does that mean science is wrong?"] "I would say, maybe there really was a Big Bang. So the minister is right, and maybe the scientist a little too."

**Level 3.** Both worldviews are considered necessary for a full explanation: "Well, to my mind, both are right. The scientist must have developed his views according to the results of scientific research. And the minister is right in that there would be no world if it were not for God. I do not see any contradiction."

**Level 4.** The relation between both worldviews is thematized: "The two statements do not exclude each other. The minister speaks about his conscience, his feelings when looking at nature, about human encounters and the like. The scientist explains how the stars came about, and..."
so on. If God had created the preconditions for those processes to occur, then the two views would supplement each other. The world came into being rather suddenly, perhaps somehow through an energy created by God, which enabled matter to come into existence. I do not quite know how to understand symbolically Genesis in the Bible. Anyway, nobody can visualize the time scales involved.

Level 5. A synopsis is endeavored. "If I were the third person in that discussion between the minister and the scientist, I might say the following: Maybe things occurred as stated by the scientist. He has presented a model that explains plausibly how things evolved from the Big Bang until today. But of course, we cannot be absolutely sure about it. But I also have to side with the minister, and even to support him. Maybe in the future even more convincing models will come about. Anyway, they will not explain why there is a world altogether, and why our life proceeds as it does, and not differently. I too believe that one can sense God in nature, in human encounters, and in one's conscience."

Those results fit into a developmental framework which characterizes a way of thought not explored scientifically at the time, namely coordinating ever better competing explanations or even "theories". That framework exhibits notably the following three features. First, there are clearly structural differences from level to level. At the lowest level, only one worldview is accepted, then both come into view, next they are coordinated, and finally an integration is attempted. Second, the argumentation becomes more and more complex (see below). Third, the existence of language games (like symbolic and scientific language) is recognized at the higher levels, but not considered an insurmountable barrier on the road to a deeper coordination.

One question arising is whether the same observations could have been made about competing nonreligious views. In other words to what extent are these findings particular to religious vs. nonreligious views?

The answer is that the same levels were found in interviews about nonreligious issues (Qser & Reich, 1987; Reich 1995b) regarding, for instance, the explanations of a brilliant performance of a concert pianist (nature vs. nurture), of the mind-body problem (which of the two, mind or body, explains well-being and human typicality?), or of an accident in a nuclear power plant (technical malfunctioning vs. human failure). As will be explained shortly, the corresponding levels are labeled RCR level 1 to V.

In the nonreligious cases the intra-individual level scores were closely

(Continued on page 8)

Table 1: Discrepancies in Reasoning About Non-Religious Issues and About Religious Issues: Frequencies of Individual Levels of Relational and Contextual (Complementarist) Reasoning (RCR) about Artistic Performance, etc., and Levels of Coordinating Biblical and Scientific Views on the World's Origin.

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(Source: Reich, 1996b, p. 132; explanation in text; N = 67. 1(2) means a level somewhat above level 1, 2(1) a level somewhat below 2, etc.)
Announcements

The Psychology of Religion Newsletter announces that Paul Williamson, a graduate student at the University of Tennessee in Knoxville, is coordinating the mailing list for student affiliates and associates of Division 36. The Newsletter is mailed to all APA members from APA's national offices in Washington D.C. Because APA does not handle mailings to division associates, Paul will be maintaining the list and supplying the Newsletter editor with corrections and additions. If you are a student affiliate or division associate and have questions about your newsletter, please contact Paul at 423-339-1590 or at wwp103@aol.com.

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This volume is a text for the introductory undergraduate class in the Psychology of Religion. The author has done an impressive job of creating a volume that will introduce the student to the essential issues in the field of psychology of religion and to selected relevant psychological theories. The psychological theories to which a student is exposed during the student's lower division psychology classwork are applied to an understanding of the religious experience.

The book is divided into four parts. The first section deals with the problems and possibilities for the psychological study of religion. The author reflects on the nature of religion and the nature of the scientific method. Chapter 1 contains a review of the history of the concept of the soul, the institutional focus of religion, and a noteworthy section on "civil religion in America." Chapter 2 deals with methodology, supporting the interdependence of science and theology.

Part II concerns the relations of three major intellectual trends in psychology: psychoanalysis, behaviorism, and humanism. Chapter 3 discusses Freud, Jung, Fromm, and Erikson. Chapter 4 suggests that behaviorism's impact on the study of religion has been more indirect where it has taken place. Behaviorism's relevance may be a "hard sell" to the undergraduate student. Chapter 5 discusses the humanistic approaches of William James, Abraham Maslow, and Gordon Allport.

Part III focuses on the connections between psychosocial development and religious growth. Chapter 6 traces how the cognitions and affects concerning religious phenomena at different ages can be explained by psychological structures and concepts. Chapter 7 deals with development of religious thinking and criteria for assessing sound religious concepts. Chapter 8 reviews the issues surrounding religious emotionality. The author presents three theorists who claim emotion to be essential to the religious life (Schleiermacher, Otto, and Jonathan Edwards) and reviews Mowrer's and Menninger's work that attempts to reintroduce the concept of "sin" as a meaningful psychological construct. Chapter 9 deals with violation and moral decision making. The author begins with a discussion of freedom and determinism and concludes with an excellent presentation of Piaget and Kohlberg.

In the fourth and final part, the author reviews religious "lifestyles." This is perhaps the best written and most insightful part of the book. It will also be the part that student readers will find most applicable to their own lives and pertinent to their experience of others. In this section the author describes three substantially different approaches to living a life in the context of religious devotion: The Religions of Authority, characterized by external forces aimed at power and control (the "Way of Obedience"); Religions of Becoming, characterized by confidence in human capability (the "Way of Affirmation"); and Religions of Spontaneity, characterized by an appreciation of emotion as a vehicle through which a deity can be known and experienced (the Way of Mysticism). The final chapter is a wonderful discussion on whether or not it is possible to have a mature religion. The author reviews briefly Alport's work on religious maturity, describes in detail Strunk's definition of maturity, and then moves to his own criteria for both immaturity and maturity in religious belief systems.

In conclusion, the book is a concise, articulate, well-organized (almost panoramic) view of the interface between psychological and religious studies. It would serve as an excellent text for undergraduate students as well as a general reader for the laity.

— Reviewed by Michael Pfeiffer
William James Award Address

—Continued from page 5

the same (mostly to better than 2/3 of a level difference), although the six issues were rather different (Oser & Reich, 1987). Given the structural similarity of all issues used in our interviews (religious vs. nonreligious explanations, respectively nonreligious vs. nonreligious explanations), one could have expected similar results throughout. Such a hypothesis would be supported if a given person scored essentially at the same level, whatever the issue. However, that was not the case when the nonreligious scores were compared to the scores above (Table 1). For instance, some persons who argued about the nonreligious issues at least at BCR level II, "coordinated" the worldviews at level 1 and so did even a respondent at BCR level IV. Hence, the intra-individual variance was larger when religious issues were included.

Is the difference due to the characteristics of the religious domain? One explanation would indeed be "segmentation" (Piaget's "décalage"), that is the time delay between reaching the same, yet domain-specific developmental levels. Alternatively, lack of pertinent knowledge or perhaps insufficient motivation for applying the existing competence could be a reason (Reich, 1996b). Notice, however, that nobody argued the case of coordinating different worldviews at a higher level than the nonreligious issues. Therefore, I assume that basically the same form of reasoning is at work. That is a reason for wishing to know more about it.

(Editors Note: The second half of Dr. Reich's talk will be in the Spring '96 Division 36 Newsletter)