The prestigious name of this award by which I feel honoured gave me the idea to start with an inquiring remembrance of William James. I will continue by taking into consideration the experience of suffering and desire which will set a counter-point and call to mind Freud's conception of religion as an illusion of desire. Thirdly, I would like to propose the idea that belief is the characteristic disposition of the human mind concerning religion.

I. Religious experience

I wonder whether many psychologists of religion still read the monumental seminal work The Varieties of Religious Experiences published in 1902. The figure of W. James sits at the beginning of psychology of religion as the totem of a founding father. Yet little empirical psychological research has been done on the topic of religious experience. It has been pursued more in the German, more phenomenological psychology influenced by Rudolf Otto’s study on the experience (Erfahrung) of the sacred or the Holy (das Heilige) in 1927.

Recent theological and pastoral literature, however, is full of the word “experience” with a kind of psychological connotation which reminds of W. James. Often these expressions result in a curious mess for those who reflect on the words: belief-experience, experience of the divine, of God, of the sacred as well as the general “religious experience”. Contrasting with this psychologically oriented expressions, historians, sociologists and cultural anthropologists of religion use the more objective and rational, quasi-philosophical expression: “belief systems”.

It indeed is as a psychologist that James centered his study of religion on experience. Looking at the multiplicity of religious ideas and affiliations, his endeavor was to grasp what they have in common, and what is really the personal core. For him the answer lies in the emotional self-consciousness of persons who entertain the ideas of their religion and who perform its moral behavior. To be sure, James does not pretend that these people themselves explicitly placed the personal focus of their religion in their religious experience. Psychology does not coincide with the lived religion but it identifies the psychological factor or factors in it.

The title of James' work stresses the Varieties of religious experiences. For James, this means that religious experience consists of various emotions: joy, fear, admiration.... But what then makes the experience typically religious? James gives three answers to this question. Firstly, that the intensity of the emotions of “the psychopathic temperament” “would allow us to penetrate into regions of religious truths and the farthest corners of the universe” (1958, 37). Secondly, the fact that religious experiences have an affective quality in common; they are “solemn and permeated with gravity” (1958, 47). Thirdly, and this is for him the decisive answer.

(Continued on page 2)
that an emotion is religious when directed towards "a religious object" (1958, 40). Taking this into account, we should conclude that the object is itself religious, independently of the way in which it is emotionally experienced. Does the object then cause the religious emotional experience? And what then determines the religious qualification of "the object"? For James, religious conceptions are only accidental constructions arising from the "sense of presence". And yet, James writes that the founders had "the immediate personal communication with the divine" (1958, p. 42).

Psychology leads to confusion here. By focusing his psychology on affective experience, James intends to grasp what is intrinsically psychological in religion. But by locating the psychic within the inner subjectivity, he separates it from its intrinsic connection with the "religious object" as this is given to the mind and to the psyche by reason and language. I suspect that these confusions often give psychologists of religion the feeling that the issue of experience leads to a dead end.

Before departing from James, I would however like to draw the attention to the subtitle of James' work: A Study in Human Nature. It points to interesting questions that the psychology of religion will continuously have to deal with. Firstly, that of mental health and religion. In religious phenomena which go beyond the regular daily psychology can occur. Religious experiences, possession, and apart from these exceptional phenomena, emotional experiences of religion are always related to an object which is beyond the realm of the rational mind. Because of this, positivist scientists suspected religion to be caused by mental disturbances. Answering them, James stresses that the intensity of emotions in religion proves that the capacity to move beyond the normal frontiers of the faculties is a valuable characteristic of human nature. And he adds the pragmatic principle: "By their fruits shall you know them, not by their roots" (p. 34). We may be surprised by this phrase: could the roots of religion be psychologically morbid even though religion is not?

The subtitle, "A Study in Human Nature", contains an interesting hint for the conception of psychology of religion. Peter Hill recently (1999, p. 233) wrote: "that the question most psychologists of religion usually ask is: How can the study of psychology promote understanding of religious experience?". He himself also puts forward the following question which he thinks to be "fundamentally different": "How can the study of religious experience (and perhaps of religion itself) promote the understanding of basic psychological and social processes?". The second question that I in my turn would like to put forward here, is actually that of James' subtitle: But can we separate both questions? Where do we study the basic psychological processes, if not in the activities where they are working in art, sexual love, social affiliation, religion...? There is no purely psychological reality: there are no psychological phenomena besides the typically human activities. And can we study psychology of religion without comparing the processes involved with similar ones in other human activities? Religion involves a lot of factors which are also present outside religion: expression of emotion, aesthetic feelings, feeling of culpability, act of commitment...

The word experience points out to a personal, subjective element in religion. But the religious experiences cannot be separated from the person's religious convictions nor from his/her world. Considering these arguments, by myself, I thought it to be interesting to try to set up and to pursue empirical research on religious experience. With my collaborators we created a thematic appreciation test with carefully selected photographs representing six general human experiences which seemed to be hypothetical situations of possible religious experience: I will just mention some main results obtained from test groups with different education levels most of which brought up in a Catholic environment (Vergote, 1996, 152-174). The most probable sites for a religious experience are nature, then childhood, and finally the figure of the loving mother. The death of a child is the most emotionally intense site, nature is the least emotionally intense one. Apparently, religious experience is not at all commonly seen as an experience of "psychopathic" intensity. The death of a child is a site of questioning and revolt, whereas the experience of nature comports positive
qualities, both evoking divine qualities by their intrinsic congruence. In the test group some were more attentive to motherly qualities of nature and of the divine, others to paternal ones. We also did some research on the religious perception of music, in a reference group of university students and musicians, half of them believers and half unbelievers. For all of them Bach's music is the most capable of arousing religious experience through its qualities: it creates an aura of peace and serenity and it has the contrasting symbolic dimensions of height and depth, and this promotes the sense of an absent reality, which means: the experience of what has great presence while still referring to an absent reality. In another, different type of research we also set up semantic scales for a comparative study of the dimensions involved in the meanings that two religious words bear: on the one hand the "sacred" (in French "le sacré"), which is a very meaningful term in the French context; in English sometimes translated by "the holy"), and on the other hand "God". Neither for believers nor for unbelievers do these two words bear the same set of meanings, so many researches presuppose: They overlap only partially and differ from one another significantly.

To conclude I would like to give a short overview of what the mentioned researches taught me. All of them did bear on religious experiences like religious emotional perception of nature, of a loving relationship (mother-child), of music. Religious affective perception, according to me, is an important component of spiritual intelligence. These perceptual experiences represent a transitional area between the purely secular world (of economics, of technology, of daily care, of entertainment) and the God of religion. This religious experience is both an interior, subjective event and an encounter with that which has a qualitative and symbolic meaning referring to the divine. Peace, greatness, depth, height and fecundity are qualities which compose a transitional reality in which, for believers, the world of the human being and of God, permeate each other without blending into each other (Vergote, 1998). Unbelievers often have the sense of this transitional reality, but they themselves do not interpret it as referring to the God of religious belief. I mention this briefly, but I am very conscious that the believing and unbelieving positions are full of interior tensions and transitions. But this is not my topic now. As for religious experiences themselves, I maintain that there are non-religious, psychological, environmental and cultural conditions which make them possible or impossible. In this respect, psychology of religion touches with psychology of mental health.

I agree with A.H. Maslow (1964) when he distinguishes two modes of perception and knowing, one ruled by "need-motivations" and the other "meta-motivated". The latter group bear their values with them, give rise to meaning and may be religious. I also appreciate Maslow's predilection for ecstatic language about peak experience, and I would not simply see the core of religion in these experiences.

In the mentioned researches, I did not pay all the necessary attention to the language of religious experience. We should not forget that language is not only an instrument for communication, but that it also structures the experiences themselves. Consequently, we learn a lot about this topic from linguistic analysis. We indeed see that they make observations and have insights which are related to our psychological ones. It has been proved, for example, that the metaphorical religious language (M. Black, 1962) brings together experiences of the quality of the perceived world with the transcendent nature of religion: example: "God is the light on my path". The structuring, process of linguistic metaphorisation corresponds to the process of religious experience and it contributes essentially to structuring that experience. And if we submit these metaphorical religious expressions to unbelievers who yet have some religious sense, they often inverse the quoted biblical metaphorical expression and comment: for me that means that light is something divine (Vergote, 1998). The object of religious experience as a transitional reality indeed can, depending on the subject, refer to a transcendent God, or it can support the quoted reinterpretation of a typical religious expression. I think this reinterpretation is exactly what C.G. Jung did in his psychology of religion.
II. Experience of evil

Following the *Oxford Dictionary* and the lemma for the word "evil", I would like to consider experiences of that which is bad, harmful, and all that causes suffering in natural and human events. I will, however, leave aside the suffering from feelings of guilt for which a different analysis would be required.

Psychology of religion observes in religious texts, the impressive expressions of suffering, and the behaviors linked with it, which consist for a large part of trusting protest, prayers, and rituals. In religions these phenomena go hand in hand with expressions of religious experiences.

Freud centered his psychology of religion on suffering and desire. However, he also wrote: "Psychoanalysis will not be tempted to trace the origin of anything as complicated as religion to a simple source" (1913). And again years later, he insists that religion is the most complex "power" in civilization, for it accomplishes three functions: it answers the human quest about the universe and the meaning of life, it assures human beings of protection and ultimate happiness, and it directs their thoughts and actions by precepts which it lays down with its whole authority." The mysterious convergence between these three components determines, he says, the unparalleled "grandiose nature of religion" (1932).

More important for my purpose is the other way in which religions deal with suffering: the way Freud studies this in his *The Future of an Illusion* of 1927, a work which represents the counterpoint to James. In his psychology of religion, Freud undeniably bases his arguments on a major phenomenon in religion: prayers and rituals. Rightly, but too exclusively, he stresses the demanding terror of these behaviors addressed to the divine being, which is believed to be ultimately beneficent. A demand is of course congruent with the experience of lack and suffering and with the trust in a transcendent rather personal being with whom humans entertain a relationship. Freud then proposes the following explicative theory. Religion obviously retrieves and reproduces an early experience and a way of being that has profoundly impressed itself in the psyche and formed it as a mode of interpretation and a scheme of behavior. The early infantile experience of distress and of protecting-loving parents moulds
the disposition of the trusting address to
a protecting-loving power who has the
divine dimension corresponding with the
might and extension of nature. Now, for
different cultural and psychological rea-
sons, Freud sees the father-figure of the
biblical God (as he understands it) as
the most spiritualized accomplishment
of humanity's conception of divinity. So
Freud concludes his study by stating that
religion is psychologically the nostalgia
for the father (a divine father of course!),
and an illusion of desire. But he adds,
what is often omitted in references to
Freud: Religion which is psychologically
an illusion may be philosophically true,
even though he himself does not believe
it is (Freud, 1927).

Concerning this theory, I first would like to
claim that no reasonable person can main-
tain together both judgements: illusionary and
true. That what a person judges to be psy-
chologically an illusion, he submits to an
intentional critical disillusionment. Now,
that is exactly what real mystics do (Ver-
gote 1988) in neoplatonism, in Christian,
Islamic and Buddhist (Bareau, 1996) mysti-
cism. Where Freud refers vaguely to mysti-
cism, he apparently ignores the living core
of it, and following romantic ideas, he confuses
mysticism with emotional imaginative
fusion with nature or with the cosmos
(Assoun, 1984, p. 111 f.). Referring to
Freud's "Illusion of desire", D.W. Winnicott
(1971, p. 10-14) gives the word a positive
meaning and is therefore sometimes
favourably quoted by psychologists of
religion and by theologians. I am convinced
that as soon as the question of illusion and
truth is asked by the individual, he aban-
dons religion when he thinks it is illusion,
even if he may think it is a positive, benefi-
cent illusion. Actually, what Winnicott
refers to is a transitional moment in the
psychology of the developing mind. But
the explicit idea that religion is an illusion
is what makes most often the religious
crisis of young adolescents today in very
many European countries. Even when they
have no rational objections and when they
respect religion, for different reasons, reli-
gion for them loses its meaning of reality;
it possibly subsists in a vague sense of
"something of divine quality" at the bor-
der of the human world.

Freud's theory in The Future of an Illu-
sal calls need or deficiency motivations.
Contrary to Freud, Maslow links religion
with "metamotivated", "being cognized" and
"peak experiences". Positive reli-
gious experiences indeed also belong to
religion and it is amazing that Freud
seems to ignore the numerous texts in
religion which praise and thank God or
the gods for the beauty, might and found-
dy of the world.

In spite of Freud’s important shortcom-
ings, I would like to retain two essential
psychological elements from his psychology
of religion. Firstly, the concept of
desire. Human beings, and definitely psy-
chologically healthy persons, are funda-
mentally desiring beings. Most often desire
is a healthy form of dynamic suffering of
a lack of being and happiness. However
desire is neither identical with sadness
or depression, nor with Maslow's need mo-
vations. The second element, I would like
to retain from Freud's religious psychology
is the major importance of the very
early experiences. Recent studies on intel-
lignce enlighten the enormous structuring
impact of affective, perceptual, infantile
experiences even on the formation of
intelligence (Greenspan, 1997, chap. I and
III). Could it be otherwise in the
processes of spiritual or religious intel-
lignce? They shape what I will now
briefly examine: belief and, if religious
tokens in the environment make it pos-
sible, religious belief.

III. Religious belief

Cultural anthropologists and historians
often use the term "belief system" for reli-
gion. Its ideas, symbols and rituals indeed
refer to what is transcendent to experi-
ence. In his investigation K. Needham
(1972) shows that many religions do not
use themselves the word "belief", but nei-
ther do they use the word "experience".
E. Evans Pritchard (1956, p.9) makes the
same observation in his extensive study
of the Nuer Religion. The expression "I
believe in God" by which the Christian
states his personal conviction is even the
very Christian solecism (Bultmann,
1933, VI. p.174f). This is a striking feature
the historian or psychologist of religion
should not neglect. And we notice that
it is a religious expression and not
William James Award Address

— Continued from page 5

a theoretical statement as is "I believe that God exists" which has degrees of theoretical affirmation as D. Hume analyzed before (1739-40, III, p.623). The psychologist who would treat "to believe in" as identical with "to believe that" greatly misses the point.

Should we then reserve the expression "to believe in" to the description and interpretation of Christian religion? My contention is that as psychologists we must use expressions that characterize most adequately the disposition of mind we think we observe. Experience may be a right word for some elements in religion. But for the whole of the religious mind of people addressing themselves to their spiritual or divine being, it seems to me that the term belief is the right one. The psychologist is allowed to transfer it for characterization of the religious state of mind which presents sufficient analogy with the Christian intention. I do not, at any rate, see another term doing right to the complexity of the religious mind. Linguistic analysis confirms my thesis. I think.

The religious "I believe in" is a complex act of the subject. Four components make up religious belief: trust, conviction, perceptual religious experience, trust and commitment. These four components are diversely in interaction and this process results in personal modalities of belief.

I do not pretend to clarify here sufficiently anything so complex as the dynamic structure of religious belief, I would however like to draw the attention to two aspects.

Firstly, the words "trust" and "commitment", that I used, designate dispositions to personal acts, analogous to that what today linguists call "speech acts". One could also say: mental acts, on the condition that by "mental" one understands the person with his reason and his emotional behavior in interaction. "Trust" relates to the other and to the future both of the believing person and of the other with whom he trusts. "Commitment" belongs to what linguists call performative acts, as is for example a promise. To believe in is a kind of promise answering the promise you perceive and hear from the other. Commitment, secondly, involves a way of moral behavior which is in agreement with the conceptions of the other in whom the person believes.

In view of both characteristics of belief, trust and belief-commitment, I prefer to use the term religious mental disposition rather than mental state. The word "disposition" has two interesting connotations. Firstly, it involves an active relational aspect. Secondly, it does not stress the present, conscious actualization of belief and it allows to conceive of belief as being preconscious and ready to actualize and to express itself in significant situations.

Finally, I would like to say some more on the question of "illusion of desire". Trust and experience indeed imply desire. Looking at old Aristotle, we characterize desire by its object: the enjoyment of happiness. What kind of happiness then do religious persons desire in their religious behavior? This is an important question psychologists should investigate. They should observe what people actualize, but also what they say and how they act, how they react when they are disillusioned, etc. After the careful reading of Freud's Future of an Illusion, one must say that in Freud's view religious people ultimately desire protection against natural evils, against death and against human injustice. But what then may be the positive content of the happiness they desire? Is it the mythical phantasm of some heavenly paradise on earth? Desire was also the essential problem for the historical Buddha. This was also the important question Allport (1967) had in mind when he introduced the difference between extrinsic and intrinsic religion. To rework this research seems to me a major task for psychology of religion. For it is the intention of desire in the personal and often largely unconscious religious belief, which determines the connection of religion with religious experience (Wood, 1970), with dogmatism or respectful tolerance, with mental health, etc. A human is a being driven by desire, but not born with a religious desire. Religion comes to the individual from history, society and education. It appeals to the whole person: ideas about the world and human life, desires, deep childhood memories of happiness and anxiety, imaginations and emotions, ideals in general, and ideals of the self, evolving reason and critical rationality.
This convergence is an interactive process in which non-religious factors differ in agreement or in tension with religious ones. There can be no simple opposition between extrinsic and intrinsic religion. The object of psychology of religion then is for a large part the study of the interactive aforementioned process and the way it evolves along three possible paths. The person who becomes aware of it may tend to transform himself in agreement with what he sees as religious ideas and requirements: there is no religion, even not a “primitive” one in which personal religion is not a kind of psychological and religious transformation, conversion. Another possible evolution of conflicts of ideas and feelings is the personal opposition to religion and the rejection or the abandonment of the religion. Psychology should also study this process. A third line of interaction consists of a failure to recognize the intra-personal tensions between the ideas and intentions proper to the religion and the personal ones. One could say: a pre-conscious even unconscious disavowal of the conflict. In this case there is often a kind of mild or severe pathology. All psychopathology with a religious content is an unhappy solution of the conflict that could not be recognized. The intolerant dogmatic religion, the insistent anxious preoccupation with sin, in-effective religious utopias, are personal and collective forms of failures to recognize the dynamic tensions which inhabit a personal religious being.

I conclude with a word of belief in the future of psychology of religion. Years of experience in research did convince me that Freud was right when he stated that nothing in civilization is so complex as religion. I also observed that among psychologists those who study religion are more and more convinced of this. I am happy to see the efforts to elaborate instruments which try to observe what is the core of religion in the psyche: the elements which compose its form of intelligence or consciousness and the intentions of desires in it. The object of psychology of religion is not firstly as in sociology, to study the attitude of persons towards religion as a cultural and social fact, but the religious person himself and herself. After all, a person is not primarily religious in his attitude towards religion and towards the institutions of his affiliation. Let’s not allow the shadow of sociology to fall on our minds. Psychology has its own most mysterious object, and nothing is more mysterious than a lived relationship, and surely a relationship that has to do with the which for most human beings, believing or not, is the ultimate mystery of existence.

References


For the Office of President

Crystal Park

Crystal Park is a professor in the Department of Psychology at the University of Connecticut. She received her Ph.D. in clinical psychology from the University of Delaware in 1993 and completed an NIMH fellowship in Psychology and Medicine at the University of California, San Francisco in 1995. She served as Division 36 program chair for the APA Annual Convention in 1997 and has served as a Member-at-Large since 1998. Her work focuses on religion, coping, positive transformation and meaning-making, and physical health and psychological well-being. She is a recipient of the Margaret Gorman Early Career Award from Division 36 in 1999. Her most recent article focuses on religion and meaning systems in coping with life stress.

I am honored to be nominated to serve as president of Division 36, especially in this time of great opportunity. We have made tremendous progress in establishing the relevance of religion and spirituality for many aspects of psychology, especially in the areas of physical and psychological well-being. We should continue to enhance our credibility in the domains of science and practice as well as promote the special and unique nature of religion and spirituality in human functioning.

Mark Krejci

Mark Krejci is a professor of psychology at Concordia College in Moorhead, Minnesota where he serves as department chair. He received his Ph.D. in counseling psychology from the University of Notre Dame in 1987. His research is related to cognitive conceptualizations of God, recently focusing on the acceptance of female God imagery. In addition to his academic duties, he sees a limited number of clients through a local church and has developed a marital enrichment course centered on the Beatitudes of Matthew. He has been serving as editor of Division 36’s Psychology of Religion Newsletter since the Fall, 1997 issue.

It has been my pleasure to serve the division for four years as Newsletter editor. I think our division is at a unique place in its history for two reasons. One, we have increased our membership over the last few years and two, recent research interest in such areas as religion and coping and publications on the integration of spiritual issues in psychotherapy have raised the understanding of religious/spiritual issues across the field. As a result, there is great interest among new professionals and Division 36 should develop mechanisms to mentor younger professionals in the field. As president, I would support our on-going efforts in the development of graduate education guidelines and curriculum, assist in the development of a graduate education guide similar to those published by other divisions, and help to develop a Division 36 conference as proposed by current President Bob Lovinger.

For the Office of Council Representative

William Hathaway

I would be honored to represent the concerns and priorities of Division 36 at Council. It was my pleasure to serve as division program chair for the 2000 APA convention and to assist with prior and subsequent programs. I have a longstanding interest in the psychology of religion, reaching back to my undergraduate days. I was very fortunate to work with Ken Pargament in the doctoral program at BGSU, from whom I learned to value a Jamesian, fruitful approach to the field. I remained invested in the psychology of religion during my several years as an Air Force psychologist and during my post-doctoral training in clinical child psychology at the University of Massachusetts Medical Center, presenting research and providing training to psychiatric staff on religious/spiritual issues in therapy. I have been the clinical training director at Regent University since 1997. Our program at Regent emphasizes integration and attention to issues of religious diversity. The psychology of religion is heavily represented across our curriculum. I also teach a required graduate survey of the field at Regent. My early research focused...
on religious coping and religious problem solving. Lately, I have become more concerned about the tendency for mental health professionals to discount considerations about spirituality/religiosity when attempting to systematically study various aspects of human functioning. I believe that psychologists need to consider religion/spirituality as a distinct and significant domain of adaptive functioning which should be routinely addressed when studying or assessing human subjects. If elected to Council I will be committed to representing the division's interests fairly and fully, and will be a proponent for greater scientific and professional attention to religious issues and concerns.

Ralph L. Piedmont

Ralph L. Piedmont received his Ph.D. in Personality Psychology from Boston University in 1989. He then did a two-year postdoctoral fellowship at the National Institute on Aging which focused on the Five-Factor Model of Personality and its application in a number of clinical and applied contexts. This work serves as an organizing paradigm for his own research on spirituality and its assessment. Currently, Ralph is an Associate Professor of Pastoral Counseling at Loyola College in Maryland. He is also the founding Director of the Institute for Religious and Psychological Research, an organization devoted to fostering an interdisciplinary dialogue on the role and value of spirituality in the social and medical sciences. The Institute supports empirical research that focuses on spiritual constructs and their value as predictors of salient psychosocial outcomes. Along with David Mcberg, Ralph is co-editor of the annual serial publication Research on the Social Scientific Study of Religion as well as being on the editorial board of Measurement and Evaluation in Counseling and Development and a consulting editor for the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. For the last several years Ralph has been active in Division 36 and serves as its current Membership Chair.

As a staunch supporter of the mission of Division 36, I believe it is imperative that we as a group are able to persuasively articulate our paradigm to the larger field of Psychology in a manner that shows both its value and necessity for the discipline. As a Council Representative, I will endeavor to be an active voice for the concerns of our division. I am also sensitive to our need for greater recognition and acceptance within this forum and will work to foster stronger ties with other divisions and with APA as a whole.

For the Office of Member-at-Large

Susan Keorge

Susan Keorge, Ph.D. is a licensed clinical psychologist. She earned her bachelor of science from Westmont College and her doctoral degree in clinical psychology from Washington State University. She completed pre-and postdoctoral fellowships at Harvard Medical School/Massachusetts General Hospital and McLean Hospital. She practiced at the Beck Institute for Cognitive Therapy and Research in Philadelphia as a senior postdoctoral fellow under the direct supervision of Aaron T. Beck, M.D. She then went on to join a group private practice, also in Philadelphia. She was invited to be a Founding Fellow of the Academy of Cognitive Therapy. She is currently an Assistant Professor of Psychology at Westmont College where she also conducts her professional practice.

I would like to serve on the Board of the American Psychological Association's Division 36 (Psychology of Religion) as Member-at-Large for the coming term for several reasons. First, as the Psychology of Religion has become a major area of interest for me professionally. I would like to become more aware of developments in the field by being more active in Division 36. Second, I would like to have more opportunity to interact with other professionals sharing my interest in this area, and I believe that serving on the APA Division 36 Board would facilitate such involvement. In particular, I would very much look forward to the interdisciplinary interaction with colleagues across the discipline of psychology who also share interest in the psychology of religion. As a clinical psychologist and assistant professor of psychology at Westmont College, I would anticipate learning from and interacting with colleagues through the process of contributing to the advancement of Division 36.

Lisa Miller

Lisa Miller, Ph.D. is an Assistant Professor of Psychology in the clinical psychology program at Teachers College, Columbia University. She received her B.A. from Yale College and her Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania where she was a student of Martin Seligman. Currently she holds the W.T. Grant Faculty Scholars Award for a longitudinal study on religion and resilience in adolescents and an NIMH grant from treatment of depression in adolescents. At Teachers College, Dr. Miller teaches courses on spirituality and psychotherapy and mentors graduate students in the conduct of research on spiritual development and resilience.

I have been very inspired by the scholars I have met, and with whom I have worked, through Division 36. I hope to contribute to this scholarly organization that has brought me such intellectual companionship and opportunity. Most of my research and teaching aims to enter knowledge about religion and religious development into mainstream academia. Mentors and colleagues from Division 36 have consistently supported and encouraged this work, giving me the confidence to continue when at first few people saw its merits. It would now be a privilege to help new scholars in this way.
The Council of Representatives (COR) met over four days from February 22-25, 2001. The APA is an ever more complex and large organization with a budget of over $85,000,000, and summarizing the work of the COR in overseeing and directing the APA is a challenge. We can only draw your attention to the most important decisions and those of particular interest to our Division 36 constituency.

The first two major issues relate to applied practice of psychology. COR passed a motion of support for the efforts of and strategic plan of the Committee for the Advancement of Professional Practice (CAPP) to achieve greater reciprocity between states regarding licensing laws for psychologists. If passed, this plan would enhance the mobility of psychologists considering a geographical move involving a change of licensure.

COR considered carefully the “Report and Recommendations of the Commission on Education and Training Leading to Licensure in Psychology.” This Commission had been formed to address the plight of new applied doctoral recipients (particularly those in the various fields of health care psychology such as clinical and counseling) who are increasingly facing daunting obstacles in gaining licensure (and earning a living while pursuing that licensure) after doctoral training. Psychology is the only major doctoral-level health care discipline that blocks licensure immediately after doctoral completion and completion of a predoctoral internship. This practice threatens the future of the field. Doctoral recipients now encounter frustrating obstacles to licensure, with the prototypical case being the individual who, having completed the internship and doctorate, cannot get a job to amass postdoctoral hours because the lack of a license to practice (because of the lack of supervised hours of service) makes the person unmarketable. She is not marketable because the lack of a license means she does not qualify for HMO panels or meet insurance carrier standards for reimbursable physician status. She needs the hours to get a job, and needs a job to live and to get the hours. The recommendations of the Commission, in general (and this is a gross simplification of an enormously complex area), would involve changing the APA’s suggested standard for licensure for health care professionals to allow for the possibility of licensure immediately upon completion of the doctorate with sufficient and suitable predoctoral (including internship) training. This, it is argued, is justified because of huge changes in training models in the field. In the early days of clinical and counseling psychology, trainees went on internship with little clinical experience, whereas the average predoctoral intern today comes to internship with almost 2,000 hours of clinical experience/training. COR did not act on this set of recommendations, but commended the findings and recommendations of the Commission for further study by the suitable boards and committees within the APA governance structure.

Two items related to ethics. First, a revision of the APA’s Ethics Code has been underway for a number of years, with the first complete draft published in the February issue of the Monitor. This is an important development in the field, and Division 36 members are urged to review the current draft and provide feedback. The best mechanism for such review and comments is to access the Ethics Code draft on the Internet through the APA website (www.apa.org); mechanisms have been established there to log comments in a way that will be directly linked to the respective sections of the document.

Second, a controversial issue considered by COR was the matter of Ethics Adjudication. COR considered, not for action but for informal feedback, a proposal to restrict APA Ethics Office adjudications to cases that could result in expulsion only. While some support was voiced for the proposal, the majority of the feedback was negative. Support was based, broadly speaking, on concern over harassment ethics complaints (most often related to disputed child custody evaluations), a preference for personal hearings on ethics complaints (often impossible or too costly with a centralized national office), and concern that outcomes short of expulsion (typically either censure or reprimand) can have disastrous consequences such as removal from HMO panels or disqualification from service in...
forensic psychology. Opposition was grounded in concerns over uneven state adjudication of ethics cases, the need for uniform and high quality national ethical standards with enforcement to maintain our status as a profession, and a lack of compelling rationale for what many saw as a fundamental alteration in the functioning of the APA Ethics Office. The issue was returned for consideration by the Board of Directors and the Ethics Committee.

COR considered three resolutions related to Assisted Suicide and End-of-Life-Decision, a significant item discussed in our last report. At the August, 2000, COR meeting, the COR approved funding for the continued work of a Working Group on Assisted Suicide and End-of-Life-Decisions (the "Working Group"). That Working Group was charged 1) with examining the role of psychology in end-of-life care and decisions, 2) to address "the invisibility of psychology around the issue of end-of-life decisions and recommend methods to increase the visibility of psychology and the role of psychologists" in this area, and 3) to consider whether APA should take a stand on this contentious issue. As a result of the efforts of this Working Group, COR at this meeting was asked to withdraw an old resolution and was presented with two new resolutions. The old item withdrawn was a resolution on "Physician Assisted Suicide" that called on APA to participate in advancing "knowledge" in the "field of hastened death." The new "Resolution on End-of-Life Issues and Care for Adults" was directed at encouraging attention, discussion, and research toward greater understanding of, greater quality of, and access to, end-of-life care. The motion passed by unanimous consent. The second new motion, the "Resolution on Assisted Suicide," was removed from the consent agenda at the request of one of our divisional representatives, and was the subject of substantial debate throughout the COR meeting. The heart of the debate was directed at the issue of the core meaning of the motion. The resolution itself stated that the APA was not taking a stand on assisted suicide. Objections were raised that by calling for the APA to "Promote psychologists' participation in multidisciplinary teams and ethics committees involved with reviewing end-of-life requests" (which was part of the resolution), the APA could not claim that the resolution was in fact neutral toward the practice of assisted suicide. Supporters disputed the claim that the resolution in any way positioned the APA as approving of or supporting assisted suicide, and emphasized the call of the resolution for reflection and scientific study of the issue. A motion to postpone consideration of the motion was narrowly defeated, and then the original motion passed by a margin of 74–65. Those interested in the specifics of the resolution should contact the Public Interest Directorate of the APA.

The August 2002 Convention to be hosted by the city of Chicago will be shortened to four days and will be scheduled in a more compressed geographical space. Council discussed with concern that while APA membership has increased slowly but steadily for many years, convention attendance has been holding steady, meaning that a steadily smaller percentage of APA members are attending the convention. The shortening of the convention and the attempt to eliminate long treks during the brief periods between sessions are two of the number of changes that are going to encourage greater attendance.

Significant discussion by COR in breakout groups and in full Council focused on identifying the most important priorities for the organization over the next five years.

Some specific issues of action:

- The Guam Psychological Association (11 members) was approved as an affiliate.
- A resolution was passed condemning racial and ethnic profiling by law enforcement and security agencies.
- A violence prevention program comprised of a multimedia campaign and community-based training program called ACT—Adults and Children Together—Against Violence was debuted. The centerpiece of the campaign is a carefully crafted and powerful 30 second commercial that should soon be aired nationally. ACT is a cooperative venture of the APA, the National Association for the Education of Young Children, and the Advertising Council. For more information, contact the Public Interest Directorate of APA or www.ACTagainstviolence.org.