On the eve of my 2007-2008 presidency, I am pondering the state of psychoanalytic psychology and Division 39. Here are my reflections:

**The Good News**
The Division is thriving. Its leadership has been energetic and collaborative. Our painful organizational schisms have faded. We have active sections, hard-working committees, and some remarkably able leaders, whose achievements David Ramirez recently reviewed here. Our membership numbers are stable. We exist comfortably in cyberspace. We had 180 submissions for 60 time slots at the upcoming Spring Meeting. We are a respected presence in APA.

Our journal is read widely, attracts more and more first-rate papers, and is starting (thanks to APA’s electronic database arrangements) to earn income that partially defrays our high annual publication costs. A search committee of distinguished members is actively seeking a successor for our current editor. (See the Publications Committee report on page 79 and the Call for Nominations on page 3.)

While we cannot foresee the consequences for Division 39 of the movement to withhold dues to protest APA’s stand on interrogations, we can be proud of the passionate engagement of members struggling with that issue.

Several recent and impressive meta-analyses attest to the effectiveness of psychodynamic therapies. Many discoveries in neuropsychology are compatible with psychoanalytic concepts, especially with constructivist theories. Eric Kandel, the Nobel Prize-winning neuroscientist, has gone public with his admiration for psychoanalysis.

The recent APA task force on evidence-based practice, on which several of our members worked, has defined “evidence” in ways that respect and protect dynamic and humanistic clinical work. Irving Weiner, a psychodynamic researcher and Division 39 member, has been elected president of the Division of Clinical Psychology (12), suggesting a friendlier atmosphere in that group toward psychoanalytic input. I encourage readers to consider joining Division 12 and contributing to his efforts to include us at that table.

**The Bad News**
In the latest apportionment ballot, Division 39 lost (barely) one of our five representatives on the APA Council. This is particularly unfortunate in light of the fact that overall, these are increasingly hard times for psychoanalytic psychologists.

In most departments of psychology, psychoanalytic ideas, when mentioned at all, are treated dismissively, even derisively. In clinical practice, analytic therapists—like all therapists—endure escalating intrusion by third parties with no stake in clients’ long-term mental health and a big stake in reducing their own short-term costs. The insurance industry has made once-a-week therapy a luxury, and by insisting on behaviorally directed treatment plans, covertly encourages a narrowly defined focus of intervention. Drug studies on the treatment of depression outnumber psychotherapy studies by a ratio of 10:1. Psychoanalytically oriented books are selling poorly, and psychoanalytic publishers are disappearing.

In treatment facilities, doctoral-level psychologists are being replaced by people with less training, and those few psychologists who are hired are being asked to supervise non-doctoral clinicians solely in manualized treatments. Projective (or free-response) testing and narrative-based assessments for treatment planning are rare. Forces beyond our individual control are industrializing therapy and jettisoning the ideal of the examined life. Disciplined introspection and sensitivity to individual differences and intersubjectivity, the skills that analytic therapists spend their professional lives refining, are at best on the edges of the general mental health map.
There was a time when simply being a clinical psychologist implied that one was psychoanalytic. My current graduate students are stunned to learn this. Despite impressive educational backgrounds, some of them have never heard the term “transference.” In psychology programs, students are being told that it is unethical to treat clients with anything but “evidence-based” interventions, and despite the recent EBP task force, most of their teachers have defined evidence strictly in terms of randomized controlled trials (of which there are very few on analytic treatments) and have concluded that psychoanalytic work has no solid basis in evidence. Movements toward explicating “best practices” in psychiatry and psychology show few signs of incorporating psychodynamic practices.

Psychoanalytically friendly internships are disappearing. Institutes where large numbers of professionals once competed for acceptance are grateful for a handful of applicants. Some training programs of the American Psychodynamic Association are surviving only because we sued them twenty years ago (trainees from psychology and social work have offset biological psychiatry’s devastation of their candidate base). Psychology graduates pursuing careers in psychodynamically oriented research face an academic world that views them at best as quaint holdovers, though sometimes they can get a university job by depicting their research interests in carefully non-psychoanalytic terms.

Confidentiality suffers growing incursions by well-intended laws that dissuade people from making uncensored disclosures to a therapist. In the name of accountability—a desirable goal but a hard one to implement without unintended negative consequences—our autonomy has been diminished increment by increment. Like the proverbial frog in progressively hotter water, we adapt to each increase in the temperature of our vocational surround and hope it will eventually cool down. I doubt that it will, but I do not want to get boiled without a struggle.

Recent empirical findings on attachment, affect, mentalization, defense, trauma, and the brain are illuminating areas that analysts have long described... If analytic psychologists do not stay involved in such investigations, future findings will be stated in nonpsychoanalytic language... unprecedented revelations of post-psychoanalytic science.

I have two further initiatives. First, I want to support psychoanalytic research and researchers. Second, I want to cooperate more actively with other psychoanalytic groups. In the next newsletter I will discuss the second initiative. Here are my thoughts on the first.

In our division, psychologists with a core identity as clinicians greatly outnumber those who share a commitment to research. The fact of their minority status contributes to our research-oriented members’ feeling marginalized and unappreciated. They grumble about this regularly, but they also see Division 39 as their natural professional home.

Currently, psychoanalytic researchers are also feeling marginalized and depreciated elsewhere, and they are suffering. Peers in their academic networks denigrate them for being analytic, while many of their analytic colleagues ignore or dismiss their work. Adam Phillips’s recent New York Times op–ed critique of clinical research elicited warm responses from my practitioner friends, who grapple daily with individual nuance that no research program could capture, but it produced a howl of pain on the listserv of the Association for Psychodynamic Research, whose members considered it one more piece of evidence that analytically oriented research is belittled even by the analysts it stands to benefit. There is a place for the spirit of what Phillips hopes to convey, and it does not have to be antithetical to good research.

Two trends have recently widened the longstanding chasm between researchers and practitioners. First, tenure and promotion have become so dependent on grant-funded, time-limited research that it is increasingly difficult to have a significant psychotherapy practice and advance academically. This is a notable change from my student era, when most professors teaching abnormal psychology had ongoing clinical experience and therefore a first-hand, in-depth understanding of the world of the practitioner. At the same time, the rise of professional schools without connections to major research centers has reduced practitioner exposure to, and therefore empathy with, the world of the researcher. Misunderstandings between the two worlds have consequently multiplied—a polarization or “binary” that requires a third angle of vision, one I am groping toward here.

I have spent my career trying to amplify the voice of the practitioner in professional and public arenas. As someone with a primarily therapeutic calling, I share the exasperation of my clinical colleagues at the limitations of most efficacy research, with its cherry-picked patients, acceptance of DSM
CALL FOR NOMINATIONS

The Division of Psychoanalysis (39) is seeking nominations for the editor of its quarterly journal Psychoanalytic Psychology.

The nominee should be grounded in psychoanalytic scholarship and research, theoretically inclusive and creative in scope. The candidate should be an APA member and have a solid background in writing as well as basic computer skills. Prior editorial experience is preferred. The position requires stamina, discretion in dealing with authors and a capacity to work with reviewers and APA staff in the production of the journal.

Psychoanalytic Psychology receives approximately 125 manuscripts annually. The incoming editor will be editor–elect beginning August 2007 and will assume full responsibility for the journal in January 2008.

Candidates are nominated by accessing APA’s EditorQuest site on the Web. Using your Web browser, go to http://editorquest.apa.org. Click on the link “Submit a Nomination,” enter the nominee’s information and click “Submit.” Deadline for accepting nominations is February 15, 2007, when reviews will begin.
reifications, oversimplification of subtlety and complexity, use of novice therapists instructed to follow protocols, and other features that make such procedures not even remotely comparable to practice in the real world. It is easy to feel that the researchers have gotten all the words and none of the music of psychotherapy.

Yet, as Sidney Blatt, Drew Westen, Beatrice Beebe, Mark Hilsenroth and many others have demonstrated, meaningful, clinically relevant psychoanalytic research is not only possible, it is critical to our survival. Such researchers have earned our respect and deserve to succeed. I think I see signs that appreciation for them is building in Division 39, as the rest of us realize that if we are to change any of the conditions I am lamenting, indeed, if analytic practices are to survive at all, we need them.

Recent empirical work on attachment, affect, mentalization, defense, trauma, and the brain are illuminating areas that analysts have long described via hypothesis and metaphor. If analytic psychologists do not stay involved in such investigations, future findings will be stated in nonpsychoanalytic language and touted as unprecedented revelations of post-psychoanalytic science. This phenomenon is already well advanced and has created a climate in which the first question many prospective clients ask is whether we do CBT; word on the Net is that no other approaches are scientifically supported. If only for the most practical of reasons, we need to keep making connections between empirical findings and our theories, just as we need to keep revising our theories in light of empirical findings.

Serious researchers, even psychodynamic ones, are valued in university communities. Simply by their presence, psychoanalytic empiricists preserve the legitimacy of analytic ideas in departments of psychology. And psychology departments are the wellspring of our membership. Division 39, an unusual psychoanalytic association by virtue of belonging to APA, depends on a regular influx of bright, creative psychology students who fall in love with psychoanalytic ideas.

It has been mostly psychologists who have captured the imagination of the present generation of analytic practitioners. In the last two decades we have watched as the relational movement infuses the psychoanalytic world with new energy. The future Stephen Mitchells may not materialize, however, if most psychology students go elsewhere because they have been persuaded that research support for psychoanalytic work is negligible, and if that conviction has created a professional world in which analytic practice is unrewarding.

Mental health policy is not made by practicing therapists who are isolated and unrepresented in public debates about healthcare. And questions of funding and policy are not influenced by arguments that begin “I had a patient who . . .” When policy wonks want help framing legislation, they go to departments of psychiatry and psychology and ask about cutting-edge research. If we want to influence the conditions under which we practice and to preserve the best aspects of our own careers for the next generation, we need a respected psychodynamic voice in the places where policy makers find their data.

**Implications and Invitations**

I am not yet sure what a divisional effort to support psychodynamic researchers and research will entail. I have begun talking with our younger members pursuing academic careers. William Gottdiener has assembled a panel of researchers to discuss at the Toronto meetings whether and how psychoanalytic research can survive in departments of psychology. Next year I will work with Sidney Blatt to bring some internationally recognized psychodynamic scientists to the 2008 Spring Meeting. Drew Westen has offered a “Meet the Researcher” hour, in which he will address concerns of early-career research psychologists. If they respond to this opportunity, other researchers could do this in subsequent conferences.

If Division 39 were wealthy, I would be trying to commit a hefty sum to grants for psychoanalytic research. Perhaps some members with fund-raising expertise could launch such a project; volunteers are welcome! There may also be opportunities here for collaboration with the American Psychoanalytic Association. I invite ideas about how to translate this research initiative from theory into practice.

I have come to believe that our survival as a clinical profession—one whose services are available to more than the wealthy few—depends on a strong psychodynamic presence in the psychology research community and on our capacity to say, believably, that our work is supported by many sophisticated empirical studies, studies that investigate psychotherapy as it is actually practiced. Let me return to our friend Eric Kandel, as quoted last spring in an online *Newsweek* interview:

> People have lost confidence in whether or not [psychoanalysis] works. I think it’s going to go down the tubes if the psychoanalytic community doesn’t make a serious effort to verify its concepts and show which aspects of therapy work, under what conditions, for what patients and with which therapists. ([www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11904316/site/newsweek/](http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11904316/site/newsweek/))

Few of us have the temperament to be good researchers. Most of us were drawn to our vocation by the desire to do therapy, not the desire to do empirical evaluations of therapy. But if we fail to support those who labor in the academic trenches to do the work that supports our own work, we will pay dearly.
Harry Sands 1917-2007

Harry Sands, died January 3, 2007. He is survived by his devoted wife of 61 years, Helene, his two sons, Jeff and Rick, and a wonderful extended family. He fought a valiant struggle against illnesses that eventually overcame him and, true to his lifelong attitude, maintained a cheerful and optimistic outlook until the very end. His fortitude echoed the amazing determination that he possessed his entire life, considering he hurdled with grace over extreme physical boundaries since birth—boundaries that most people would consider barriers. He had an unusually gifted ability to bring people together. He was a friend, colleague and “second father” to many, and he will be greatly missed.

The combination of the various positions he held was a model for all. His career encompassed research, teaching, practice and advocacy. He began independent practice in psychotherapy in 1952, and was actively engaged in practice advocacy and training issues from the very beginning of his career. He trained as a psychoanalyst at the Postgraduate Center for Mental Health (PCMH). While there, he trained a generation of postdoctoral psychologists, social workers, and psychiatrists in psychoanalysis. He served there as chief executive officer from 1979 to 1988, later became a trustee and member of the executive committee. The legacy of his passion and commitment to people through psychology continues today, with the dedication of the PCMH’s Community Residence I in June 2006, “The Harry Sands Residence.”

He was a member of the organizing committee for the College of Professional Practice and was later elected to the college’s board. In 1985, he served as president of the New York State Psychological Association (NYSPA), and then represented NYSPA on APA’s Council of Representatives from 1988 to 1991.

Early in his career, he worked with, and wrote extensively about, the social and emotional problems of persons with epilepsy. Among his later publications, he co-edited a book, with James Barron, Impact of Managed Care on Psychodynamic Treatment (international Universities Press, 1996); and was co-author, with Gary Ahlskog, of The Guide to Pastoral Counseling and Care (Psychosocial Press, 2000).

His awards and honors include AAP’s Outstanding Advocate for Psychology Award (1997), the National Academies of Practice Distinguished Practitioner in Psychology Award (1995) and the APF Gold Medal Award for Lifetime Achievement in the Practice of Psychology (1995).

Hans Strupp 1922-2006

Hans Hermann Strupp, internationally renowned psychotherapy researcher and clinical psychologist, died on Thursday October 5, 2006. He is survived by his wife, Lottie Metzger Strupp; daughters, Karen Strupp of Houston, TX, Barbara Strupp of Ithaca, NY; brother, Werner Strupp of Bethesda, MD; as well as numerous grandchildren.

Dr. Strupp was born in Germany, but his family fled the Nazi regime in 1939 and settled in Washington, D.C. He received his doctoral degree in psychology from George Washington University in 1954. After completing his formal education, he accepted his first academic position in the Medical School at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill in 1957, where he taught until 1966, when he joined the faculty of Vanderbilt University. In 1976, he became Distinguished Professor and he held that position until his retirement in 1994.

Early in his research career he identified the important role of the therapist’s personal reactions in determining the quality of therapeutic process and the eventual outcome of treatment. His research findings and theoretical/clinical writings helped move contemporary psychoanalytic theory in a more interpersonally oriented direction. His pioneering research on psychotherapy process and outcome quickly won him worldwide recognition. Dr. Strupp was one of those rare clinical psychologists who were master clinicians and teachers as well as leading researchers. His clinical work, teaching, and research were psychoanalytically informed and, in turn, his scholarly writings have enriched the thinking and clinical work of countless psychoanalytic therapists.

Dr. Strupp held more than 15 editorial positions and has received numerous awards and honors, including the Harvie Branscomb Distinguished Professorship at Vanderbilt University in 1985 and the Earl Sutherland Prize for Achievement in Research at Vanderbilt in 1987. In 1981, he received APA’s Distinguished Scientific Contribution Award and in 1987, the Distinguished Professional Contribution to Knowledge Award. He was the author of many books and articles, including (with co-author Jeff Binder) Psychotherapy in a New Key (Basic Books, 1984) and Psychotherapy for Better or Worse (Jason Aronson, 1978).

He was a wonderful husband and father, friend to many, and cherished mentor to generations of graduate students. All who knew him will miss Dr. Strupp. Those who knew him well will especially miss his wisdom and wit, always delivered in his unmistakable sonorous voice.
FROM THE EDITOR

I was struck in reading President McWilliams inaugural column the extent to which her observations and concerns are echoed in the other contributions to this issue. An important focus of the column and her tenure as president is to promote the value of psychoanalytic research; and this issue celebrates (pp. 8-11) one of our more prominent research members, Sidney Blatt, who has contributed significantly to establishing the value and utility of psychoanalytic research for the clinician as well as the academic. Also note that John Auerbach et al.’s edited volume in tribute to Dr. Blatt is also reviewed (pp. 37-39).

Early in her column, Nancy touts the “good news” of the increasing visibility of the Division; and she later addresses the increasing opportunities for collaboration and cooperation with other psychoanalytic organizations. Regarding the former, the list of books written (or edited) by Division members (p. 36) should serve as testimony to our members’ success in the wider psychoanalytic world. The publication of the second volume of *Relational Psychoanalysis* (reviewed pp. 46-51) also suggests the particular importance of Division 39 members’ contributions to advances in psychoanalytic theory and clinical work. Marilyn Jacobs (pp. 32-34) recounts the recent symposium at the Austrian Embassy that took place with the active participation of the Psychoanalytic Consortium organizations. This issue also carries quite a number of reports from Sections and Local Chapters (pp. 84-88) that ably reflects the vibrancy of our component groups. Division 39 members, especially members of Section IX, played an important role in shaking the conscience of our parent organization concerning psychologist participation in interrogation of detainees at Guantánamo and other centers around the world where individuals are held as “enemy combatants” (without the rights of either prisoners of war or criminals, without even a process for determining their status). Steven Reisner’s article (pp. 23-29) summarizes the attempts over the last year to expose this issue and to move APA toward a more ethical stance concerning psychologist participation in these detention centers. Although his is not exactly “good news,” the article does reflect the importance of our members being heard in the wider organization.

There are a number of articles that expand on Nancy’s “bad news,” including Peter Zelles (pp. 30-31) warning about the impact on patients and the conduct of psychotherapy as medical privacy becomes increasingly constrained and increasingly at the service of Big Business and Big Pharma. There are also two reviews of books on the problems and deficiencies of psychoanalytic training: *Jurgen Reeder’s Hate and Love in Psychoanalytic Institutes* (pp. 60-61) and Richard Raubolt’s *Power Games: Influence, Persuasion and Indoctrination in Psychotherapy Training* (pp. 65-66).

Another piece of bad news is the loss of a Council seat. By my calculations, it appears that fewer than 1,000 APA members gave any votes to Division 39, even though we have over 3,000 members. I would suggest that we have to do a better job of getting out the vote in next year’s balloting.

Finally, I would also note that this issue has two death notices of valued Division members (p. 5), Harry Sands and Hans Strupp. I would like to thank Ruth Ochroch and Josh Williams who helped compose the Sands obituary, and Jeff Binder who contributed to the write-up of Hans Strupp’s obituary.
On Clinical Momentum: Time, Process, and Complexity in Psychoanalytic Engagement

APRIL 18–22, 2007 • TORONTO, ONTARIO

The multiplicity of perspectives now entertained by psychoanalysis can generate a cornucopia of views on what we might call “clinical momentum.” Attempts to give expression to complex experience challenge received understandings about what, in our ways of being with others and with ourselves, propels the forward motion of clinical engagement. The contemporary affinity for uncertainty, interest in complexity, and appreciation of each treatment’s unique flux, moment by moment and through protracted time, seize our attention.

Our featured panels will represent multiple perspectives that highlight the dynamic elements that contribute to clinical momentum—those elements that capture the moving and evolving dynamism of experience as it filters into awareness such as interpretation, enactment, emotional creativity, disclosure, rupture and repair, “present” moments and the linking of affective and/or bodily states and neurobiology. We will also be presenting panels that consider applied research and the intersection between clinic and culture.

KEYNOTE SPEAKERS:
Adrienne Harris, Ph.D. and Irwin Z. Hoffman, Ph.D.

CO-CHAIRS: Hazel Ipp, Ph.D. and Judi Kobrick, Ph.D.

Continuing Education Master Classes on Wednesday, April 18 open to all mental health professionals. Continuing Education Credit also offered during the conference.
Sidney J. Blatt Receives Mary S. Sigourney Award

Sidney J. Blatt, Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology, and Chief of the Psychology Section in the Department of Psychiatry at Yale University has received the Mary S. Sigourney Award for distinguished contributions to psychoanalytic theory and research. The Sigourney Award, considered the most distinguished international award for contributions to psychoanalysis, includes a prize of $50,000.

Blatt’s research at Yale over the past 40 years has been based on the assumption that many psychiatric disorders are not separate diseases, but disturbances derived from disruptions of normal psychological development—specifically, disruptions of the capacity for interpersonal relatedness and in the formation of a coherent and essentially positive sense of self. Blatt demonstrated how a) these two fundamental psychological processes, interpersonal relatedness and self-definition, evolve synergistically over the life cycle from infancy to senescence, b) moderate variations in emphasis on these two fundamental developmental dimensions define two normal personality types who, as extensive research indicates, experience and engage life differently, and c) extreme deviations in this developmental process—excessive preoccupations with one dimension to the neglect of the other—define two primary configurations of psychopathology that encompass many forms of psychopathology. Unlike conventional psychiatric views of mental disorders, Blatt’s conceptualizations are based on the identification of structural similarities and basic interrelationships among various forms of psychological disturbance. The validity of these formulations has been demonstrated by empirical research indicating that these two groups of patients can be differentiated reliably from each other, are differentially responsive to different types of therapeutic intervention, and change in different, but equally desirable ways, in both brief and long-term intensive treatment.

Blatt and his colleagues also developed methods for systematically assessing changes in the structural cognitive organization and thematic content of mental representations (cognitive-affective schemas) of self and significant others and demonstrated that changes in these dimensions provide understanding of the extent and nature of therapeutic change.

Blatt’s contributions had previously been recognized by awards for distinguished scientific contributions from two divisions of the American Psychological Association (2000, 2004), a division of the Canadian Psychological Association (2006), the American Psychoanalytic Association (2005), the Society for Personality Assessment (1989, 1994) and the Association of Professors of Psychology in Medical Schools (1995).

Also in the News...

In 2005, the Society for Psychotherapy Research honored Mark J. Hilsenroth with the prestigious Outstanding Early Career Award. A summary of Dr. Hilsenroth’s recent work can be found in a recently published article titled “A Programmatic Study of Short-Term Psychodynamic Psychotherapy: Assessment, Process, Outcome, and Training” (Psychotherapy Research 17: 31-45). The article reports on an ingenious “hybrid model” combining efficacy and effectiveness methodology to examine the interrelated issues of psychological assessment, psychotherapy process, treatment outcome, and training of graduate clinicians. In his conclusion to the paper, Mark notes, “the most significant accomplishment regarding the programmatic research I have conducted thus far in my career is in relation to the student involvement and success in these endeavors. [S]tudents working with me have been first author or co-authors on over 50 peer reviewed journal articles… have made over 100 conference presentations at national and international meetings, and several have won awards for their thesis or dissertation research. … I believe it will be the familiarization with the research process and an increased self-efficacy of the students involved with this treatment program that will ultimately prove to be its greatest contribution.” For more information about the Society for Psychotherapy Research, go to www.psychtherapyresearch.org.

The membership of the American Psychoanalytic Association (APsaA) is pleased to announce that Nancy McWilliams will be inducted as honorary member at the association’s Winter 2007 Meeting in January 2007 at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York. The citation honoring her reads (in part): “Nancy McWilliams, PhD, is an author who has contributed greatly to psychoanalytic treatment through her books, Psychoanalytic Diagnosis and Psychoanalytic Case Formulation. She is an Associate Editor of the Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual, an 800-page compendium of psychoanalytic case formulation published in 2006. Dr. McWilliams’ book on case formulation received the Gradiva Award for best psychoanalytic clinical book of 1999.”
I will discuss in these pages something that I have never kept secret, that indeed I have spoken about in professional meetings, but about which I have never written for publication. I was working for Sid Blatt as a research assistant when my father took his life. I mention this here because, although I had been working for Sid for just four months at the time and was really just his new research assistant, he was one of the few people around me who truly understood the pain I suffered through my father’s suicide and who was able to respond to me with something more than platitudes. For his kindness and support at this juncture in my life, I will always be grateful.

Beatrice Beebe

Congratulations for a well-deserved award to a mentor and colleague I have known for over 30 years. I met him on my internship at Yale, at the Connecticut Mental Health Center, 1971-72. We had an immediate affinity for our shared interests in Piaget, Werner, and the integration of developmental studies with psychoanalytic theory. He gave the best class in psychodynamics that I ever took, developing then the core of the theory that has now blossomed. He was a generous mentor, and we have stayed colleagues and friends over the years. Now he is a co-author on my study of the effects of 6-week maternal dependency and self-criticism on 4-month mother-infant face-to-face communication. We have demonstrated that these two key dimensions of maternal personality already shape mother–infant nonverbal communication by 4 months. These ongoing contributions to psychoanalytic research continue to inspire younger colleagues.

Ken Levy

Sid’s contributions to psychology and psychoanalysis should be well known to all who read this newsletter. In addition to being trained as a psychoanalyst, he has conducted extensive research on personality development, psychological assessment, psychopathology, and psychotherapeutic outcomes. He is an expert in the areas of mental representation and internalization, psychological testing and assessment, personality development, depression, schizophrenia, borderline personality, and has brilliantly integrated these interests into the study of psychotherapy process and outcome. He has proposed a personality development model of psychopathology which serves as a viable alternative to the symptom based approach of DSM. He distinguished differences between relational and self-definitional forms of depression (doing so years before cognitive–behavioral theorist and recent prestigious Lasker Award winner Aaron Beck proposed a similar distinction).
Along with his many students and colleagues, he has developed several widely used and well-validated measures for assessing depressive experiences, self-and other representations, and thought disorder. Throughout his career, Sid has been committed to the proposition that it is not only possible but also essential to investigate psychoanalytically derived hypotheses through rigorous empirical science. Equally important is that, in those 40 plus years, he has been committed to training students who also hold to the perspective that psychoanalytic ideas can be validated and refined through empirical testing. His genuine interests and enthusiasm for psychology is infectious and inspiring and his keen clinical insights have been a great inspiration to many.

Like so many others who have worked with Sid, I have been deeply influenced by his humanity. He has been personally important in my development; and I have felt so very fortunate and privileged to have worked with him. Over the last two decades, he has acted as a mentor, through teaching and instruction, through encouragement and faith, but most of all, through example. He is a remarkable example of how to combine clinical insights with academic scholarship and similarly how to integrate research findings into clinical work and teaching. He has also been an important friend. Working with Sid and knowing him has contributed to powerful evolution in my sense of personal efficacy, my capacity for intimacy, and my facility to parlay my interests in a productive direction. Sid has provided warm support, encouragement, advice, and compassion. His example has been a beacon and helped me to aspire for myself. He has shown me how to be tough-minded and focused while being deeply related and caring. He has shown me how to integrate and achieve both professional and personal goals. I am deeply grateful and truly appreciative for all that he has done on my behalf and on behalf of the field. I am a better clinician, researcher, and person for having known Sid.

PAUL WACHTEL

Congratulations to Sid for an honor so richly deserved. I have been enriched by Sid’s thinking and his talents in so many ways, they are difficult to enumerate. I first encountered Sid as an awestruck first year graduate student at Yale. Sid was my mentor then, as he was throughout my time in graduate school. I served as his research assistant, took his courses, and, when it was time to do my internship, interned at YPI (Yale Psychiatric Institute), where Sid had moved over from the psychology department just in time to enrich my education even more. At YPI in particular, I had the opportunity to experience Sid’s uncanny clinical acumen. Going over a Rorschach with Sid was an experience probably not unlike what it might have been like to discuss a musical score with Mozart.

When it came time to write my dissertation, it seemed only natural for Sid to be my mentor there too (I actually got
my PhD from Blatt University, not from Yale). In that capacity, I got to experience still another side of Sid’s extraordinary talents. Few people in our field are able to address the richness and complexity of psychoanalytic ideas in a manner that is both scientifically rigorous and true to the ideas themselves. Sid is one of the wonderful exceptions. His contributions have been massive and diverse, but it is probably his exploration of the distinction between anaclitic and introjective modalities that has been his best known contribution. From new understandings of development and personality dynamics, to ways of making sense of psychotherapy outcome data that rise to levels not originally seen in the data, to the ways in which what might seem like arcane matters of psychoanalytic theory relate to the most profound philosophical questions about human beings as both uniquely individuated and powerfully bonded and interconnected, Sid has employed this distinction in extraordinarily illuminating ways. A master clinician, thinker, writer, and researcher, Sid represents the very best that our field has to offer.

DAVID ZUROFF

It is a very great pleasure to have the opportunity to write a note of appreciation on the occasion of Professor Sidney Blatt’s receiving this major award recognizing his extraordinary contributions to psychoanalysis. Sid’s work has been so deep and so wide-ranging that many different intellectual portraits could be sketched; there is Sid the psychodiagnostician, Sid the personality theorist, Sid the developmental theorist, Sid the psychopathologist, Sid the psychotherapist, Sid the empiricist, and on and on. To me, the greatest of Sid’s achievements is his creation of a comprehensive, operationalizable theory of personality development that has been a bulwark, a touchstone, and a rallying point against the medical model’s domination of psychology, psychiatry, and related disciplines, and his creation of measurement tools that have permitted this theory to be grounded in the empirical data that have nourished the theory’s continual growth. At a personal level, it has been an incredible privilege to have had Sid as a close friend and collaborator for over 25 years. It has been inspiring to witness the creativity, insight, intellectual brilliance, and enthusiasm that he brings to his work. It has been wonderful to be the recipient of his endless encouragement, support, generosity, and kindness. It has been profoundly educational to share his insights about personality, assessment, and therapy. But, most of all, it has been exhilarating fun to have been in contact with his sharp mind and warm heart. All of the gifts that I have received from my association with Sid have also been received by the psychoanalytic community. He has been a colleague and friend to many, an intellectual beacon to all, and for that he richly merits this year’s Sigourney Award (and probably next year’s as well!).

PSYCHOANALYTIC TRAINING
at the
CHICAGO CENTER FOR PSYCHOANALYSIS

The Chicago Center for Psychoanalysis, a postgraduate training program leading to a Certificate in Psychoanalysis, welcomes applicants who have state licenses in a mental health field (e.g., PhD, PsyD, MD, LCSW, LCPC). Besides state licensure, requirements include malpractice insurance, post-license experience practicing psychoanalytic psychotherapy, and two years of either personal psychoanalytic psychotherapy or one year of a personal analysis. Once accepted, candidates who have not begun a personal analysis must do so before taking their first class.

- WE OFFER A CONTEMPORARY CURRICULUM that encompasses multiple theoretical perspectives. The Center has no single point of view but is dedicated to teaching all of the major contemporary psychoanalytic narratives, including but not limited to, classical Freudian drive theory, ego psychology, object relations theory, self psychology, interpersonal theory and intersubjective theory.

- COURSES ARE SCHEDULED ON THE QUARTER SYSTEM, and take place either downtown weekly in the evenings or in intensive weekend seminars. Training is focused on theories of development, psychopathology, clinical theories and case conferences.

- THE SUPERVISED TREATMENT OF THREE PSYCHOANALYTIC CASES is also required. WE ARE ESPECIALLY PROUD OF OUR CUTTING EDGE FACULTY which includes many of the best from the Chicago analytic community and also draws internationally famous psychoanalysts, many of whom are authors of contemporary theory. Among those who have served or are serving as instructors are: Mark Berger, Jessica Benjamin, Hedda Bolgar, Bertram Cohler, Jody Messler Davies, Darlene Ehrenberg, Lawrence Friedman, Glen Gabbard, John Gedo, Merton Gill, Jay Greenberg, Michael Hoit, Irwin Hoffman, Frank Lachmann, James Fosshage, Kenneth Newman, Donna Orange, Fred Pine, Owen Renik, Roy Schafer, Frank Summers, Johanna Tabin, Arnold Tobin, Marian Tolpin, Leon Wurmser and Elisabeth Young-Bruehl.

- FLEXIBILITY IS THE HALLMARK OF THIS PROGRAM, one of the first in the nation to have a truly interdisciplinary group of candidates and faculty. Part-time candidacy is optional at the discretion of the Admissions Committee, and the Center accepts applications for admission throughout the year.

- WE ALSO OFFER ADJUNCTIVE EDUCATION COURSES AND REDUCED FEE PSYCHOANALYSIS FOR THE COMMUNITY AT LARGE. For further information about the Chicago Center for Psychoanalysis, call (312) 986-1187 or visit our Web site

www.chicagocenterforpsychoanalysis.org
An interdisciplinary perspective can offer powerful insights into the deeper fundamental mechanisms of human nature. . . psychoanalysis can . . . benefit from forging links with other disciplines that also attempt to more deeply understand the human experience.

In a number of works I have suggested that an interdisciplinary perspective can offer powerful insights into the deeper fundamental mechanisms of human nature, and that psychoanalysis can greatly benefit from forging links with other disciplines that also attempt to more deeply understand the human experience. Echoing this integrative perspective, Joe Bobrow, at the Psychoanalytic Institute of Northern California, provides a succinct but effective and creative overarching synthesis of fundamental concepts that lie at the core of both contemporary psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism. Throughout the essay he weaves together the developmental and clinical psychoanalytic construct of mentalization (the critical capacity to reflect on internal mental as well as psychobiological affective states) with mindfulness meditation (the nonjudgmental awareness of present-moment mental, emotional, and somatic stimuli). And at the same time, he attempts to link this integration to current advances in attachment theory, neuropsychoanalysis, and neuroscience.

The concept of mentalization has been greatly expanded in the important contributions of attachment theory to developmental psychoanalysis (Fonagy et al., 2002). As Fonagy, others, and myself have argued, attachment is essentially an intersubjective affective process. Yet, this fundamental evolutionary mechanism of affect communication and regulation is the source generator of not only more complex emotional and social processes, but also more complex cognitive functions, such as mentalization. Current psychoanalytic models of development thus describe “cognitive development as spontaneously blossoming from the affective nucleus” (Andrade, 2005, p. 677). This development, which is facilitated by the intersubjective affective communications between mother and infant and by the affect regulatory mechanisms that lie at the core of the bodily–based attachment relationship, includes the experience–dependent emergence of a more complex cognitive–affective ability to reflect upon one’s own and other’s mental states. As Bobrow suggests, current advances in developmental psychoanalysis clearly suggest a commonality in the somatically focused attentional processes of mentalization and mindfulness.

In a recent volume (Schore, 2003), I cited Brown’s (1993) observation: “Adult affective development is the potential for self-observation and reflection on the very processes of mental functioning.” This involves not simply the affective content of experience but the very processes by which affect comes into experience—how it is experienced by the self and what informs the self about its relationship to internal and external reality. This developmental process appears early in securely attached infants, and is further developed in the psychotherapeutic context in the expression of “disciplined conscious reflection on affective processes.”

Throughout the essay Bobrow argues that another point of convergence between Zen meditation and psychoanalytic mentalization processes is a commonality of psychic structure. Clearly, both involve not the verbal, linguistic, rational, analytic conscious mind, but rather the nonverbal, holistic, unconscious mind. Thus, both operate in the realm of affectively driven, bodily–based survival functions of the right brain, the biological substrate of the human unconscious (Schore, 1994, 2003). Indeed three current studies demonstrate “a right hemispheric dominance for mentalizing” (defined as the capacity to detect the intentions of others) (Ohnishi et al., 2004), right hemispheric activity in mentalizing (defined as self-awareness and taking the perspective of others) (Moriguchi et al., in press), and the critical role of the right hemisphere for insight (Mendeza & Shapiro, 2005). In the following, I expand upon Bobrow’s neurobiological speculations on the common neurobiological systems that underlie both mentalization and mindfulness.

In a number of writings (e.g., Schore, 1994, 2003), I have described how the orbitofrontal (ventromedial) regions of the right hemisphere that are directly shaped by attachment experiences are essential to self-reflective function. This executive control system of the entire right brain acts as a “thinking part of the emotional brain” and is thereby critical to the processing of affect-related meanings. Because its activity is associated with a lower threshold for awareness of sensations of both external and internal origin, it operates as an internal reflecting and organizing agency, and its adaptive role in “self-reflective awareness” allows the individual to
reflect on his or her own internal emotional states as well as others. I also proposed that in light of recent interest of neuroscience in the “mind’s eye,” the psychobiological operations of the right orbitofrontal system represent the “subjective lens of the mind’s eye.” This same right hemispheric lens is accessed in therapeutic mentalization and in the altered states of meditative practice.

Furthermore, recent studies indicate: the right orbitofrontal cortex is critical to interoception, the implicit subjective evaluation of the physiological condition of the body and the differentiation of an affect associated with a bodily feeling (Craig, 2003); the right anterior insular cortex supports a representation of visceral responses accessible to awareness, providing a substrate for subjective feeling states (Critchley et al., 2004); and individual differences in subjective interoceptive awareness, and by extension emotional depth and complexity, are expressed in the degree of expansion of the right anterior insula and adjacent orbitofrontal cortices (Craig, 2004). This interoceptive awareness operates in meditative mindfulness as well as in the patient’s burgeoning capacity to mentalize and in the therapist’s intuitive ability to reflect upon somatic countertransferential bodily-based responses (somatic markers) to the patient’s nonverbal unconscious communications (Schore, 2005). Because of the extensive connections of the right orbitofrontal cortex into the autonomic nervous system, I suggest that both mentalization and mindfulness reflect activity of the energy-conserving right-lateralized parasympathetic ventral vagal system. This right brain cortical–subcortical system underlies Bobrow’s description of Milner’s assertion that the clinician’s “concentration of the body” depends upon an attention to her bodily sensations while simultaneously listening to the patient’s narrative.”

I have also previously suggested an isomorphism between the right hemisphere and unconscious implicit self, and the left hemisphere and conscious explicit self. This translates to a right brain Winnicottian true self, and a left brain false self. The different operations of these two systems bear directly upon Bobrow’s characterization of the Zen principle that only with “forgetting the self” “can we come to ourselves and find intimacy with others.” The right brain researcher Vadim Rotenberg (2004) summarizes a large body of evidence to conclude that the left frontal pole builds a “pragmatically convenient but simplified and restricted model of reality” while “the function of the symmetrical structure of the right hemisphere is a simultaneous capture of an infinite number of connections and the formation of an integral, but ambiguous… context.” In the right hemispheric mode the whole is determined by the interconnections between its elements that interact with each other. This right brain type of thinking (and not the linear, sequential processing of the left) “is the highest human mental function, responsible for creativity and integration of past, present, and future experience” (p. 864). In a similar conceptualization, Wheeler, Stuss, and Tulving (1997) state that the right frontal cortex is critical to “the ability to mentally travel through time”—the capacity to mentally represent and become aware of subjective experiences in the past, present, and future.” The right brain functions of mentalization and mindfulness thus both represent the right frontal area’s capacity to consider the self’s extended existence throughout time.

Even more specifically, a recent magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) study of experienced Buddhist Insight meditation practitioners demonstrated that both years of practice and change in respiration rate (a physiological measure of cumulative meditation experience) were correlated with increased cortical thickness in the right and not left hemisphere (Lazar et al., 2005). This cortical remodeling was most extensive in the right insula, a structure essential to bodily attention and increased visceral awareness, and the right medial frontal cortex, an area involved in the integration of emotion and cognition.

Another recent study of “mystical experience” may reflect what Bobrow terms “no-mind.” Citing work in what is now known as “spiritual neuroscience,” Beauregard and Paquette (2006) report the neural correlates of the state in which the individual experiences “the sense of having touched the ultimate ground of reality, the experience of timelessness and spacelessness, the sense of union with humankind and the universe, as well as feelings of positive affect, peace, joy and unconditional love.” Functional magnetic resonance imaging of this experience revealed activation of the right medial orbitofrontal cortex responsible for the positive affective experience and the right parietal area reflecting “a modification of the body schema associated with the impression that something greater than the subjects seemed to absorb them” (Beauregard et al., 2006, p. 189).

In his groundbreaking volume, Zen and the Brain, Austin (1998) presented a positron emission tomography (PET) scan during a period of relaxed awareness. The author describes this state: “I was resting, letting go of thoughts, concentrating on the movements of abdominal breathing. Aware. No koan” (p. 282). In this “nonverbal state of mental and physical relaxation, of external visual and auditory blockage, and of awareness simplified” the PET scan shows a preponderance of activity on the right side of the brain. For those of you with a copy of my “blue book” (Schore, 2003), notice Figure A-16, showing more red and reduced metabolic activity on the right side of the scan.

In closing, I would like to announce that I have recently taken the position of Senior Editor of the Norton Series on Interpersonal Neurobiology. I’ll be looking for manuscripts that integrate updated clinical psychoanalytic models with current advances in neuroscience.
References


Allan N. Schore
anschore@aol.com
In this essay, I explore the interplay of psychoanalysis and Buddhism, their practices, theories and worldviews. They are different, of course; psychoanalysis is concerned with personal integration while Buddhism involves a quest for direct knowledge of the meaning of our living and dying (our essential nature). I do not make an amalgam, and I consider divergences as instructive as areas of overlap. I describe how elements of each are already in dialogue, which is facilitating cross-fertilization of theories of mind and their impact on what we do in the analytic encounter. The ideas I explore cluster around mentalization, mindfulness, and no-mind.

Mentalization, or reflective function (Fonagy, 2000) refers to the capacity to reflect on mental states and to understand and interpret human conduct in terms of the states of mind that underlie it. Mindfulness refers to Buddhist mindfulness meditation, a core practice in the Theravada school of Buddhism (‘Teachings of the Elders’) whose classical approach emphasizes the importance of bare awareness of mental, emotional, and somatic states as the path to see into, unhitch and de-condition from desires and attachments and liberate oneself from the delusive self-structures and suffering they engender. It originated in India with the historical Buddha Gautama, also called Shakyamuni, and reached prominence in Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam, and Burma. “No–mind” refers to a teaching of the Mahayana school (‘Great Vehicle’) which developed in India and tended to emphasize practices which facilitate direct experience of our essential nature, beyond dualistic concepts such as self and no-self and self and other, and the embodiment of this realization in daily living. Personal liberation is seen here as arising in concert with, and for the benefit of, all beings. Mahayana Buddhism spread throughout China, Korea, Vietnam, Japan and Tibet, reaching particular form in Zen and Vajrayana Buddhism. Teachings and practices from both Theravada and Mahayana schools have taken root in the West where they are co-mingling, creating a pluralism analogous to the current psychoanalytic scene.

**Convergence**

The convergence between Buddhist meditation and psychoanalytic research may be succinctly expressed as follows: it is not primarily what we experience, painful or pleasurable as it may be, that determines our well being. Rather, it is the extent to which we are able to attend to that experience and make it meaningful. As Fonagy has pointed out, the capacity to reflect fruitfully on experience is correlated with the quality of primary attachment relationships. The more secure, the more possible to reflect upon, bear, and learn from even the most painful experience. This capacity is shaped in turn by the caregiver’s ability to mentalize or reflect on his own states of mind. A key ingredient in this intergenerational process is the caregiver’s ability to hold the baby *in mind as someone with a mind of her or his own, someone with intentions, mental states (coalescing bundles of emotions, thoughts, and bodily sensations) beliefs, and desires. This appears to be at the heart of the caregiver’s ability to recognize, attend, and respond in a transformational way to the infant’s mental, emotional, and somatic states.* Schore (2003) details how neurobiological development, attachment, and human emotional and attentional capacities evolve in concert. Bion’s notions of containment, reverie, and alpha function, which lead to the capacity to “think,” Winnicott’s holding environment, and Sandler’s concept of safety are analogous though not identical to reflective function.

*When we think of “presence,” we tend to think of the “relationship” side of what the analyst provides, general factors such as empathy, concern, and interest, in contrast to his interpretive activity. When we think of the phrase “presence of mind,” we imagine someone who’s cool under pressure, not driven by blind impulse, able to tolerate complexity and uncertainty without jumping to conclusions, a good person to have around in a crisis. Or perhaps we imagine a state of mind, receptive yet durable, that reflects equanimity and patience, a state from which we respond in accord with circumstances. The functioning and exercise of presence of mind needn’t be limited to problem-solving; it can have, in and of itself, salutary effects. It implies a container of sorts, that is, presence, and a substance or contained, that is, mind. However, it is less a thing than the absence of reactivity, and suggests at once strength, responsiveness, and equanimity. Does presence derive its benefits, even its very meaning, from*
a certain absence? What about the homonym, “presents?” Is it something that bestows a growthful influence on those who come into contact with it? Is it implicit in the process of giving? Although we may talk about something, say, ultimate reality in Zen or a troubling affect in analysis, each process places value on the muffin fresh out of the oven, embodied, “presented” in living form, not simply talked about abstractly.

The capacity for attentiveness that is enduring, pliable, and able to recognize and respond flexibly in accord with changing (even traumatic) circumstances is a quality that cuts across child development, and the relationship and attentional field between patient and analyst (Schore, 2003) and, not surprisingly, mediator and spiritual teacher. It is an aim of psychoanalysis as well as the means to the aim. Presence of mind reflects not only a way of being and communicating with others but also a way of regarding the processes and contents of one’s own mind. It isn’t just instrumental; it has—in and of itself—healing, enlivening or, in Buddhist parlance, awakening properties. It conveys love and insight, compassion and wisdom. It represents not just the content of consciousness but the quality of consciousness at play. Perhaps it can’t be “given” after all, because that would make the receiver quite self-conscious, but it can be lived together and retrospectively feels like a gift.

Let’s look at some implications of this convergence. Dissatisfaction, pain, loss, and trauma are inherent in living. However, whether these result in anguish, torment, disability, or are integrated into a life of growth and creativity depends on particular attentional capacities and their deployment. We are what we make of what we’re dealt, but what we construct is contingent on a particular aspect of what we are dealt, namely provision of conditions for developing the ability to attend. To grow this capacity, to develop a mind of our own, we paradoxically need access to the mind of an “other.” In Fonagy’s view, the infant finds himself in the mind of the other, as in Winnicott, the infant finds himself in the eyes and expression of the other. A self (or we might say a mind) is “born of illusion because mother and father believe that a self is there and call it into being by their own responsiveness” (Sanville, 1991). The ingredients necessary for the growth of mind privileged by these thinkers are a safe, protective, and responsive environment in which the play of illusion and metaphor can develop (Schore, 2003). Another key ingredient, privileged more in Bion’s account and in Freud’s, is the capacity to tolerate frustration and endure emotional pain. “Standing” (affect regulation) and understanding painful mental states and the self that experiences and suffers them (liberating insight) develop hand in hand.

**Mindfulness**

The equivalent among Buddhist meditators of the psychoanalytic idea of “thinking about” disturbing mental-emotional-somatic states is learning to “sit with” them. Whether or not one is motivated by bodhicitta, the aspiration for liberation, most contemporary Buddhist practitioners spend significant periods of time “sitting with” painful, confusing, conflictual, or not-as-yet-represented affective experience.

In classical mindfulness meditation we cultivate bare attention to the moment-to-moment flux of our mental, emotional, and somatic experience—thoughts, feelings, and bodily sensations, how these interact to produce all variety of states and how we pursue some states and are aversive to others. We take note of our reactions to the texture and rhythms of bare experience, as it is—as it arises and passes, how it bundles together into repetitive versions of “I,” versions which usually include representations of “other” as well. Practitioners cultivate welcoming, non-judgmental awareness of how they constellate and maintain repetitive, affectively charged narratives featuring “me” and “mine” front and center, in positive and negative versions, and how they selectively “attach to” and identify with—indeed construct—these narratives, generating, in the classical view, dissatisfaction and suffering. The “I” that is so constellated is seen into and through and is gradually shed, as a more fluid, less ensnared way of being in the world grows.

If reflective function implies the capacity to understand human behavior in terms of states of mind, then mindfulness practice is quite in accord. This practice, and the growing freedom to observe implicit in it, is also congenial with Bion’s notion of reverie and the analyst’s being unattached to memory, desire and understanding, Keats’ “negative capability,” and Freud’s concepts of evenly hovering attention and free association. This is not just a mental affair; in her seminal 1960 paper British psychoanalyst Marion Milner (1987) described what she called the “concentration of the body,” a way of attending deeply to her bodily sensations while also listening to the content of the patient’s narrative. This was more helpful
in generating capacities for symbolization than clever interpretations. From a neuropsychoanalytic perspective, Schore (2003) writes that “... the therapist’s ability to ... self-regulate ... the stressful alterations in his/her bodily state evoked by the patient’s countertransference communication” is key. Citing Freedman and Lavendar, Schore (p. 30) describes the analyst’s “... reparative withdrawal,” a self-regulating maneuver that allows continued access to a state in which a symbolizing process can take place ...” It is the therapist’s awareness of his/her “... bodily signals and his/her capacity to auto-regulate the disruption in state ...” that literally determines whether the countertransference is destructive or constructive, ‘symbolizing’ or ‘desymbolizing.’” In the most troubling moments, willful attempts to change our state of mind by wriggling free from what is only seems to make things worse and even tightens the vise.

We don’t “sit with it” in a vacuum. Meditating silently together, relationships with fellow practitioners, with the teacher, tradition, and the practice itself—these are supportive and help us self-regulate as we explore more deeply. The ability develops in the doing, and it is simultaneously instrumental—a way to reach an aim such as liberation from suffering—beneficial in and of itself, irrespective of aim or content, and presentational, that is, expressive of intrinsic meaning and value (Bobrow, 1997).

It is not just the technique of attention that is at play but how and to what ends it is used. “Noting” feelings in mindfulness meditation can be done in a mechanical, detached, even obsessional manner, without engaging them at all. To reap the harvest of our experience we have to suffer “properly.” Not masochistically but by allowing (one of the meanings of suffering) in a simultaneously wholehearted and attentive way. This reflects an unconscious choice in Symington, an unconscious decision in Rangell, *zich zu übergeben* or surrendering to the drift of the unconscious in Freud, and a turning toward truth or *teshuvah* in mystical Judaism.

From process, let’s move to bedrock. In classical Buddhism, life is examined through the lenses of *dukkha*, *annica* and *annata*, suffering, impermanence and no-self. “There is suffering” is the first of the Buddha’s Four Noble Truths. Suffering is caused by attachment or clinging to misguided views of who one is and the way things are. Contemporary students of Buddhism frequently confound the term attachment, as meaning clinging to formulations (constructions) of “me” and “mine,” with attachment as the life-giving process of connection so necessary for the growth of the very reflective capacities necessary for meditation practice and inquiry! One way to understand the different uses of the term is to think of the classical Buddhist use as referring to breakdown products and processes of not good-enough attachment and development (we might say that emotional experience becomes unprocessable trauma because of not good enough “othering”), in reaction to which we construct and maintain, often to our detriment, protective and obstructive structures. These reactively generated structures of mind, entrenched, usually unconscious, often in conflict with one another, and sometimes malevolent (and therefore the cause of real anguish and guilt), are the object of Buddhist meditative practice, not the human need for living attachments, which lasts throughout life in evolving forms (Schore, 2003).

Likewise, some Buddhist teachers see therapists and analysts as maintaining and shoring up the “ego,” considered the key factor of delusion and suffering. A confusion of tongues is at play here. They are referring to reactively constructed or precociously developed and cathected mental structures, what Buddhists might call “ego-centered attachments,” not to developed ego capacities or functions which have no need for a self-conscious, rigid “I” in order to function with vigor and creativity.

In the classical Buddhist view too, then, we cannot escape suffering. Rather it is how we meet and engage with suffering, the attentional quality of the encounter, that is key. What contemporary developmental psychology calls rupture is inevitable—so the capacity for repair or transformation is essential. Whether we unwittingly create anguish for ourselves and others or find value and meaning, even transformation and insight, is contingent on how we approach suffering. “Suffering is inevitable, anguish is optional,” is a saying that may seem to trivialize the agonies humans are subject to, but the idea is analogous to the understandings emerging from infant and neurobiological research (Schore, 2003). The capacity to bear affective experience, pleasurable and painful, is a prerequisite for, and a by-product of, understanding, and is front and center in contemporary Buddhism and psychoanalysis alike.

**No–Mind**

There is a paradox at the heart of human experience. We must develop a “feeler” to feel, a “thinker” to think, a “dreamer” to dream—in short, a mind with which to bear and attend fruitfully to the states of mind we encounter, and become capable of learning from them. Yet, when this process is moving along well, there is no thinker, feeler, or dreamer—no mind—apart from the living experience. The subject of mind, a mind of one’s own, is critical, yet we only become aware of it when it doesn’t work well. We could say that the subject is a background function whose concretization is a breakdown product. This is reflected in the quote by Jones, “I do not think that the mind really exists as an entity.” Winnicott (1949) writes of the tendency to localize the mind in the head or elsewhere and describes how the mental apparatus can become an end in itself, a mind object, when
the reciprocal caregiver–infant mutuality goes awry and the mental capacities of the infant have to take over prematurely to ensure survival.

The mind that “cannot be grasped” is, in Winnicott’s words, not “localized” in time or space. The meaning of the word sesshin (a Zen retreat) is to touch the mind, to perceive and convey the mind. In Zen, mind is empty. Not vacuous but void of absolute or permanent material; a field of potentiality. Our conceptions about reality form a discursive veil that obscures it. Although the mind has no thing in it, it breathes, sits down, stands up, goes to sleep, shops, gets sick, laughs, and weeps. When we look closely we can’t find a static entity, we can’t find an agent. If such is found, there has been a derailment or, in Zen terms, we have fallen into ignorance or delusion.

A mind that is empty is, by virtue of this very quality, interconnected. Minds ‘interare.’ This is in accord with Fonagy’s model and Bion’s reformulation of Klein’s ideas on projective identification to reflect an unconscious communicational field, function, and motive (see Schore, 2003). The Buddhist image is the Jewel Net of Indra (Cleary, 1983). Each being, sentient or not, is a point in a vast net in which there are mirrors at each knot. Each point reflects and contains every other point of the web, not unlike the hologram. It is precisely because the self and the mind have no absolute substance that we are interconnected and multicentered selves. We cannot say “wrapping paper” without saying tree, branches, rain, sun, earth, lumberjack, storekeeper. This is because that is. The Buddha called this paticc samuppada, mutual causality, or dependent co-arising. To come alive is to realize this interpenetration. In realizing our own essential nature, we realize the nature of all things.

This field, the fundamental ground of Hua-Yen Buddhism, described in lyrical detail in the Avatamsaka Sutra written about two thousand years ago (Cleary, 1983), doesn’t function in the abstract. Analysts will recognize it in the unconscious emotional field. This field has deep roots in our neurobiology and puts human flesh on Indra’s existential net. The “formless field of benefaction” of Zen, has modern echoes in the interactive dyadic intersubjective field of synchrony with its reciprocal, mutual regulation (Schore, 2003).

In Zen, emptiness and interdependence co-arise with intimacy. This is at once the mind essence, the aim of practice, and the way to its realization. Yet none of these distinctions are required for its presence. It characterizes the spontaneous and illuminating dialogues between Zen teacher and student:


Freud’s distinction between psychical and material reality set the stage for psychoanalysis, and remains central. But what intimacy did Hogen become suddenly aware of? Was it inner? Outer? Sacred? Profane? Empty? Full? Self? Other? Fantasy? Reality? From a Zen perspective we can say that it arose as a fertile field of empty interconnection where he found himself unsnared by any of these dualities. For purposes of discussion, we call it nondualistic. Hogen’s realization wasn’t conceptual however, nor was it “mystical.” Yet he could have presented it very simply and with vivid particularity. Another Zen teacher said, “Morning to evening, I am always intimate with it.” Preoccupation with clinging and “attachment,” or with their resolution, the classical factors of suffering, are absent here.

In Zen, when self-preoccupation and the small self-centeredness that congeals around it fall away, we can know directly (in contrast to knowing about) the intersection, the identity of the personal and the sacred. No longer a container for our anxieties, a projection screen for unbearable aspects of self-experience, or even a facilitating environment, the “other” is none other than the self. Particularity is not sacrificed; things are vividly distinctive. Searching for something “outside,” even meaning, ceases; the “aim” is closer than our own nose. Wallace Stevens (1972) captures this human mystery in his poem “Tea at the Palace of Hoon”:

I was the world in which I walked, and what I saw / Or heard or felt came not but from myself; / And there I found myself more truly and more strange.

The apparent paradox is that, only with “forgetting the self” (the reactive structures of mind whose narratives we identify with and mistake for who we are) can we come
to ourselves and find intimacy with others. Observation, the bread and butter of classical mindfulness meditation and psychoanalytic exploration, gives way to non-dualistic immersion. Are we breathing or are we being breathed? When the actor, the action and that which is acted upon fall away, we may come alive to a reality referred to as “suchness” that is not conveyed adequately by the terms dualism, non-duality or any category.

What has psychoanalysis to learn from the epistemology and attentional practices of Zen and Theravada Buddhism? Mindfulness practice, while it can over-privilege conscious attentional capacities, can also complement the psychoanalytic perspective in ways similar to how the idea of procedural memory is complementing the dynamic unconscious. Certain material and certain modes of awareness are not exactly unconscious or preconscious. As Alvarez (1992) has written, they are just outside, alongside or underneath our awareness. If a patient or analyst is practicing mindfulness alongside psychotherapy, for example, cultivating a wide, welcoming, non-judgmental, awareness of bodily states and how these interact with emotional experience, this can deepen, extend, and energize what might otherwise be a dry, intellectual treatment. In the service of self-knowledge, this can also complement, even deepen and flesh out the associational capacities traditionally fostered in analysis. It is not only what this makes me think of—the associational chain—that is important, but the sound, look, smell, and feel of what it is that I am actually thinking, feeling, and sensing. We become curious about the meaning of certain thoughts, feelings, or bodily sensations that arise, and how they connect up with our troubles in living, but even so, certain experiences have intrinsic meaning and transformational power outside realms of meaning making, symbolization, and insight—the unconscious made conscious. Mindfulness practice extends our capacity for and the range and depth of experience while expanding the palette of what makes analytic experience valuable. For many people who have difficulty recognizing affective states, mindfulness practice helps them develop this capacity.

Simple experiences such as breathing, entered into fully, can have remarkable impact. Winnicott (1949) describes a woman who came to an early experience where living is equivalent to breathing. Twenty years ago, before I read his Psyche-Soma paper, I had a similar experience with a patient (Bobrow, 1995) involving what we might think of as “being alone in the presence of the other” or sharing a kind of early “quiet alert” state. But why think of these as simply regressive, even if by this we mean a regression to dependence in the service of inter-dependence, a regression in the service of ego capacities, or in Bateson’s terms, a falling back to leap. These experiences are novel forms of being alive that carry great weight and power, despite not being formally in the realm of time at all. The consolidation of distinctions between past and present, inner and outer, self and other—are critical developmental achievements, yet they can also trip us up and constrain us. Winnicott’s ideas on the intermediate area of experience help but do not quite capture the non-dual nature of experience that Zen practice facilitates and I believe psychoanalysis also potentially makes available.

There is something primordial about the experiencing of breathing and inhabiting one’s body in an open and alive way. But why stop at breathing? We often pass over simple realities of living such as walking, cooking, eating, talking, touching, digging in the ground, and feeling, thinking and dreaming themselves, perhaps in our desire to understand deeper meanings. Can we harvest the ordinary activities of living, inner and outer, pleasant and painful, engaging them, in and of themselves, as expressive shapes of living mind itself? What if transformational capacities, based on deep, internalized understanding of mind and self, develop such that the inevitable ruptures and the negative affect states they engender are no longer perceived as obstacles to be resisted and no longer generate surplus suffering? Would there be a reduced need for repair? What if affect regulation were no longer such a primary preoccupation but rather an integrated background function? Could we open to deeper knowledge and appreciation of what our lives and death are?

A line from a pop song, “The secret of life is enjoying the passage of time,” brings us toward the question of aim. If suffering, dukkha, is inherent in life, life is also short, and impermanence, annica, is our lot. This is a growing realization and catalyst for growth or despair in both analysis and meditation practice. What obstructs our ability to allow the moments of living themselves, without added or associated “meaning,” to present life itself to us, through and as us, and for us to have the presence of mind to be in attendance and encounter it, if not as a gift, then with curiosity?

Psychoanalytic explanations run the gamut; a partial list includes: excessive envy, developmental deficits, a psycho-neurological makeup unable to contain our capacity and appetite for experience, super-ego harshness, irrational guilt, unbearable anxiety, and masochism. In Schore’s neuroanalytic developmental view (2003) defenses are strategies for dealing with unprocessable affect. Obstructions are as diverse as the individual character. But from the Buddhist point of view, these explanations, valid as they may be given the theoretical vantage points from which they emerge, are incomplete. The problem lies in our attentional approach to reality. From the Theravada perspective, we do not observe closely enough. From the Zen point of view, we have not entered into the experience wholeheartedly, there is still an observer observing something external to it. We are
To see a World in a grain of sand
And Heaven in a wildflower
Hold infinity in the palm of your hand
And Eternity in an Hour

William Blake

Blake and Buddhist intersubjectivity are in accord. We can say that each of us has an epistemological blind spot that coexists, metaphorically speaking, with an “attention deficit.”

In Zen, essential nature is unfathomable and must be “been.” But how? It is vividly expressed through all sensory channels when “localized mind,” irritable searching after certainty, and constricting dualistic views, are not obscuring. Beyond categories, mind operates as our senses, emotions, thoughts, pains and pleasures, the sun, the moon and the earth. How can that which cannot be measured, or be “been.” But how? It is vividly expressed through all sensory channels, come forth without mediation? This is difficult for our minds to fathom. Why? It is our mind.

I suggest that the attentional approach that characterizes presence of mind is a receptive, non-judgmental equanimity that doesn’t simply contain; it fathoms or knows, and recognizes, while retaining the potential to respond spontaneously and flexibly, in accord with circumstances. A neuropsychoanalytic analogue might be what Schore, citing Bach (2003, p. 31), describes as “...a higher level integrative capacity that allows ‘free access to affective memories of alternate states, a kind of superordinate reflective awareness that permits multiple perspectives on the self.’” This subjective position permits the unitary self to fall away without disintegration, and perhaps, in Buddhist parlance, wake up. Mind comes forth in multitudinous and surprising ways when our feelers, sensors, our eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body, mind are open and alert in a multidirectional, non-vigilant way, acknowledging inner and outer, emotion and thought, past and present, reality and fantasy, without becoming snagged on or privileging either pole—that is, when such categories (and the theories of mind that underlie them) do not constrain perception.

Perhaps it is our presence, borne of freedom of mind, that we as analysts give our patients. This implies an absence, but I don’t see it as depriving. It is a provision of something that can’t be given. Our patients’ responses, likewise, may be how they give of themselves, as we embody and bring the mind to life together, moment by moment.
I would venture to guess that no poetic form is at once so widely admired and so little understood as haiku. The brevity seems to invite imitation—as if short should make it easy to do. And the minimalism lends itself in popular imagination to corny one-line jokes. But even when taken seriously, the seventeen-syllable, 5-7-5, arrangement of lines, which has an organic relevance in Japanese (having to do with Japanese writing, speaking and even breathing patterns), has little meaning or relevance in English.

In fact, the brief haiku form disguises enormous complexity. And the larger intention is far more interesting than the syllable count. The aim is to capture the tension between the timeless and the momentary, between the big picture and the distilled and clarified instance. I rely on a number of translators and commentators for my analysis here, including Robert Hass (1994), Kenneth Rexroth (1955) and Hiroaki Sato (1995). Haiku evolved out of a feudal Japanese Buddhist consciousness: out of a view of the universe (then and now still) in which all of time, and cyclical time (usually represented by reference to the seasons of the year), and no-time-at-all are understood as one and the same. The poetry is an effort to express, embrace and illuminate that view.

Interestingly, psychoanalysis has its own concern with the way in which the timeless and the lived moment come together. We are ever mindful of the timelessness of the unconscious, the big picture, the long story, but as therapists, we want to address the experiential moment with maximal clarity. Our recurring clinical challenge is to address the two together, which is to say that in our best interpretations we want to do much of what a haiku does! Of course I do not mean that we want to sound like oracles. I mean that we want to address, in a minimum of words and with a minimum of fuss, both the big picture and the small—this moment in the context of many such moments. And we want to do it pithily, in a word, a phrase, and in common speech.

Here are some little examples of addressing the big picture in a word, a phrase, and in common speech: Readers might recognize my title as two-thirds of what is perhaps the best-known classical haiku. This one is by the 17th Century poet, Basho. (There are literally hundreds of translations of this poem into English, which gives some idea of the degree to which complex ideas and extended references and resonances have been compressed into a few words. See, for example, Sato’s (1955) *One Hundred Frogs.*) Here’s a translation which I like:

Old pond,
frog jump in:
water sound!

So many evocations packed into one distilled statement! The natural world, summertime, the image of an old pond (lily pads, vines hanging down, the deep silence of the woods), the slightly comic, homely frog, this moment, all moments, all of this in one kerplunk!

Here is another lovely haiku by Buson, a somewhat later poet, in Robert Hass’s translation:

Coolness—
the sound of the temple bell
as it leaves the temple bell

“Coolness” is a kigo, a traditional seasonal phrase, here a metaphor for autumn—and, of course, for that season in a person’s life. (The original audience for haiku was a learned one—mostly other poets—who could and would appreciate such references.)

And another of my favorites is by a third great classical haiku master, Issa.

One bath
after another—
How stupid!

Haiku (especially Issa’s) can be wonderfully funny. But dark, too. In this one, a Western reader might not understand that there’s a reference to the bath one gets on the day of one’s birth and the bath one’s body gets on the day one dies.

Reading these little poems as a group makes clear that central to haiku is an expression of surprise. As I understand it (from Hass), this sense of surprise is built in structurally: typically, there are “pivot words,” kake-kotoba, which function to change the direction or meaning of a thought. And there are “cutting words,” kireji, a kind of voiced punctuation with no exact equivalent in English, variously rendered as a dash, a colon, or an exclamation point, and sometimes as an “Ah!” or an “Oh!”

So surprise, a freshness, is of the essence—and, I think, the source of the haiku’s delight. But note: it’s freshness in the context of the already (deeply) known. This tension too should have a resonance for psychoanalysts. Clinically (as Stern [1997] will have taught us) we want to be fresh, ready to be surprised, ready to express surprise—even in the context of old familiar stories and of truths we take to be inevitable.

---

References on page 74

Henry M. Seiden, PhD, ABPP

Old Pond, Frog Jump In. . .

Old pond, frog jump in: water sound!
Annual Conference of the International Association for Relational Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy

Athens 2007

Metamorphosis
Therapeutic Change in a Changing World
A Relational psychoanalytic Perspective

Featuring…

▷ The latest clinical advances in relational studies.
▷ Plenary topics on: metamorphosis, the analyst’s personal life, war, and relational analysts at work.
▷ Select from more than 50 symposia, workshops, papers, and discussion groups on: attachment, creativity, enactments, Eros, evil, globalization, immigration and racism, mythology, religion, transference and countertransference, politics, and the West’s romance with Greece.
▷ Special programs include a musical concert with the Mikis Theodorakis orchestra, the theatrical play The Apology of Socrates based on Plato, and Greek folk dancing by the sea.
▷ Join us for a historic relational conference in the Athens, the cradle of democracy and dialogue.

5-8 July 2007

Athens Hilton Hotel ATHENS - GREECE

Alexis Mordoh, Psy.D. & Spyros D. Orfanos, Ph. D.
Conference Co-Chairs

Ethical Concerns About Psychologists’ Participation in Interrogation of Detainees

The United Nations Principles and other codes of ethics for health professionals make no distinctions based on the role of the health professional. Their premise is that the knowledge and skills of health professionals should not be used to the detriment of humans; the particular position the professional holds therefore is not relevant. To the extent that health professionals “apply their knowledge and skills” to assist in any manner with interrogations that “may adversely affect” (emphasis added) the physical or mental health of the detainee, they violate professional ethics and the right to health of detainees.

Report On The Situation Of Detainees At Guantánamo Bay
UN Commission Of Human Rights

On August 13, 2006, the APA Council of Representatives engaged in an historic debate and vote on a resolution put forward by Division 48 (Peace Division) and supported by Division 19 (Military Division). The motion was titled the “Resolution Against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment.” Two speakers had been invited to address the Council that day. The first was Lt. Gen. Kevin C. Kiley, Surgeon General of the Army, who spoke in favor of psychologists participating in military interrogations at places like Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib. I was the second speaker. I spoke against such participation and argued that the Resolution Against Torture would be a first step toward ending such participation. It turns out that I was wrong. Contrary to my belief at the time, the Resolution Against Torture did not interfere with psychologists’ continued participation in coercive interrogations in sites like Guantánamo, Abu Ghraib, and CIA “black sites.” It does nothing to prevent a psychologist from continuing to engage in behaviors condemned by international human rights organizations and international law, so long as these acts are not defined by U.S. or U.S. military law, as torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Furthermore, although Council has repeatedly requested a change, the ethics code itself continues to allow military psychologists to follow law over ethics when these are in conflict over issues of basic human rights.

Four months after the August Council meeting, I, a son of tortured Holocaust survivors, find that I inadvertently supported psychologists’ continued participation in coercive interrogations in sites like Guantánamo, Abu Ghraib, and CIA “black sites.” It does nothing to prevent a psychologist from continuing to engage in behaviors condemned by international human rights organizations and international law, so long as these acts are not defined by U.S. or U.S. military law, as torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Furthermore, although Council has repeatedly requested a change, the ethics code itself continues to allow military psychologists to follow law over ethics when these are in conflict over issues of basic human rights.

Because the Council of Representatives will be meeting again in February when they will be offered the possibility of changing direction, I offer this article as an updated presentation to Council, in support of Neil Altman’s courageous Resolution for a Moratorium on Psychologists’ Participation in Military and Intelligence Interrogations. I want to begin with three questions.

- Why are you, members of the Council of Representatives, here for a third time to address the questions of whether psychologists should be guiding military or intelligence interrogations?
- Why am I, someone who has never been involved in APA politics or government in any way, here to speak to you about these issues?
- And finally, why have psychologists been involved in these scandalous activities in the first place, and what effect might we have on these practices?

You are here because, like all Americans, you were shocked when certain photographs were published which revealed how prisoners at Abu Ghraib were being treated. You are here because it was discovered that similar practices, as approved techniques of interrogation, had taken place at Guantánamo.
Bay. And you are here specifically because of the role health professionals in general and psychologists in particular were said to play in coercive interrogations. You are here because it turns out that, in many cases, abusive interrogations were supervised and directed by teams of health professionals, called BSCT teams (Behavioral Science Consultation Teams). You are here because psychologists played, and continue to play, a substantial role on those BSCT teams.

You are here because each of the major health professions re-examined its ethics code after seeing the participation of mental health professionals and physicians in these BSCT practices, and each of them, except one, re-wrote its ethics code to preclude such participation. You are here because only APA has not done that. And finally, you are here because, as a result of this inaction on the part of APA, the Pentagon decided to use only psychologists in those positions.

I am here because I did not believe these issues were getting a fair hearing within APA. I am here because of two letters I wrote to APA President Gerald Koocher.

The first one followed the publication of a front-page article in the New York Times: “Military Alters the Makeup of Interrogation Advisers.” The article began, “Pentagon officials said Tuesday that they would try to use only psychologists, and not psychiatrists, to help interrogators devise strategies to get information from detainees at places like Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.”

This is what I wrote to Dr. Koocher:

I am embarrassed that the American Psychological Association has not been willing or able to combat the publicly held view that psychologists are more willing than psychiatrists to participate in coercive, possibly abusive, interrogations of prisoners at Guantánamo Bay. And worse, I am horrified that the APA and officials at the Pentagon believe that psychologists’ participation in BSCT teams is acceptable; whereas both the American Psychiatric Association and the World Medical Association have stated unequivocally that such participation violates the Hippocratic Oath and is unacceptable...

President Koocher replied:

The APA Board of Directors understands and appreciates that its members have strong opinions about psychologists’ involvement in interrogations, and that their opinions are not uniform...The Board has adopted as APA policy a Task Force Report, which unequivocally prohibits psychologists from engaging in, participating, or countenancing torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. As the basis for its position, the Task Force looked first to Principle A in the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, “Do No Harm,” and then to Principle B, which addresses psychologists’ responsibilities to society... In both domestic and national security-related contexts, these ethical principles converge as psychologists are mandated to take affirmative steps to prevent harm to individuals being questioned and, at the same time, to assist in eliciting reliable information that may prevent harm to others.

A colleague forwarded my letter and Dr Koocher’s response to Amy Goodman of Democracy Now!, who subsequently invited Dr. Koocher and me to debate this issue on her public television and radio show.2

Mine was certainly not the first protest. Members of the Divisions for Social Justice had already voiced their dissent at the February meeting of the Council of Representatives. They introduced what would become the “Resolution Against Torture,” which was passed by Council in August 2006. The resolution stated, in its first draft, that “it is a contravention of professional ethics for psychologists to apply their knowledge and skills in order to assist in the interrogation of prisoners and detainees in a manner that may adversely affect the physical or mental health or condition of such prisoners or detainees, and which is not in accordance with relevant international instruments.”

Following the Democracy Now! debate, investigative journalists continued to research the relationship between the APA and military/intelligence interrogations. Mark Benjamin, of Salon, looked in particular at the 2005 PENS Task Force, which President Koocher cited as the source of the APA Ethics Policy on psychologists’ involvement in coercive military and intelligence interrogations at places like Guantánamo Bay. Benjamin’s article called into question the objectivity of the Task Force and the validity of its report because, he discovered, six of the nine voting Presidential appointees had direct ties to military or intelligence agencies.3

It turns out that of these six, four had been present at Guantánamo, Abu Ghraib, Baghram or elsewhere in Iraq and Afghanistan, supervising, directing, or consulting on the interrogation of detainees. A fifth was the director of

---

1 The article can be found its entirety at: http://psychoanalystsopposewar.org/blog/2006/06/08/

2 http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=06/06/16/1355222

the Behavioral Science Directorate of Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA), former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s recently created counter-intelligence agency. Among its mandates, this intelligence agency researches effective detainee interrogation techniques; psychologists from CIFA have provided questions for military and intelligence interrogators at Guantánamo. A sixth member of the PENS task force also worked for CIFA.

These revelations raised the significant possibility that the members of the PENS Task Force had been chosen to offer a foregone conclusion. First of all, active duty military personnel, by law, must put the interests of the U.S. military first on issues which effect military operations (which means that four of the members simply should have recused themselves). Further, if six members of the PENS Task Force were already actively committed to guiding and supervising military and intelligence interrogations, how could they be called upon to objectively assess whether such endeavors were ethical? And finally, in the 18 months since the publication of the Task Force report, two of the non-military members have questioned the validity of the Task Force, and all three non-military members have called for the suspension of the PENS Report as a basis for APA policy.

The wide press coverage of psychologists’ unique stance among the health professions with regard to interrogations\(^4\) spurred protests both within and outside the APA against the PENS report and against psychologists’ participation in such interrogations (a petition against participation had garnered more than 1600 psychologists’ signatures). The aim of the protests was to revisit the issue at the August meeting of the Council of Representatives, and to pass the Resolution proposed by Division 48.

However, a piece of information included at the end of Benjamin’s *Salon* article spurred me to write a second letter. I was shocked once again to discover that the pro-military bias of the leadership of the APA had trumped fairness and common sense. In his penultimate paragraph, Benjamin wrote: “Koocher has asked Lt. Gen. Kevin C. Kiley, the surgeon general of the Army, to come to New Orleans and address the organization’s leadership.” It turned out that despite the many suggestions to the contrary, President Koocher had invited one and only one expert speaker to address the Council as they debated this vital issue.

My second letter was an attempt to communicate my shock and dismay at learning that when the Council of Representatives was to meet in New Orleans the following week “to discuss the issues raised by psychologists’ participation in interrogations at Guantánamo and elsewhere, and to decide on what, if any, changes should be implemented in the ethics code as a result of alleged psychologist participation in abusive interrogation practices...there will be a single guest speaker addressing the Council: Army Surgeon General Kevin C. Kiley.”

I was particularly dismayed, since General Kiley was the author of the military study that praised the work of the psychologists on the BSCT teams. The study was the first military document to describe the work of these psychologists, which was to “check the medical history of detainees with a focus on depression, delusional behaviors, manifestations of stress, and “what are their buttons.” [Psychologists] will greatly assist [interrogators] with: obtaining more accurate intelligence information, knowing how to gain better rapport with the detainees, and also knowing when to push or not to push harder in pursuit of intelligence information.”

I wrote that the General had written the latest BSCT protocols, coupled with the fact that he would only respond to Council members’ questions vetted in advance, “strikes me as continuing a practice of stacking the deck in favor of a military interpretation of the role of psychologists, even when this conflicts with the history of ethical principles which have governed the behavior of health professionals for millennia.”

I recommended that Dr. Koocher invite either former APA President Phil Zimbardo or Physicians for Human Rights Executive Director Len Rubenstein. They had each written extensive critiques of the PENS Report, Rubenstein\(^5\) from a human rights perspective and Zimbardo\(^6\) from the perspective of psychological research. Dr. Koocher did not take either of my recommendations (he had already rejected similar suggestions, made by others). Instead, Dr. Koocher invited me, “in the interest of presenting a balanced view.” I said at the time that I thought Dr. Koocher chose an unknown like me, rather than a world-renowned psychologist or a Nobel Prize winning humanitarian, because, by comparison, I could be considered a lightweight. To add weight to what I have to say, I consulted with both Dr. Zimbardo and with Len Rubenstein. It is in their shoes that I stand, in speaking to you today.

---

\(^4\) In addition to Benjamin’s two articles, there had been reports in the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, and on CNN.


---

Let me turn, now, to the third question: why have psychologists been involved in these scandalous activities in the first place, and what effect might we have on these practices? To answer this question, it is necessary to share the results of extensive research that I have undertaken, with the help of dedicated colleagues, into the history of the use of aggressive techniques in the “war on terror” and into the
unique role of psychologists in that history. Everything that follows has been verified via documentation available on the Web.

There are two acronyms that play a central part in the evolution of abuse at Guantánamo, Abu Ghraib, Baghram, and elsewhere. These are ‘SERE and BSCT. SERE stands for Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape, and BSCT, for Behavioral Science Consultation Teams.

SERE originated as military training, developed by a Special Forces officer, Col. James “Nick” Rowe, who had been a prisoner of the Viet Cong for over five years. Rowe’s training regimen involved, among other things, exposure to severe forms of physical and psychological torture, as preparation for resistance, were the agent to be captured and exposed to these techniques. As part of the SERE program, military psychologists developed and administered severely aversive psychological interrogation techniques, including sleep and sensory deprivation, personal, cultural, religious and sexual humiliation. Other tactics included forced nakedness, waterboarding, and death threats.

BSCT teams began advising interrogators at Guantánamo on the use of similar interrogation techniques in the summer of 2002, as part of the ramped-up effort on the part of the Department of Defense to gather information to fight the war on terror. There is record that Guantánamo interrogation personnel were being trained in SERE tactics as early as September of 2002. Later on, SERE training became standard operating procedure for BSCT team members. This transformation of SERE from training to withstand abusive interrogation into highly specialized methods of abusive interrogation reflects a shameful loss of ethical standards on the part of participating psychologists.

Not surprisingly, this very transformation of tactics spurred growing tension between interrogators who favored these SERE-based techniques, and those who relied on more traditional interrogation methods. Requests for authorization of the aggressive techniques went to the highest levels of the Department of Defense. On November 27, 2002, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, responding to a request for clarification from the commanding general at the Guantánamo, Maj. Gen. Michael Dunlavey, specifically approved a set of hitherto illegal interrogation methods. In fact, Secretary Rumsfeld asserted in a hand-written note that one of the techniques, enforced standing “for a maximum of 4 hours,” was too lenient. He wrote, “I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?” By December 2002, Geoffrey D. Miller (who had replaced Dunlavey at Guantánamo in November), had suggested SERE standard operating procedures for BSCT interrogations at Guantánamo.

Rumsfeld’s memo generated enormous debate among the armed services and we now know that interrogators from the Navy Criminal Investigative Task Force refused to participate in interrogations if such practices were being used, and that the highest echelons of the Navy protested the practices as illegal. This spurred Secretary Rumsfeld to temporarily rescind his approval, pending the report of a ‘working group’ to assess the legality of the techniques.

The report of the working group and Rumsfeld’s directive, based upon it, explain why psychologists have come to play such an intrinsic role in our military and intelligence services’ coercive interrogation practices, and implicates the APA in practices which have been condemned throughout the world as torture. An understanding of Rumsfeld’s directive also explains why APA’s August Resolution Against Torture did not go far enough to guarantee that APA members will no longer participate in such practices, and why only a moratorium on such participation will bring the ethics of APA in line with the other health associations, with international human rights organizations, and with the highest ethical standards as embodied in the United Nations Convention Against Torture.

Rumsfeld’s working group report asserted, as had a number of now notorious Justice Department briefs, as well as legal analyses from the Department of Defense (including the Yoo, Gonzales, and Beaver memos), that US reservations to the UN Convention Against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment, meant that the United States is bound by the Convention “only to the extent that cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment means the cruel and

---


8 It is important to note that originally BSCT teams often included psychiatrists and physicians, along with psychologists. But at least since January 2004, it was preferred policy that “only psychologists have been on BSCTs.” Mercury, September 2005 (an Army Medical Department publication).
unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.” It goes on to justify each and every technique practiced by the BSCTs at Guantánamo as legal under these limitations.

For example, the report asserts that to meet the standard of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment,” detainee treatment must reflect “deliberate indifference’ to the prisoner’s health or safety… The Court has established that ‘only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities’ are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.’… It is not enough for a prisoner to show that he has been subjected to conditions that are merely ‘restrictive and even harsh....’ Rather, a prisoner must show that he has suffered a ‘serious deprivation of basic human needs,’ such as ‘essential food, medical care, or sanitation.’”

Similarly, the authors of the report interpret the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of due process, according to American legal precedents, to mean, “only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense… That conduct must ‘shock the conscience.’” The report concludes that one of two criteria must be met to invoke the Fifth Amendment guarantees: “First, whether conduct is ‘inspired by malice or sadism.’ Second, the official must have acted with more than mere negligence… an official must know of a serious risk to the health or safety of a detainee and he must act in conscious disregard for that risk in order to violate due process standards.”

The working group report recommended that aggressive interrogation techniques, including sleep-deprivation (up to four days), isolation (up to 30 days), hooding, forced nudity, the use of dogs, threats, slaps, were all permissible according to the U.S. Constitution if they were “approved by the appropriate authority… [and included] supervisory requirements to ensure appropriate application of methods; specifics on the application of technique(s) including appropriate duration, intervals between applications and events that would require termination of the technique; and requirements for the presence or availability (as appropriate) of qualified medical personnel.”

Upon receipt of the working group report, Rumsfeld wrote a new memo, re-instituting aggressive interrogation techniques, under the specific conditions recommended by the working group. In so doing, Rumsfeld authorized U.S. military and intelligence agencies to practice methods condemned internationally as cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, using two related justifications: first, that the U.S. reservations to the United Nations Convention Against Torture meant that the U.S. Constitution (specifically the interpretation of the 5th, 8th, and 14th amendments) was the authority on the legality of severe interrogation methods, rather than the international standards, such as the Geneva Conventions or the UN Convention Against Torture; and second, that, in order to stay within the law as defined by these amendments, interrogations must be done under appropriate medical supervision.

Defense Secretary Rumsfeld solved the problem of legitimizing these interrogation methods by elevating the BSCTs from experts in the application of psychological SERE interrogation techniques, to medical supervisors required by the U.S. Constitution. Thus “medical supervisors” would function in two roles by ensuring the effectiveness of the interrogations, while at the same time functioning (in what General Kiley termed) as “safety officers.” In other words, following the advice of his working group, and the legal briefs which preceded it, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld made it official policy that the BSCT teams’ widely condemned interrogation techniques would be considered legal under U.S. law, so long as medical officers were on hand to ensure that the practices were “safe and effective.”

9 Thus, PENS’ chairperson, Olivia Moorehead-Slaughter’s assertion that, “as experts in human behavior, psychologists... have a critical role in keeping interrogations safe, legal, ethical and effective” is entirely consistent with U.S. military and intelligence policy. Monitor on Psychology, Volume 37, No. 4, April 2006.
Rumsfeld memo approving the techniques, BSCT practices were exported to Abu Ghraib, and elsewhere in Iraq.\(^\text{10}\)

The rest of the story is well known. In November, 2004, officials of International Committee of the Red Cross broke with their historic mandate of confidentiality and leaked to the press the appalling conditions and treatment of detainees at Guantánamo. Among the details revealed by the ICRC were interrogation techniques, described as “tantamount to torture,” a physical environment, which in its very construction “cannot be considered other than an intentional system of cruel, unusual and degrading treatment,” and the role of the BSCT teams, undermining the traditional division between humanitarian medical care and intelligence operations.

In the aftermath of these revelations, every major American organization of health professionals, except one, overrode American government and military policy on detainee interrogations. In their review of their ethics policies, the American Medical Association, the American Psychiatric Association, and the American Nurses Association, all required their members to behave in a manner consistent with international human rights standards; each prohibited their members from participating in any individual interrogations or in activities that may compromise the physical or mental health of prisoners. Only the American Psychological Association, after ostensibly examining the ethical issues, permitted its members to continue to participate in coercive military and intelligence interrogations. Only APA has aligned its human rights ethical standards with the U.S. Constitution instead of international conventions and law. And, when ethics and law conflict, only APA has amended its ethics code specifically to permit following the law, rather than its ethical code, when these are in conflict.

To put the matter simply, at the present time, only APA provides the U.S. military and the intelligence agencies with the medical supervision that this administration asserts is necessary to circumvent international humanitarian law.

Understanding this exposes the frank manipulation of the PENS process; it explains as well what I believe to be the manipulation of the good intentions of the authors of the Resolution against Torture, which at the 11\(^{th}\) hour incorporated the Rumsfeld working group definition of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, in the place of its original international human rights language.\(^\text{11}\) To understand the history of the relationship between medical oversight and America’s continued use of techniques condemned as torture is to understand the fact that if the APA takes a stand against participation, this is not simply an academic position—we have the opportunity to stop these universally condemned practices altogether.

So, what can you, the Council, do? I am asking you to reverse the shameful course that the APA has taken unwittingly and unwittingly in participating in interrogation processes that have rightly been condemned as torture; in aligning our definition of torture with the U.S. government and military’s definitions of torture, which disregard international human rights obligations;\(^\text{12}\) by tacitly approving

---

\(^{10}\) Major General Miller visited Iraq in late August, 2003 and recommended the creation of BSCTs there.

\(^{11}\) The Resolution was amended, during a break at the August Council meeting and without public discussion, to read, “BE IT RESOLVED, that the term ‘cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment’ means treatment or punishment by any psychologist that is of a kind that, in accordance with the McCain Amendment, would be prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, as defined in the United States Reservations, Declarations and Understandings to the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment done at New York, December 10, 1984.

\(^{12}\) “The Special Rapporteur [on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment] deplored the failure of the United States to include a crime of torture consistent with the Convention definition in its domestic legislation and the broadness of the reservations made by the United States.” Report on
the conditions detainees are being held in by permitting our members to collaborate with authorities in settings that have in themselves been condemned as “cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment,” by the ICRC and a violation against the UN Convention against torture;\(^1\) and in permitting our ethical obligation: “to benefit those with whom they work and take care to do no harm” to be subverted into participation in committing grievous harm to human beings who have been charged with no crime, who have been deprived of the right to question their incarceration, and who may join the ranks of the disappeared in unregistered CIA “black sites,” where even the ICRC is prevented from assessing their conditions.

As members of the major body of American psychologists, we have a special responsibility to maintain high ethical standards precisely because psychologists are known to have contributed shamefully in the development and the execution of abusive and coercive interrogation techniques within certain branches of military and intelligence operations.

It is up to you, the Council, to take back your mandate. The PENS Task Force report became APA policy without going through Council processes. Without Council having the opportunity to study the implications of its conclusions, the Report was presented soon to the Surgeon General and cited by the military as evidence of psychologists’ support for a role in the medical supervision of interrogation practices. The Resolution Against Torture likewise passed through Council in extraordinary session. Changes that supported the Administration’s position on aggressive interrogation techniques were introduced into the amendment during the Council meeting, without discussion.

I am asking you, the Council, to do the following:

1. Suspend the PENS Task Force Report. We now know that the majority of its members were actively involved in the interrogation process.
2. Declare a moratorium on psychologist participation in military and intelligence interrogations. We know, too, that psychologists are being asked to provide justification for practices condemned as unethical by all international human rights bodies and by all domestic professional health care organizations.
3. Demand that the ethics committee enact the repeated resolutions of the Council to amend Ethics code provision 1.02. The Council has twice resolved that the words “except in cases of basic human rights violations” be added to the provision; the leadership has continued to postpone action. We know that psychologists are increasingly asked to participate in environments where, under the Military Commissions Act, widespread denial of basic human rights has been deemed legal.
4. Establish a new task force to examine the appropriate ethical role of psychologists in cases of national security. I suggest that the new Task Force consult with ethicists who have grappled with these issues from other health professions, human rights groups and the United Nations.

You, the Council, must take back responsibility for the good name and ethical conduct of psychologists. You have a rare opportunity to make a significant difference for good in the world. If I am right, and the US government believes it can only legally justify these shameful techniques by claiming medical supervision, then the refusal of psychologists to participate may finally put an end to these practices. At the very least, it is time you stopped psychologists from being associated with them.

Steven Reisner, PhD
SReisner@psychoanalysis.net

---

\(^1\) “Detaining persons in such conditions constitutes, per se, a violation of the Convention [Against Torture].” Report of the UN Committee Against Torture, 36th session, 1 – 19 May 2006.
In many ways it seems like rejecting motherhood, apple pie, and freedom to question something that everyone seems to favor: making electronic medical records universally available. It sounds so simple and so . . . necessary. The reason for this, we’re told, is so we can obtain accurate and relevant medical treatment anywhere; it is hard to argue with the idea of useful and relevant medical care—something we all want. I am a medical professional, in charge of assessing and treating patients every day. It is not electronic records themselves to which I object; I keep electronic records in my office and find their convenience wonderful. The world is moving toward digital storage of data, and the savings in paper and space are great, but when these databases become available over the Internet, they are highly vulnerable. Advocates of universal medical record access suggest that strict policies will be enforced, strong security strategies will be employed, and patient privacy will be valued above all; it would be imprudent not to question this promise. Once we give more leniencies to the use of our medical records, their availability could very easily expand as people decide on new ways such information should be used.

Many think about the idea of private records becoming public as merely a matter of embarrassment; we have private information—perhaps regarding delicate conditions such as sexual problems, infections, surgeries, or even psychiatric and psychotherapeutic records that detail emotional difficulties—that would be awkward to have public. That in itself is enough for many people to want their data withheld from a network; private things should stay private. Unfortunately, however, it goes much further. We are hearing daily about new breaches of electronic data bases: most recently Medicare, and also the Department of Veteran’s Affairs, America OnLine, the National Student Loan Program, and others. The risks for people suffering identity theft are great—possibly losing their savings and credit reputation, not to mention being liable for huge debt. Custodians of these databases assure us they are taking strong steps to control access and security, but computer professionals have not been able to protect us from hackers and the creators of computer viruses. The best they have been able to do is give us some help after the damage has begun; we’re given symptomatic treatments for the illnesses, but no inoculation to avoid the problems in the first place.

While these situations are relatively rare and can be serious, some of the problems can be solved without making all of our data vulnerable. More about solving that problem later. First, let us look at why you might not want this information made available on a vulnerable medium such as the Internet, even with promises of security. It can be argued that one of the unspoken (but highly motivating) uses of medical information available on the Internet is for the purpose of marketing products to a vulnerable population. We’re all aware of registering with an online company and being asked, “May we send you e-mails about important new products that may interest you?” Imagine a company with the ability to target us based on knowledge of our medical conditions; it is not only the inconvenience of a glut of e-mails and telephone calls about the latest insulin pump, esophageal reflux medication, or back pain remedy, but also that most people are not at all adequately informed to decide if these treatments are useful. People desperate for help often seek multiple cures to a problem, delaying recovery, rather than working with their physician to set up a reasonable plan of using the most reasonable treatments in a sequential fashion. We are all vulnerable to this, not least of all the elderly, the very ill, the young, and the cognitively impaired.

Insurance companies have a tremendous stake in knowing our state of health to make underwriting decisions. Already, every medical visit submitted to an insurance company for payment is logged at the Medical Information Bureau: a clearinghouse that lists all dates of visits with your doctor, the procedure performed, and the diagnosis related to that visit. When you set out to buy new insurance your Medical Information Bureau file is reviewed to see if you are an adequate risk. If they believe you may be too great a risk, they will write for detailed records from your doctors. Upon review of those records, they make a decision. Are you a good enough risk, or should you be denied or put into a high-risk pool with higher rates? So long as we have private companies providing medical insurance as a business, this system will be in place; they are companies designed to make money (whether or not they are “for profit” entities), and they will use such strategies to optimize profits.

What most people don’t know is this: your homeowners, auto, life, renters, disability, and other insurance providers have that same access to your medical records. The Statement of Privacy Policy forms make this clear, although most of us discard them as quickly as we receive them in the mail. This same medical data access holds true for your other insurance providers. Perhaps they won’t like that you’re taking a muscle relaxer for back pain, anti-anxiety or antidepressant medication and will decide not to renew your auto policy or put you in a higher risk (and rate) category. Perhaps you’ll find yourself unable to obtain home, life, disability, or business insurance, because some aspect of your medical information, currently available to any insurance company and soon to be available to almost everyone, makes you undesirable.
Now add one more startling fact: insurance companies with access to your medical information are free to sell it to whomever they choose. At this point you will hear the often-used phrase, “. . . to provide you information about goods and services that may be of interest.” Or for what other purpose? Perhaps an enterprising person could start a company that purchases healthcare information for the purpose of pre-employment screenings; companies who are rightfully concerned about the rising cost of health insurance may be all too willing to use this information for the purpose of reducing their risk-rating with an insurance provider.

This will be easier yet when our medical information is provided online; in the early days of this policy, overly curious (and merely irritating) hackers may break into systems, but it wouldn’t be long before enterprising ones take over to provide this information to others. Don’t forget most medical records, include dates of birth, Social Security numbers, home address and telephone numbers, and may include names, ages, and schools for your children as well as other sensitive information—sometimes including credit card numbers.

Over time, of course, policies change, and the data previously released under one set of rules become subject to the new, usually more lenient, set of rules. As hospitals and large clinics gear up for the electronic medical record, they are busy digitizing old medical records, which we had previously agreed would be shared only with 1) our physicians, and 2) on a very limited basis with our insurance company. Now, new rules will govern that data, making it much more widely available, and superseding the agreements made in the past. Changes in such rules have come along with HIPAA (the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) that was envisioned as way to provide more privacy, but often leaves us with less.

In addition to all the problems outlined above, it’s worth considering that there are groups of patients who will, and already are, avoiding all medical treatment because of this lack of privacy. They fear losing their insurance coverage (which they might at least use for catastrophic illness), of losing the disability insurance in their small business or self-employment, or having damning information used against them at work. Patients with socially delicate conditions rightly fear that information becoming public. Right now, these people are not seeking treatment they need and are learning to fear the medical system. Their well-meaning physicians write notes outlining conditions and treatment, and the end-usage of that data is far different than the use intended. Individuals who can afford it pay cash for their medical care, maintaining their privacy by avoiding a Medical Insurance Bureau record of their visit. Most people cannot afford this: they lose their privacy or go without treatment.

Despite all this, I am sensitive that we often need medical records to be made available in emergencies. Fortunately, we have technology that allows this to happen quickly in most circumstances. Telephones, computers, and fax machines allow quick transfer of information, solving the problem in most cases. Furthermore, it is possible for people to have important information available on a very small “memory key,” essentially a tiny computer memory chip that can be inserted in almost any current desktop computer, providing data to a treating physician. It would be wise to have such information when traveling, or if one has conditions that may result in sudden need for medical care. The cost of providing this data is surprisingly affordable: we all have access to our own medical data through our caregivers; it can be scanned and digitized easily, and the cost of a memory key for portable storage is about $20.

Still, there will be a few cases where people have had accidents and their medical data are not immediately available when they need them most. Such an incident can only be seen as a tragedy; but in this country we have always made decisions that promote freedom and privacy first, with individuals occasionally bearing part of the burden for those rights. As an obvious example, I point to our legal system, which assumes that people are innocent until proven guilty, and people must be considered guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; sometimes guilty people go free. When we personally are paying a cost for greater freedoms, it is always a huge price; but on some level we must deal with this issue through promoting a greater good. We bear some personal cost through managing our own medical data and, on rare occasions, enduring the consequences when our medical data is not available.

I believe the greater good is more privacy, freedom from an often unscrupulous marketplace, and ultimately, greater real access to private medical care that is truly private. With the world moving inexorably toward electronic storage of medical data, it may seem a tiny extra step to make that data available on “secure” Internet databases. Don’t be fooled; this is a huge step, and once this dangerous genie is out of the bottle there’s no putting it back.

Peter A. Zelles, PhD, LP, ABPP
PeterZelles@cs.com
On September 15, 2006, the symposium “Freud’s Place in our Minds: A Day of Reflection on Sigmund Freud’s Significance in the 21st Century” was held at the Embassy of Austria in Washington, DC. This symposium was in commemoration of the 150th anniversary of the birth of Sigmund Freud. The event was collaboratively planned and organized by the American Academy of Psychoanalysis and Dynamic Psychiatry, the American Psychoanalytic Association, the Division of Psychoanalysis (39) of the American Psychological Association and the National Membership Committee on Psychoanalysis in Clinical Social Work.

Prior to the day of the event, participants received a copy of the essay “Sigmund Freud: Conquistador of the Unconscious” written by the sociologist Edith Kurzweil and published by the Austrian Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The narrative was enhanced by a collection of diverse photographs depicting the life of Sigmund Freud on loan from the Freud Museum. Kurzweil’s essay framed the dialogue of the event by posing the following questions:

What might our world be like if Freud had not discovered the dynamics of the unconscious? If he had not, as he stated “agitated the sleep of mankind” would we still be in the dark about the causes of psychosomatic disorders? Would we believe that “hysterical patients suffer from reminiscences, whose . . . symptoms are residues of particular (traumatic) experiences”; or that our rational and independent selves are subject to internal and conflicting impulses? Would we still be using the doctor’s gaze and hypnosis to uncover unconscious motivations, or assume that our moods are controlled by “humours?” And might poets alone have access to our unconscious?

The format of the symposium was in two parts. H.E. Eva Nowotny, Ambassador of Austria to the United States opened the first part, which was open by invitation only. What followed were four working sessions wherein representatives of each constituent group each gave a five-minute paper relevant to the working session. The first working session was “Psychoanalysis in Practice,” with two panels: “Freud’s Legacy and New Challenges in Clinical Treatment” and “The Application of Psychoanalysis in Non-clinical Domains.” The second working session was “Psychoanalysis as Cultural Theory” with two panels: “Freud’s Model of the Mind and Its Significance for Modern Life” and “Psychoanalysis and Society: Can Psychoanalysis Help to Understand Modern Conflicts?”

An evening program that was open to the public followed the afternoon session. The format of the evening program was a panel discussion that considered the question of “Freud’s Significance in the 21st Century.” The keynote speech was given by Eli Zaretsky. Other speakers on this panel were Sheila Hafter Gray, Harold Blum, Nancy McWilliams, Miriam Pierce and Thomas Aichhorn. Ambassador Nowotny was the moderator. The program was followed by a reception.

Members of Division 39 presented papers at the afternoon working group. The following made presentations: Jane Darwin, Nancy McWilliams, Marilyn S. Jacobs, Usha Tummala-Narra, and Richard Ruth. David Ramirez, Dennis Debiak, and Marilyn Metzl were also in attendance at the working group and the evening session. Other members of the Division also attended the public sessions.

Several members of the Division in attendance shared their impressions of the event as follows:

David Ramirez
I like to think that Freud would be pleased with the way this event came to life: through happenstance. Richard Ruth chaired Division 39’s program for the 2005 APA Annual Convention in Washington, DC. In anticipation, he contacted the Austrian Embassy to ask whether we might hold our Board of Directors meeting there. While the embassy was unable to extend an invitation to use their space (they customarily take the whole month of August for vacation), they were interested in pursuing an altogether different meeting.

Working with the cultural attaché, Margarita Ploder, Richard helped plan the embassy’s U.S. program. He identified the other three major North American psychoanalytic groups and helped develop the process of putting together a program. The theme for the sesquicentennial was Freud’s relevance
in the 21st century. The challenge was to develop a program that would be intellectually interesting with contemporary relevance.

The final program consisted of four topical working sessions, with representatives from each organization delivering a brief paper. It was this aspect of the symposium that most intrigued me. Presenters were charged to limit their remarks to five minutes, a “lacanianly” laconically brief time frame. Amazingly, each analyst adhered to the five-minute frame.

In the aggregate, these two-dozen brief papers were a satisfying psychoanalytic symposium. By the end of the program it seemed that each participant resolved to take the serendipitous finding of satisfying brevity back to their parent organization to reconsider the process of presenting psychoanalytic papers. Ultimately, the challenge of capturing Freud’s relevance to the 21st century analyst may have been a renewed appreciation for parsimony.

Jaine L. Darwin

The ultimate birthday tribute to Freud was that all his often-squabbling children could unite under the roof of the embassy of the country from which he had to flee to honor the continuing importance of his ideas. To see the major analytic groups sharing ideas was powerful. The range of invited speakers and the content of the talks represented the pluralism in psychoanalysis, from the abundant use of the words “libido” and “cathectic” by some groups to the inclusion of socioeconomic and cultural factors by others. The format of five-minute papers challenged us all to focus on the essential points. I was also impressed with the non-defensive remarks of the Ambassador and her candor about Austria’s role in the murder and diaspora of the Freud family.

I was pleased and astounded at the large crowd attending the evening panel, which was open to the public. Eli Zaretsky gave an excellent keynote address in which he assessed what has made psychoanalysis iconic and what has perpetuated the demonizing of psychoanalysis. The opportunity to participate in the past and future of psychoanalysis was exhilarating for me.

Richard Ruth

Two things stand out for me. First was that the four major psychoanalytic organizations in the U.S. went beyond “playing nicely” to real engagement and dialogue. Our afternoon symposium was not just a routinized recital of Freud’s praises, but far richer for being a collection of different views and different voices organized around a shared, common theme. Emerging from that experience, I felt renewed in a hope that we can find other good ways to work together to advance our common interest in seeing to it that analytic ideas and analytic work have space in which to continue to live and develop. I was also moved by the graciousness of our reception by our hosts, the Embassy of Austria. The beautiful spaces and bountiful provision with which we were received echoed a psychic space and a psychic provision. The concept that ideas matter and that a major event can be commemorated by a day of shared conversation and thinking, were a valued counterpoint to life in an environment that all too often dismisses what we do as irrelevant.

Dennis Debiak

I was awash in intense emotions throughout the Austrian Embassy Event in September. I felt honored to be a part of this event, which felt historic to me. While I consider Freud to be one of the most important figures in history, the recognition of his contributions by the Embassy of Austria felt validating of psychoanalysis in a way that I found very moving.

This event marked a point in the history of psychoanalysis and made me wonder about its future. Eli Zaretsky, in his keynote address, made the point that psychoanalysis is a treatment, a cultural hermeneutic, and an ethic of self-knowledge. He made the provocative point that it is dead as an ethic of self-knowledge and challenged as a treatment. While I found Zaretsky’s points daunting, I was comforted when I thought that the challenged enterprise of psychoanalysis could thrive if it is as inclusive as possible. The more that psychoanalysis includes, for example, academicians, researchers, neuroscientists, clinicians of diverse psychoanalytic schools and professional backgrounds, and early career professionals, the more likely it is to survive.

I was also encouraged by the fact that, unlike many psychoanalytic gatherings I have attended, everyone at this event was not white and straight. There were a few people of color and a few gay people representing their respective professional organizations. There was not as much diversity in age as I would have liked, but I think that this reflects the fact that the four professional organizations that participated did not have white and straight. There were a few people of color and a few gay people representing their respective professional organizations. There was not as much diversity in age as I would have liked, but I think that this reflects the fact that the four professional organizations that participated did sent members of their Boards of Directors, who I think tend to be more senior professionals. The diversity that did exist in the group, however, made me hopeful.

Finally, the stellar contributions of Jaine Darwin, Marilyn Jacobs, Nancy McWilliams, and Usha Tummala-Narra made me feel very proud to be a psychologist. As a younger member of the Division 39 delegation, I felt excited and hopeful about the participation of psychologists in the future of psychoanalysis.

Marilyn Newman Metz1

After the exhilaration and the thrill of attending the day of reflection on Sigmund Freud’s significance in the 21st century at the Viennese Embassy in Washington, I am so pleased to have the opportunity to gather my thoughts and to distill this
most meaningful experience. It was a pleasure to gather with my fellow analysts in a place that looked and smelled like the Vienna of Sigmund Freud. The welcome by the Ambassador of Austria to the United States set the tone for the seriousness of purpose that was to follow. I must confess that I have always felt like one of Sigmund Freud’s daughters, and the analytic training that I pursued served to further my transference relationship with the idealized papa who was honored in that room on September 15, 2006. Freud’s legacy was monumental and continues to this day; it was evident throughout the range of presentations, which demonstrated that, “love him or leave him,” we were all Freud’s children, and were shaped by his profound and innovative thinking. In spite of the wide range of orientations, all of the speakers who presented at the meeting were well prepared and erudite, and were able to consolidate, what obviously was a lifetime of thinking, into a five-minute presentation. Everyone gathered in the room was either a fan of Freud’s or disagreed on some issues with Freud, but it was evident throughout the day that all of our work in psychoanalysis was a direct derivative of Sigmund Freud’s ideas.

In preparation for the symposium, I re-read many of Freud’s original works, the new Phillip’s translation and Peter Gay’s book on Freud as well as re-reading The Interpretation of Dreams. A close friend said, “What are you doing? This is a celebration, not a test,” which ended my rather excessive preparation. The reading, combined with the flurry of deciding what to wear, was part of the anticipated festivity.

The Austrian Embassy was lovely, stately, and austere and many allusions were made to the celebration of the birth of a favorite son, in a place redolent with memories of his fortunate escape during times of war. The realization that Freud’s family and fellow Jews suffered tragedy and death was accompanied by my intense appreciation and gratitude for his survival. The conference was multifaceted and reflected on the place that Freud inhabits in our minds and in our culture. The speakers were able to address their philosophy in the brief time allotted to them and the kernels of insight gleaned during that day will remain long after the papers are filed in their appropriate places.

**Usha Tummala-Narra**

The commemoration at the Austrian Embassy of Sigmund Freud’s work presented a unique opportunity for a group of psychoanalysts and psychoanalytically oriented therapists to share their perspectives on the relevance of Freud’s ideas to contemporary clinical practice, modern cultures, and global conflicts. I was impressed with both the initiative taken by the embassy to bring together members of four major national psychoanalytic organizations for this exploration, and with the structure in which we were expected to present our ideas. Each presenter had five minutes to present his/her thoughts on a pre-assigned topic, such as the relevance of Freud’s ideas in contemporary times. This structure was challenging, yet effective for the listener.

The sessions consolidated several thoughts I had prior the event, including how Freud’s own study of culture, history, archeology, and anthropology of ancient Western civilizations informed his understanding of the individual as in conflict with larger society and culture (*Civilization and its Discontents*, 1930). His aim was to establish a discipline of psychoanalysis that was based on modernist and positivistic ideals. At the same time, Freud’s development of psychoanalysis as theory and technique was never divorced from cultural experience and political realities. Freud’s ideas developed in a pre-WWII and WWII European context where he and his family faced persecution in the latter part of his life.

It is interesting to note that contemporary psychoanalysts have extended the study of the unconscious into the study of social phenomenology, such as race and its presence in the psychotherapeutic relationship. Contemporary issues such as immigration, globalization of world economies, and the role of the Internet can be understood from Freud’s view of society as impinging on the individual, as these changes offer, paradoxically, new material possibilities for individuals in the face of emotional disconnection and loss. One of the most rewarding aspects of the Freud anniversary event was hearing about the ways in which these present-day challenges were approached through Freud’s perspective of human beings. I left the event feeling hopeful in finding ways to engage in such a vibrant exchange in the future.

**IN CONCLUSION**

The Austrian Embassy has posted transcripts of the entire symposium on the Web site of the Austrian Cultural Forum. The working group papers, the Keynote Speech and the discussant papers can all be accessed at: (http://www.acfdc.org/freud-symposium-transcripts/).

In addition, a book contract to publish the entire proceedings is in the final stages of negotiation. The editors of the published volume will be Joseph Merlino (American Academy of Psychoanalysis and Dynamic Psychiatry), Lynne Moritz (American Psychoanalytic Association), Marilyn S. Jacobs (Division 39), and Judy Ann Kaplan (The National Membership Committee on Psychoanalysis in Clinical Social Work). In addition to the proceedings, the book will include photographs of Sigmund Freud, an essay by Edith Kurzweil with an introduction by the President of Austria.
Getting from Here to There: Analytic Love, Analytic Process
Sheldon Bach
0-88163-439-5 2006 176pp. $37.50
"Getting from Here to There is a profound and practically useful integration of many strands in psychoanalytic history with contemporary understandings of attachment, regulation, and trauma.*
—Jessica Benjamin, Ph.D.

Awakening the Dreamer: Clinical Journeys
Philip M. Bromberg
0-88163-441-7 2006 233pp. $55.00
"This extraordinary and beautiful book explicates how one mind reads another and why the mind-brain is intrinsically relational*"—Philip M. Bromberg, Ph.D.

What Do Mother's Want? Developmental Perspectives, Clinical Challenges
Sheila Feig Brown, editor
0-88163-400-X 2005 288pp. $49.95
"I cannot think of another book in which such an impressive group of clinicians has come together to deal with all aspects of the profound life changes set in motion by the birth of a baby.*
—Anni Bergman, Ph.D.

Symptom-Focused Dynamic Psychotherapy
Mary E. Connors
0-88163-444-1 2006 296pp. $59.95
"It is the particular gift of this volume that the working clinician is offered a pathway through which neither depth-psychological understanding nor symptom-focused relief has to be sacrificed in providing sound clinical care.*
—Jill R. Gardner, Ph.D.

The Dissociative Mind
Elizabeth Howell
0-88163-408-5 2005 328pp. $59.95
"Howell's book is so authoritative in its scholarship, so incandescently lucid, and so intimately true, that I believe its contribution will help to share our understanding of the mind's normal development and its therapeutic growth for many years to come.*
—Philip M. Bromberg, Ph.D.

Unconscious Fantasies and the Relational World
Danielle Knaf & Kenneth Feiner
0-88163-420-4 2006 232pp. $45.00
"Knafo and Feiner have done a masterful job. Their synthesis not only attests to the centrality of fantasy as a problem-solving mode of thought; it also reestablishes the critical importance of fantasy for contemporary psychoanalysis.*
—Virginia Goldner, Ph.D.

Craft and Spirit: A Guide to the Exploratory Psychotherapies
Joseph D. Lichtenberg
0-88163-433-6 2005 216pp. $45.00
"Dr. Lichtenberg presents his material so clearly and covers so much ground that the book's audience will include both experienced and recently trained practitioners and interested laypersons as well. I can only congratulate him on this exemplary achievement.*
—Estelle Shane, Ph.D.

The Healer's Bent: Solitude and Dialogue in the Clinical Encounter
James T. McLaughlin, edited and introduced by William Cornell
0-88163-436-0 2005 256pp. $49.95
"This volume offers the reader a rare glimpse into the heart and mind of one of America's most brilliant analytic thinkers.*
—Karen Maroda, Ph.D.

Talking with Doctors
David Newman
0-88163-446-8 2006 208pp. $32.50
"David Newman brings the sensitivity of a psychotherapist, with expertise in the nuances of emotion, personality functioning, and interpersonal dynamics, to this riveting examination of his horrifying and inspiring illness experience.*
—Lawrence Friedman, M.D.

Endings and Beginnings: On Terminating Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis
Herbert J. Schlesinger
0-88163-413-1 2005 256pp. $55.00
"This book is a small miracle; there is nothing quite like it. Schlesinger is clear, terse, detailed and clinical and, best of all, he is right there at the therapist's side, telling him what he means in practice.*
—Lewis Aron, Ph.D.

Psychoanalytic Collisions
Joyce Anne Slochower
0-88163-425-5 2006 208pp. $45.00
"Slochower tackles the difficult therapeutic challenges posed by mutual idealization, hatred, and erotic transference and countertransference and beautifully demonstrates how the analytic process negotiates and transforms these collisions.*
—Lewis Aron, Ph.D.

To Order:
Call Toll-Free: 1-800-926-6579
9a.m. - 5p.m. EST (M - F)


Jack and Kerry Kelly Novick. *Good Goodbyes: Knowing How to End in Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis*. Lanham, MD: Jason Aronson, 2006; 160 pp., $34.95.


Psychoanalytic Books: Reviews and Discussion


The review of an edited book is not an easy task, because it is difficult to do justice to all the single contributions that may need close examination. But the task becomes almost impossible if the edited book has 18 chapters written by 29 contributors. This is the case of the beautiful collection of essays in honor of Sidney Blatt, edited jointly by three students of Sidney (“Sid”) Blatt. This Festschrift is interesting because it provides an overview of the many areas of investigation in which Sid Blatt has been involved; and at the same time it gives you the opportunity to have a glance at various problems of contemporary research in fields related to psychoanalysis. Sid Blatt, who is the recipient of the 2006 Sigourney Award, is a very well known researcher in different areas of psychology and psychoanalysis, and an incredibly gifted and prolific researcher who has spent most of his career at Yale University. He has been involved in different areas of investigation such as personality development, psychopathology, psychological assessment and testing, psychotherapy process, applied psychoanalysis, and cultural trends. All these areas are well represented in this book, whose chapters are written by some of his colleagues, friends, and students (who often are the same who were involved in Sid Blatt’s researches, so that the reader has the opportunity to have a first hand account of these studies).

The contents of the book give an idea of its richness and provides a context for my ensuing comments. In a brief foreword, Morris I. Stein tells about the first researches of Sid Blatt, who was one of his graduate students at the University of Chicago. Then, the three co-editors, in a 20-page introduction (“The contributions of Sidney Blatt”), describe the various chapters; this presentation is quite useful in orienting the reader to this complex book, and also helps him/her select the chapters that are close to his/her specific interests.

The book is divided in five parts, each devoted to one of the areas mentioned above. I will briefly review the titles of the chapters of these five parts. Part I (Personality Development) has 3 chapters, respectively by Beatrice Beebe, Joseph Jaffe, and Frank Lachmann (“A dyadic systems view of communication”), Beatriz Priel (“Representations in middle childhood: a dialogical perspective”), and Norbert Freedman (“On spatialization: personal and theoretical thoughts”). Part II (Psychopathology) has 4 chapters, respectively by David C. Zuroff, Darcy Santor, and Myriam Mongrain (“Dependency, self-criticism, and maladjustment”), Nasreen Khatri and Zindel V. Segal (“Characterizing cognitive vulnerability in depression”), Stephen Fleck (“The development of schizophrenia: a psychosocial and biological approach”), and Phebe Cramer (“Another ‘lens’ for understanding therapeutic change: the interaction of IQ with defense mechanisms”).

Part III (Assessment) has 3 chapters, respectively by Barry Ritzler (“Sidney Blatt’s contributions to the assessment of object representations”), Howard D. Lerner (“Object relations and the Rorschach”), and Philip S. Holzman (“The Rorschach method: a starting point for investigating formal thought disorder”). Part IV (Psychotherapy and the Treatment Process) has 3 chapters, respectively by Peter Fonagy and Mary Target (“Some reflections on the therapeutic action of psychoanalytic therapy”), Lester Luborsky, Tomasz Andrusyna, and Louis Diguer (“How often are relationship narratives told during psychotherapy sessions?”), and Stanley B. Messer and Laura Maccann (“Research perspective on the case study: single case method”).

Part V (Applied Psychoanalysis) has 4 chapters, respectively by Paul L. Wachtel (“Greed as an individual and social phenomenon: an application of the two-configuration model”), Diana Diamond (“Narcissism as a clinical and social phenomenon”), Rachel B. Blass (“Attachment and separateness and the psychoanalytic understanding of the act of faith”), and Robert R. Holt (“The menace of...
postmodernism to a psychoanalytic psychology”).

It is impressive to see how many outstanding researchers and scholars have contributed to this book, and not only from North America (Fonagy and Target come from England, and Rachel Blass and Beatriz Priel come from Israel). This speaks to the importance and the prestige of Sid Blatt, who has been able, in his long academic career, to attract so many colleagues in intellectual exchanges and investigations around common areas of interest. It should be mentioned that Sid Blatt is also a clinician, and this quality, uncommon among academic researchers, puts him in the position of having both perspectives that divide our field: that of clinical practice and that of research. It is my impression, reading this book, that there is this common thread, this ideal goal: the attempt to fill the gap between these two realms of knowledge, in order not to lose sight of the “person” with all his/her daily problems and sufferings (as well as healthy functioning, as we will see). More than that, a quite uncommon peculiarity of Sid Blatt’s studies is the fact that he has made a continuous attempt to integrate, or to utilize, knowledge from fields that are often separate: think of Piaget’s ideas on cognitive development, the Rorschach and other projective tests, psychoanalysis and object relation theory, and attachment theory.

The editors, in their introduction, give us a vivid picture of Sid Blatt as a person and of his biography, in order to understand why he was motivated to study specific topics. For example, following a suggestion of Sid himself, they make the hypothesis that his strong interest in the two different forms of depression (that he originally called “anaclitic” or dependent and “introjective” or self-critical) originated from specific experiences with his family of origin. This information makes the reader feel eager to know and understand the theoretical part of the book, because, in a way, he or she keeps in mind some vivid clinical examples of what will be discussed.

The “two-configurations model” of personality and psychopathology is indeed one of the most well known conceptualizations of Sid Blatt. The co-editors’ introduction to the book gives the reader the opportunity to see this line of research in its historical development. For example, Sid not only had an interest in depression because of experiences in his family of origin, but initially observed these two forms of depression in two of his control cases at the Western New England Institute for Psychoanalysis in the early 1970s. One patient was dependent and seeking emotional contact, the other was self-critical, suicidal, and guilt-ridden. He called them, respectively, “anaclitic” and “introjective,” but later he extended this model to other forms of psychopathology and also to normal personality development, and, under the influence of attachment theory, he made the more inclusive distinction between “attachment or relatedness” and “separateness or self-definition” (for example, he found that most likely anaclitic psychopathologies derive from resistant attachments, while introjective psychopathologies derive from avoidant attachments). The “two-configurations model” characterized Sid’s research interests from very early in his career and accompanied him for many years, but, as we have seen, it is only one of his many areas of investigation described in this book. Actually, the two-configurations model represents his main frame of reference, a sort of “lens” though which he has always tried to build a comprehensive model of personality, of development, and of psychopathology.

A major interest for Sid Blatt has been the assessment of object representations and the relationship between cognitive processes and personality development. Some chapters of this book, for example in Part I and in Part III, as well as the introduction, are very clear in summarizing the conceptualizations and research findings of this area. Sid Blatt has been a major contributor to the research on psychological testing: since the early 1960s he was inspired by the classic text of 1945-46 by Rapaport, Gill, and Schafer, Diagnostic Psychological Testing, and for example used extensively the Rorschach and other projective techniques (see, to this regard, Phil Holzman’s chapter on the Rorschach method, in Part III). He also developed several rating scales, such as the Object Relations Inventory (ORI) and the Depressive Experience Questionnaire (DEQ); the latter, a structured questionnaire that has been validated in numerous studies, was used to evaluate the two types of depression (“anaclitic” and “introjective”).

In his work on cognitive representations he developed the Conceptual Level (CL) scale, which rates the descriptions of parents and other important figures of the child, and in his studies on personality development he tried to integrate some Piagetian ideas on cognitive development with his two-configurations model. This brought him eventually to suggest a comprehensive model of personality development, psychopathology, and therapeutic change that he named “cognitive morphology.” As John Auerbach, Kenneth Levy, and Carrie E. Schaffer explain in their detailed introduction (see pp. 9-10), this model is an integration of cognitive-developmental theory, psychoanalytic object relation theory, and attachment theory, and identifies several nodal points in

One of the merits of this book is to give the reader an overview of the body of research stimulated by Sidney Blatt, who... has been remarkable in his effort to consider simultaneously the data coming from diverse traditions, and to attempt conceptual integrations.
the development of the child. This model is impressive not only because it takes into consideration Erikson’s theory of life cycle, but also because it is an integration—and, in a way, an updating—of a Piagetian model with psychodynamic insights. It is also used to understand both normal and pathological phenomena, and it is extended to the analysis of the history of art and wider social phenomena as well (see, in this regard, Part V of the book, concerning applied psychoanalysis).

Another important feature of Sid Blatt’s investigations is that they are not limited to the building of a theoretical model or to psychological research, but they address also psychotherapy process and outcome, that is, they are relevant to clinical practice (see, in this regard, Part IV of the book). For example, Sid reanalyzed two major studies of psychotherapy research—namely, the Menninger Foundation Psychotherapy Research Project and the NIMH Treatment of Depression Collaborative Research Program (TDCRP)—and found interesting correlations between forms of psychopathology derived from his two-configurations model and the therapeutic outcome of specific diagnostic groups treated in these studies. He also analyzed the patients’ treatment at Austen Riggs Center (the Riggs-Yale Project—see Phebe Cramer’s chapter, in Part II). Regarding psychopathology, see also Part II, that contains, as we have seen above, chapters on specific stressors for specific types of depression, on schizophrenia, on the correlation with Aaron Beck’s “sociotropy versus autonomy” model of depression, and so forth. (Beck’s formulations, incidentally, were first published in 1983, long after Blatt’s original work on anaclitic and introjective depression which first appeared conceptually in 1974, and then empirically in 1976 and 1982).

Quite outstanding, it seems to me, is Part V of the book dedicated to applied psychoanalysis, because it is not common nowadays to see empirical researchers extending their investigations to wider social and cultural phenomena. In the spirit of the contributions of Sid Blatt, who applied his two-configurations model to art history, to the culture of narcissism, and to history of science. This final part of the book has a chapter by Paul Wachtel who uses the “two-configurations model” to study the psychodynamics of greed as well as a chapter by Diana Diamond who discusses the psychoanalytic theories of narcissism in light of the theories of the Frankfurt School (Marcuse, Adorno, Horkheimer, etc.). In the remaining two chapters of this part, Rachel Blass uses the concepts of attachment and separation to study religious faith, and Robert Holt analyzes the implications of postmodernism for psychoanalysis.

Overall, we can say that one of the merits of this book is to give the reader an overview of the body of research stimulated by Sidney Blatt, who, as we have seen, has been remarkable in his effort to consider simultaneously the data coming from diverse traditions, and to attempt conceptual integrations. Many authors in psychoanalysis have tried to draw general comprehensive models of the mind, in an attempt to overcome the fragmentation of our field that is divided into many different “schools,” often ignoring each other. Almost always, these attempts simply show the good will or naïveté of the respective authors, whose voices remain mostly unheard, and their books lie among hundreds of others in dusty library shelves. Sid Blatt’s attempt is different, because it is rooted in rigorous empirical research, has implications for psychotherapy process and outcome, and comes from the best academic tradition. His ideas are not forgotten, but to the contrary, as this book exemplifies very well, they have stimulated numerous other studies.

I would say that in his case it is true what is often said about the importance of a line of research: it deserves attention not only for its discoveries (which are and must be always provisional), but for the unanswered questions and the many pathways of research that it leaves open for future investigations.

Paolo Migone
migone@unipr.it

---

THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR PSYCHOANALYSIS
329 East 62nd Street, New York, NY 10021
The second oldest Psychoanalytic Institute in New York
Established in 1941
www.aipnyc.org

Most graduate students wish to be clinicians. How do they start a clinical practice and develop the resources to keep it going? How do they become part of a nurturing professional network?

The training programs at AIP have been serving the complex needs of clinicians for over sixty years.

CERTIFICATE PROGRAM IN PSYCHOANALYSIS
CERTIFICATE TWO YEAR PROGRAM IN PSYCHODYNAMIC PSYCHOTHERAPY

Training at the American Institute for Psychoanalysis offers:
• A broad-based contemporary curriculum with practical relevance to everyday clinical practice
• Inclusion of Karen Horney's ground-breaking and experience-near theory of split and conflicted self
• Participation with a dynamic, welcoming group of professional colleagues and being mentored by senior clinicians
• Intensive supervision by outstanding psychoanalysts
• Stimulating Scientific Meetings and professional workshops
• Private practice development for candidates
• Fee for service clinical work opportunities and training in a variety of specialty programs of the Karen Horney Clinic

Many of our members are now doing what they envisioned 3-5 years ago. Are you making your plans? Deadline for applications: June 15, 2007

We invite you to meet our Faculty and Students at our Open Houses, on February 3 and March 24, 2007
Saturdays, 12:00 to 2:00 PM
Please reserve your place by calling Joanna Macias at 212-838-8044
Every survivor of a disaster, whether natural or man-made feels lucky. Those of us who survived the Holocaust are only too aware that luck played a crucial role in our survival. It may have helped to be smart, resourceful, courageous and well connected, but more than any other factor, it is to luck that we owe our life.

What effect does that awareness have on our psyche? Those of us who believe in the importance of agency and choice are hard pressed to accept the fact that it is ultimately to chance that we owe our lives. Perhaps that is why so many of us have been drawn to the existential position; a philosophy that recognizes the inescapable aspects of human existence but at the same time urges us to transcend our limitations and take an active stance in our lives. We may owe our survival to luck but we have a responsibility to make our life a meaningful one.

Writing one’s story, telling the world what happened to us is part of that responsibility. Increasingly we, the remaining survivors of the Holocaust, are experiencing a moral imperative to bear witness. But it is never without a degree of ambivalence that we do so. A wish to leave a legacy for future generations and the responsibility to preserve the memories often collide with the desire to forget or to let the painful past remain in its encapsulated internal place.

Survivors are perpetually suspended between concealment and disclosure. To tell or not to tell; to know or not to know are themes that appear and reappear in the autobiographical writings of the two psychoanalysts whose work will be reviewed in this essay.

Anna Ornstein and Henri Parens, born just one year apart in the late 1920s, both waited until 2004 to publish their wartime stories. At that point, they had many years of successful practice in the field of psychiatry with a specialty in child psychiatry. Perhaps the fact that their childhood was shaped by war influenced their desire to help children who suffered. Their dedication to a life of healing is not unusual for survivors and their children who are well represented in the mental health field.

Their pre-war experiences were markedly different as were their wartime experiences although both spent time in concentration camps. Nevertheless, it is striking how many similarities there are in the way that they coped, their values, and the kind of life that they were able to create post-Holocaust. Those common themes are of particular interest to me, because I have observed them in my own life and in the lives of other survivors whom I have known intimately or professionally or through their creative productions.

Survivors I have known, myself included, do not fit such clear categories. We are complex individuals who are not affected in the same way by our diverse experiences. We all have scars from wounds that are forever in the process of healing, which may fade with time. But they don’t necessarily prevent us from living productive lives.
fulfilling lives are testaments to their resilience during and in the aftermath of severe trauma.

Anna Ornstein’s *My Mother’s Eyes* is a collection of stories based on her memories of events that took place in 1944, when as a young girl of seventeen, she was imprisoned in Auschwitz along with her mother. The title of the book, which memorializes her bond with her mother, refers to the fact that when they arrived in Auschwitz her mother’s glasses were taken away and Anna became her mother’s eyes and hands. Her mother in turn, used her brain and wits for both of them. The powerful bond between the two of them was an important factor in their survival.

These stories were originally told around the Seder table and they became a cherished part of her family’s Passover tradition. Each year for twenty-five years, Ornstein reached into her memories and shared a specific moment from her past with her children and the Passover guests. Taken together the stories provide a coherent picture of the author’s experiences. While most of her focus is on events that took place during the Shoah, there are a few memories from before the war to give us a context, and there are a couple of chapters at the end of the book in which she shares her observations and ideas about the Holocaust. Throughout we see the brilliant psychoanalyst using her training and her experience to make sense of what she lived through and of its impact on her life. As she looks back, she brings the wisdom and understanding of the analyst to the memories indelibly etched in her mind.

Ornstein is interested in the workings of memory. She observes that memories of the past become stronger and not dimmer with time as one might expect. She notes that looking at her children and grandchildren stirs those memories. In fact, she was inspired to write the Passover stories by a suggestion from her eldest daughter Sharone, a college freshman at the time—probably around the same age as Ornstein was when she was imprisoned.

Another interesting observation that the author makes is that shared memories have an immensely cathartic effect. I myself have noted this fascinating phenomenon. When I write about emotional events, the words seem to come unencumbered with strong affect that could potentially be disorganizing. It is not until they are read out loud to a friend or an audience that their full emotional force emerges. My theory about this is that a witness to our suffering provides us with a holding environment that facilitates a fuller integration of the experience.

When Ornstein wavers in her commitment to bring the past into the present, she motivates herself with the recognition that it is through these stories that she memorializes those who have perished. She writes:

During the last few years, each time Passover neared I decided not to write another story. But each time I changed my mind. I believe I cannot stop writing because these stories are memorials I am erecting in the minds of our children. I fear that if I stop writing, stop building the memorial, my children and everyone who reads these stories, will stop remembering the people we have lost—and those who are forgotten are truly dead. (p. 14)

Ornstein recognizes that mourning is a lifelong process and she welcomes it as a way to keep her loved ones with her forever. Through her stories we become acquainted with the lost members of her family, her father and her two older brothers. She shares with us a slice of her life before the Shoah. We also meet her husband-to-be Paul Ornstein, who wrote the preface to her book. This partnership, which has lasted through their forced separation during the war years and resumed when they found each other after the war, is now over sixty years old.

Ornstein’s capacity for joy is alive and well. In fact, she maintains that what she endured makes her appreciate life more. The sense that one gets in reading the book is that young Anna always had, and never lost, the capacity for seeing the silver lining. Remarkably, she was able to find moments of joy even under the worst of circumstances. An interesting example of this is found in the chapter “The Tattoo.” We are all at this point familiar with the horror of the numbers tattooed on the arms of inmates at the death factories like Auschwitz. But Ornstein’s description of the experience is quite novel. She tells us that the announcement of the tattoo filled the inmates with optimism because it meant that the Germans intended to keep them alive. She writes “We were proud of our tattoos, which gave us some sort of identity…we considered them to be ‘passports’ to life” (pp. 87-88). She then describes in detail how she managed to find the person who did the neatest tattoo and get on that line. She was determined that her tattoo would have small well-shaped numbers.

Anna Ornstein’s formula for survival in a concentration camp was “A bit of alertness, a bit of determination, and lots and lots of good luck” (p. 96). I would add another piece, which she implies but doesn’t directly state. I would call it a rich imaginative life and a capacity for dissociation. She describes how when standing on those interminable lines, she and her fellow inmates would try to recover lines of a poem or piece together the plot of
a novel. These mental games that took her away from her abysmal situation are beautifully described in a chapter, “The Window.” Here she describes how she created an elaborate fantasy about a small house that she passed everyday on the march out of the camp on a work detail. As she returns from hours of labor, exhausted and hungry in shoes that do not fit because they belonged to someone else, she finds a way with her creative mind to transport herself to another world. She focuses on the small lace-curtained window of the house and in her mind’s eye she imagines the most intricate details of a room behind the window. She furnishes the room with glowing lamps, books piled high on a night table next to an imaginary bed with clean sheets smelling of soap, and she even imagines the drawers of a dresser filled with clean underwear, warm sweaters, and wool socks. Everyday she looks forward to the fantasy, which she savors and uses to make her life a little easier to bear.

Such a story is not the usual stuff of Holocaust memoirs and gives us a little window into the heart and mind of an adolescent who managed to survive horrific conditions with an inner core of strength and determination intact.

Revisiting places where one’s trauma was experienced is for many survivors a dreaded but also necessary experience. Toward the end of her book, the author writes about her return to Auschwitz with her children. She is surprised by a strange feeling of contentment. The presence of the children and grandchildren and a chance to share the memories provided a soothing background for the profound grief that was awakened by the visit. Survivors are keenly aware of the link between generations because for so many of us the link was severed. Having one’s children to witness what has been endured is a way of reaffirming the link and ensuring the continuity of generations.

Ornstein’s greatest pride is in her children. She has particular difficulty with the notion of transgenerational transmission of trauma. Her three impressive adult children, all psychiatrists like their parents, are indeed a testament to the limitations of such a concept. No doubt trauma is transmitted intergenerationally, but at the same time there are some wonderful values that are transmitted, as well such as the appreciation of the small joys of life and the recognition that life is precious and never to be taken for granted.

Some have criticized Ornstein for minimizing the devastating effects of the Holocaust. I don’t agree with those so-called trauma specialists who say that she doesn’t acknowledge the tragic consequences. What I believe that she does do is highlight what is usually minimized, which is the potential for personal growth in such experiences. In her emphasis, she attempts to redress the wrongs of those who have pathologized survivors. I personally find her perspective refreshing and enlightening.

A lthough Henri Parens and Anna Ornstein are contemporaries, Parens was a few years younger when he was caught in the maelstrom of the Holocaust because the Nazis invaded Belgium during the early part of the war and did not get to Hungary. Ornstein’s birthplace, until 1944. Henry Parens had experienced loss even before the Holocaust. His parents separated when he was a young child, and his mother relocated from Poland, where he was born, to Brussels, leaving his older brother and father behind. The bond with his mother was particularly strong, which was a fact that made their ultimate separation during the Holocaust when he was just 12 years old especially traumatic for him. They had fled for safety to France but had found themselves imprisoned in a concentration camp in Vichy. Parens’ mother had the foresight to urge him to escape while she remained behind and ultimately died in Auschwitz. He found asylum with OSE, a Jewish organization in France that protected and transported refugee children to America. He arrived in America in 1942, and began a new life as a foster child with a Jewish family.

For his memoir, Parens chose the title, Renewal of Life: Healing from the Holocaust. So even before we read the book, we know that his focus will be on the positive aspects of recovery from trauma. His book is divided into three sections and only the first part “What Happened to My World” deals with his childhood trauma. In the remainder of the book he examines the impact of those early years on his adult life and choices. Like Ornstein, but somewhat less subtly, he brings his professional expertise to his self-analysis. In the last section, he gives us detailed information about the professional work that he has been engaged in. His personal experiences have undoubtedly influenced his interest in the early prevention of violence and malignant prejudice. Some readers may find the philosophical sections a bit heavy-handed and a little preachy but the feeling of hope that he communicates may be inspiring to others.

For some time now, I have been interested in the stylistic aspects of autobiographical writing particularly when the author is not a professional writer. I have found that the most successful work is characterized by a simple understated style that evokes the emotions in the reader rather than making them explicit in the text. I agree with Paul Ornstein when, in the preface of his wife’s book he writes, “The immediacy and unembellished simplicity of her narratives draw her readers into these experiences as if they had been there” (p. 7). In contrast, Parens’ book is replete
with repetitions, foreign phrases, and free associations. One wonders why the editors did not take a more active role in shaping the final product.

Although it may be somewhat laborious to get through Parens’ book, it is a challenge that is worth undertaking because it gives us insight into the mind and heart of a man who has made a commitment to be as honest as he can be. He lets the reader be a witness to his struggle by sharing his doubts, his failings, and his fears. One has the sense that he is working through his trauma in the process of writing about it. He sprinkles foreign phrases throughout the text in what I presume is an attempt to connect with the memories in a more immediate way. Sometimes it feels somewhat obsessive, but most of the time we appreciate the fact that he is less guarded than those who have produced more polished work.

I have found much to identify with in Parens’ work. The link between intense anxiety generated by the psychological work of revisiting the traumatic past and psychosomatic symptoms is brilliantly illustrated in his memoir. Once he decided to write his Holocaust story, he found himself continuously itching and battling severe eczema. This mind-body connection reminded me of my experience in 1990, when I was invited to testify by the Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies at Yale. The night before my interview, my entire body was covered with hives for the first time in my life.

In his attempt to understand the reasons for his resistance to going public with his story prior to now, the author concludes that a conscious reason is that he did not want to burden his patients with the knowledge that he is a Holocaust survivor. I too have grappled with the issue of self-disclosure and I have written about it extensively elsewhere (Richman, in press).

Those of us who have told our stories, despite our reluctance, resistance, and ambivalence are sometimes rewarded with a letter like the one that I received four years after the publication of my memoir. It was sent from Germany by a stranger who had found my book in an English bookshop in what was once East Berlin. He wrote:

I want to thank you for your impressive description of your life. As a German, born 1956, I am very interested in the contemporary witness descriptions and I regret that we haven’t more books about this issue—we couldn’t have enough! The storytelling by the witnesses is important and necessary for the post-war generations (not only) in Germany. Your stories are an admonition that we don’t forget what happened.

As contemporary witnesses, Ornstein and Parens have made a valuable contribution to the literature on the Holocaust. Their works are not only stories of courage, insight, and hope but also important documents to be passed on to future generations.

REFERENCES

Sophia Richman
SophiaRichman@aol.com
This book is comprised of two monographs that were presented at a weekend conference on love, organized by the British Psychoanalytical Society in 2000. The book opens with André Green’s atypical psychoanalytic paper, “To Love or Not to Love: Eros and Eris,” and concludes with Gregorio Kohon’s fascinating clinical study titled “Love in a Time of Madness.” Though the book’s ambitious title is quite misleading given that love in its vicissitudes are barely touched upon, nonetheless this book presents two brilliant European psychoanalytic minds reflecting on the theme of love. Green, perhaps the consummate French analyst, focuses predominantly on the nature of passion in the endeavor of love while Kohon, an Argentinian practicing in London, considers the role that madness plays in accompanying love.

Green attempts to revisit the place of love in psychoanalytic theory and practice. He asks us to consider what in the psychoanalytic method is related to love and what in the teachings of psychoanalysis is essential to love in life. In engaging these questions, Green offers a brief outline and critical analysis of different psychoanalytic positions with their strengths and shortcomings.

In particular, he considers the contributions made by Freud, Balint, Klein, Bion, Winnicott, Bowlby, Lacan, Bergmann, and Kernberg. His analysis leads to a difficulty that lies at the heart of psychoanalytic theorizing: namely, that the conceptual vocabulary of “science” does not easily lend itself to the poetry of the inner world and the core human experience of love. In brief, Green concludes that psychoanalysis has not contributed much to our understanding of the experience of love and that instead, it is to literature that we must turn for enlightenment about the nature of Eros in all its depth and complexity.

Holding that “passion will be our model” (p. 10) for grasping love’s elusive nature, Green states, “the main feature of love is a feeling of irresistible attraction, experienced in exaltation, and the desire to be as close as possible to the love object” (p. 11). Symbolization is regarded as a derivative of love relationships and love is viewed as “not only an opening of the senses but also an exaltation of a sensitivity to the offerings of life” (p. 11). Consequently, Green frames his erudite monograph with epigraphs drawn from Racine and Shakespeare, relates the Indian myth of Brahma and Shiva, and concludes by appending one of Shakespeare’s most haunting and mysterious poems, “The Phoenix and the Turtle,” as a model to inspire one’s contemplation of love and its vicissitudes. Green’s discussion of this poem, based on an Ethiopian myth, helps us to grasp the poem’s otherwise intangible force drawing the reader to the sacrifices of identity in love (and its apotheosis in death itself), the importance in love of fusional states and primary processes, the deadly power of passion, and the realm of the ecstatic. He uses his reading of this poem’s melancholic ferociousness that defies logical analysis to support his view of what psychoanalysis can learn from poetry and what psychoanalytic theorizing has found it hard to grasp hold of.

Kohon’s “Love in a Time of Madness” is a completely different kind of paper, focusing instead on an extended account of a seventeen year long analysis of a psychotic young man. This beautifully written case study and its wide ranging elaboration completed while the author was part of an IPA Research Group on Borderline Phenomena (2000-2003) that included André Green, Kernberg, Spillius-Bott, and others, demonstrates the virtuosity of an experienced psychoanalyst working for extended periods of time with the sufferings, the hatefulness, and the idealized love of a highly disturbed patient. Kohon’s skillfully crafted narrative demonstrates the unthinkable and incomunicable psychic extremes both patient and analyst are forced to endure in an analytic journey through fearful states of madness and delusion, idealized transference-love and terror, and ultimately love and hate. As Margot Waddell of Tavistock Clinic notes in the book’s Foreword, Kohon frames and contains “the quasi-metaphysical evocation of passion and destruction, of fusional unity and dislocation,” (p. xv) just as André Green manages in his discussion of “The Phoenix and the Turtle.”

We see in this presentation of the case of Tony how a patient’s life can become a perversion of love deriving from early on where he was condemned by a mad mother to live with her in a kind of delusional unity. The absolute significance of infantile experience drawn from the mother/baby relationship in the forging of the passions and madness of love are evident throughout Kohon’s work with Tony. As a British object relational theorist, albeit renouncing partisan terminologies, Kohon emphasizes the import of an infant being enabled by his mother’s mind to bear the extremes of love and hate as a normal condition—a condition that generates the ordinary or “normal madness” (p. 68) of the infantile state. This ordinary madness, distinct from psychosis, lies at the root of the capacity for passion and Eros and thus, will have a continuous presence in adult life. In Kohon’s words, “it is the personal madness present later in all forms of love . . . . It is there in all
manifestations of the drives, in every expression of sexuality; it is the madness of pleasure and desire, of narcissism and idealization, a basic madness which informs human life right from the start” (p. 69).

Kohon’s sensitive and evocative narrative, somewhat more like poetry and literature, breathes life into theory and as such, makes a unique contribution to the psychoanalytic canon. For example, in describing Tony’s tragic predicament of being of his mother with no father, Kohon states, “Tony had believed . . . he was a real prince who had been given to her by the Royal Family” (p. 45). When Tony subsequently concretely demanded that Kohon was “his father,” Kohon skilfully chose neither to provide delusional satisfaction of his wishes nor to interpret his “wish to be my son” (p. 53). Consequently, by providing his own sage reflections on psychoanalytic technique, Kohon takes up love as being “at the centre of transference, making all frustrations (including the sexual ones) bearable to the patient” (p. 78). This understanding becomes paramount when dealing with the primitive patient’s idealization of the analyst—perhaps the only available experience of love and consequently necessitating considerable prudence and narcissistic health on the analyst’s part not to interfere with this idealization “just on principle” (p. 79).

This wonderful paper closes with Kohon’s distinctive musings upon Winnicott’s notion that madness is the most personal characteristic of a human being, and as such, one must come to accept the inevitable conflict between the fear of madness and the need to be mad. Kohon, with Tony, elegantly shows how psychoanalytic love is able to survive destructiveness by remaining alive to and eventually achieving some sort of balance between the fear of madness and its need to exist.

Taken together, these two marvelous and highly stimulating papers make an important contribution to what is otherwise a rather sparse psychoanalytic literature on love in its more passionate bodily and elemental manifestations. Though a short and rather concise book, it is rich in evocative writing and filled with ideas that any clinician can make use of. Green’s monograph broadens our discipline’s approach to love by bringing the poetic in closer alignment with the analytic, while Kohon helps us to see how love and hate require the analyst’s complex understandings and skillful technical navigation within the madness of deeper analytic work. I recommend this book without reservation to virtually any psychoanalytic clinician, from the most experienced to those just beginning. There are pearls of wisdom for all.

Michael J. Diamond
dadiamond@aol.com
The first volume of *Relational Psychoanalysis* occupies a special place in my heart and mind. Published in 1999, I remember the excitement of early continuing education seminars on articles from the book; and I remember being jealous of those fortunate enough to be in an online seminar with the editors, Stephen Mitchell and Lewis Aron. When the online seminar was offered the next year, it was interrupted by the sudden, too soon death of Stephen Mitchell. I keep the *New York Times* notice of his death in the front of that volume as a reminder of all he has done and some of what we have lost.

That first volume gave me a way to think about Lacan and Bion through an article by Michael Eigen; expanded my sense of the unconscious in articles by Donnel Stern and Robert Stolorow and George Atwood; alerted me to the complexities of a two person psychology and attending to the subjectivities of both analyst and patient in articles by Hoffman, Chodorow, Greenberg, Aron, Bromberg, Stuart Pizer, and Renik; and introduced me to the importance of intersubjectivity in papers by Benjamin and Ogden. Mitchell, Spezzano, Harris, and Davies and Frawley hinted at the power that comes from looking from a different perspective. But certainly the most personally transformative article introduced me not only to the thinking of its author, Emmanuel Ghent, but through him the work of Winnicott’s colleague, Marion Milner. As the editors were preparing this second volume of *Relational Psychoanalysis*, Emmanuel Ghent also died. The editors are aware of the huge challenge they face of charting the growth of relational psychoanalysis in the context of great promise and great loss.

In this review I hope to trace what Mitchell and Aron hoped to accomplish in the first volume, and to describe the view of relational psychoanalysis that emerged, the responses to the vision of that volume, the purposes of the second volume, and how well the articles in the second volume meet the editors’ purposes.

Mitchell and Aron noted that relational psychoanalysis shares certain ideas with Freud. A psychoanalysis that does not draw on basic features of Freud’s thought and practice would be virtually unrecognizable as psychoanalysis—thinking about mind in terms of unconscious processes; exploring the dialectic between present and past; grounding states of mind in bodily experiences; a careful, patient listening to the analysand’s associations; a play in the dialectic between fantasy and reality; the focus on feelings about the analyst (transference) and psychical obstacles to uncomfortable thoughts and feelings (resistance). (p. ix.)

In a workshop on the therapeutic action in relational psychoanalysis, my colleague Billy Brennan and I (Brennan & DeMattos, 2003) noted that relational thinkers posit a different model of the mind, that rather than seeing the mind as a set of predetermined structures emerging from inside an individual organism, Mitchell (1998) drew on a social theory of mind that redefined mind as “transactional patterns and internal structures derived from an interactive, interpersonal field” (p. 17). Once you accept a theory of mind that involves two people, then technique is naturally going to be examined in terms of the impact and participation of the analyst in the relationship. As Crastnopol (2001) has pointed out, this means...
that the relational analyst needs to be grounded in his or her own subjectivity and engage in interventions “out of the underlying conviction that this approach will progressively allow patient and analyst together to experience and fully recognize aspects of the patient’s self that were heretofore unknown or unaccepted” (p. 388).

The relational view has been critiqued by several contemporary analysts. Of the critiques I wish to discuss, only Silverman’s (2000) was written before Mitchell’s death. In 2000, Silverman did an interrogation of the relational turn and expressed concern that Mitchell’s appeal to contemporary philosophers to support his view of mind and his defining validity as a function of utility were problematic. Mitchell responded:

There is no place in any of my writings in which I argue against the idea that the patient has a mind with preexisting properties before ever encountering the analyst or that there are no continuities among the versions of ourselves that emerge with different people. This would, of course, be preposterous. But I think a problem with preconstructivist thinking is the assumption that there is a static organization to mind that manifests itself whole cloth across experiences. A very good description of the way I think about mind as preexisting but not preorganized is to be found in Ogden [Reverie and Interpretation, 1997, p.190]:

The internal object relationship … is not a fixed entity; it is a fluid set of thoughts, feelings, and sensations that is continually in movement and is always susceptible to being shaped and restructured as it is newly experienced in the context of each new unconscious intersubjective relationship. In every instance it will be a different facet of the complex movement of feeling constituting an internal object relationship that will be most alive in the new unconscious intersubjective context. It is this that makes each unconscious analytic interaction unique both for analyst and analysand. (p. 155)

In responding to Silverman’s concerns about validity, Mitchell writes that psychoanalytic knowledge is generated in the intersubjective mix between analyst and patient and that “the only way analyst can know anything about the mind of the patient is in interaction with his or her own mind” (ibid, p. 157). These versions of the patient’s mind are unique to the particular analytic encounter and so cannot meet traditional definitions of validity.

Busch (2001) is particularly critical of the social theory of mind espoused by Mitchell and other relational writers. For Busch, the primary goal of analysis is to free the individual patient’s mind, replacing the inevitability of action with the possibility of reflection. He objects to the relational analyst’s stance of not knowing and exploring the relational matrix rather than the patient’s individual mind. Greenberg (2001) has written of his concern about relational analysts’ “risk-taking, engaging patients in a highly personal way that breaks the traditional analytic frame” (p. 359). He worries about relational psychoanalysis becoming a movement with all the excesses that movements bring, outlining four relational principles and then expresses this concern:

Consider the four principles as I have outlined them. The personal influence of each analyst, the uniqueness of each analytic dyad, the inevitable uncertainty about what is happening at any moment in the treatment, and the consequent unpredictability of the effects of any intervention all suggest that there is no one way of working that can be privileged across the board over any other. Each analyst and each analysand must find the mode of engagement that best serves the analytic goals the participants have defined. There is no way, the relational critique reminds us, to assert a priori the
benefit of any technical intervention. . . And yet, the clinical examples through which relational authors illustrate their perspective seem always to point us in a particular direction. (pp. 363-364)

Eagle, Wolitzky, and Wakefield (2001) also raise concerns about the relational view of the mind and the relational analyst’s stance of not knowing.

Our main thesis is that new view theorists, in attempting to justify their critique of classical theory, have taken philosophical positions that are untenable, create at least as many difficulties as they are intended to resolve, and undermine assumptions essential to psychoanalysis. We also maintain that these positions are unnecessary to sustain the legitimate criticisms of psychoanalysis advanced by new view theorists. We show that even they are uncomfortable with a philosophical position that precludes any attempt to uncover truths about mental contents. This discomfort is reflected both in the disjunction between their conceptual stance and the clinical material they present, and in their tortured redefinitions of truth and objectivity. We conclude that a fruitful philosophical position for psychoanalysis is a “humble realism” in which one recognizes the uncertainty of psychoanalytic inference but nonetheless is governed by the ideal that interpretation and understanding attempt to “tally with what is real in [the patient].” (p. 461)

Most recently, Mills (2005) has offered an appreciation and a critique of relational psychoanalysis. Mills examines three main philosophical tenets of relational psychoanalysis: the primacy of relatedness, intersubjective ontology, and psychoanalytic hermeneutics. In terms of the primacy of relatedness, Mills states, “relational theory is merely stating the obvious” (p. 158), and that what is really unique to relational psychoanalysis is the abnegation of the drives. Mills is also concerned that relational psychoanalysis privileges intersubjective systems in a way that diminishes “the individually constituted and constitutive mind” (p. 162). Thirdly, Mills notes that the relational theorists have “embraced a constructivist epistemology and method of interpretation” (p. 162) but do not clearly define their theoretical system that guides analytic method.

I read these critiques before I read the second volume of Relational Psychoanalysis. So I came to this second volume with some curiosity about whether the editors and contributors would address these critiques of the nature of mind, the nature of therapeutic action, the authority of the analyst, and the elaboration of the theoretical system that guides analytic method.

What immediately becomes clear when looking at the table of contents is that the editors do intend to address therapeutic action, and the nature of mind, and the social and cultural dimensions of relationality. In the Introduction, Aron and Harris make it clear that they are aware of the dangers of relational psychoanalysis becoming a school or of being vague and eclectic. Following the sensibilities of the first volume, Aron and Harris continue to refer to a tradition rather than a school:

In the spirit of pluralism, we begin with a guiding premise that there can be multiple pathways in the development of theories and that individuals in distinct and different communities work and interact and influence each other in ways that can only add to the health of our discipline and our practice. (p. xiv).

While Mills states that what makes relational theory unique is the abnegation of the drives, Aron and Harris return to Mitchell’s 1988 book on relational concepts to find the relational approach being much more inclusive, housing theorists who maintain an allegiance to the drive model, theorists who use drive model language but redefine key terms, and theorists who broke from drive theory. As Aron and Mitchell wrote in the first volume, drive theorists and relational theorists are exploring the same phenomena but using different language. This gave me a sudden pang of missing Emmanuel Ghent (2002) who dealt with these issues so movingly in his last published paper, “Wish, Need, Drive.”

Unlike Mills, Aron and Harris are not defining relational concepts as a theory but as a structure or schema or plan of action or strategy “that holds together various concepts, thus allowing a theorist to integrate his or her own theory within it” (p. xvi). Aron and Harris describe how Mitchell established such a structure with three dimensions (a self pole, an object pole, and an interactional pole). This is the beginning of elaborating how to think intersubjectively that is extended in the papers by Beebe and Lachmann and Karlen Lyons-Ruth.

The first part of this second volume on therapeutic action serves as a thoughtful response to Greenberg’s concern that relational authors “seem always to point us in a particular direction.” Demonstrating their commitment to the spirit of pluralism, the editors present a series of papers on therapeutic...
action that both share a recognition of the interactive nature of
the analytic field and demonstrate a variety of points.

If in the first volume Hoffman, Chodorow, Greenberg, Aron, Bromberg, Pizer, and Renik had alerted me to the complexities of attending to the subjectivities of both analyst and patient, in this second volume Ehrenberg, Slochower, Cooper and Levitt, Slavin and Kreigman, Maroda, and Jacobs explore the choices analysts have in this interactive, intersubjective field. Ehrenberg, drawing on her interpersonal training and extending it by relating to the work of Winnicott (“the continuity-contiguity moment”) and Guntrip (“the moment of real meeting”), sees analyst and patient as “observing-participants” (p. 7) engaged in a mutual and authentic collaboration. In this article, Ehrenberg stresses the value of sharing her unprocessed, immediate reactions to her patients. However, in the afterward she notes, “disclosure is only one of the many possible responses we can offer at any given moment. How to determine the kind of response is the critical issue” (p. 19). Ehrenberg also keeps the memory and thought of Mitchell alive by continuing to dialogue with him and clarifying what she means by the intimate edge: “an interactive creation that exists only intersubjectively. It is always unique to the moment” (p. 20).

Offering a counterpoint to Ehrenberg’s article, Slochower explores when the analyst’s subjectivity should be kept in the background. Also drawing on Winnicott, but this time using Winnicott’s idea of the analytic holding environment, Slochower explores analytic situations in which mutuality is not clinically possible until there is some holding that allows the patient to develop his or her subjectivity without being overwhelmed by the analyst’s “otherness.” Slochower writes:

When the reality of my separate subjectivity consistently disrupts inner process and cannot be worked with or worked through, I turn to the holding process. I use holding in a metaphoric sense to allude to the coconstructed creation, by patient and analyst, of an illusion of analytic reliability and attunement. (p. 34)

As Ehrenberg stresses the importance of the therapist’s disclosure, and Slochower explores when the therapist needs to stay in the background, Cooper and Levitt explore another dimension of the analyst-patient interaction: “the patient’s experience of the analyst as old and new.” Cooper and Levitt note that their paper was inspired by Greenberg’s paper on neutrality (published in the first volume of Relational Psychoanalysis). While Greenberg had equated new objects with good objects and old objects with bad objects, Cooper and Levitt see three possible readings of Fairbairn and end by encouraging analysts to cultivate new ways of describing old and new.

Slavin and Kreigman offer another context to understand the work of Ehrenberg, Slochower, and Cooper and Leavitt, who each in a different way address the action of the analyst, to explore why the analyst needs to change, how in order for the patient to change the analyst must change. Using Winnicott and concepts from evolutionary psychology, Slavin and Kreigman develop a theory of conflict, negotiation, and mutual influence. Some of the themes that had been present in Benjamin’s and Pizer’s articles in the first volume are revisited by Slavin and Kreigman through the lens of evolutionary psychology:

We develop here a perspective in which the centrality of the conflict between the patient’s and analyst’s needs and identities leads to continuing efforts to break down each other’s identity: to reveal and examine each other’s biases (identities, loyalties, agendas) and the inevitable conflicts between them. Patient and analyst continuously experience each other doing this. (p. 82)

Maroda focuses on one of the ways analysts need to change:
by showing some emotion. Maroda highlights the importance of affective communication citing the recent research of neurobiologists and emotion researchers. The title of Maroda’s article, “Show Some Emotion,” is in some sense a tease: she tells us that we cannot help but show our emotions.

Maroda’s argument is echoed by the research of Heller and Haynal who found that a psychiatrist’s facial expression while interviewing patients who had made a suicide attempt was a much better predictor of subsequent suicide attempts than the psychiatrist’s conscious assessment.

Maroda’s article points to the importance of knowing one’s feelings so that the analyst does not mislead her or his patient. Jacobs also makes this point in his contribution. He writes that neutrality does not include misleading or double-binding patients by refusing to acknowledge their accurate perceptions of the analyst.

The second part of volume two is devoted to relational perspectives on development. The contributors to this section, Beebe and Lachmann, Fonagy and Target, Coates, and Lyons-Ruth, use current infant–caregiver observation research and attachment research to demonstrate how minds are developed in interaction. Fonagy and Target’s concept of reflective functioning seems very close to Busch’s idea of helping his patients develop minds that reflect rather than act. No philosophers are quoted in these papers, but there is solid support for a social theory of mind.

The articles in the third part of the volume bring society into the clinic by discussing the urban poor (Altman), perversion (Dimen), race (Leary), and homosexuality (Corbett). Again, there are echoes of earlier work by Harris and Mitchell (2002a, 2002b). But this is also an indication where a relational strategy/tradition can take us.

In closing, I was very grateful for the careful editing of these papers that made for enjoyable reading. I was also glad that the editors continued the tradition of the first volume of providing introductions to each paper that put them in context and afterwords that allowed the authors to reflect on the development of their ideas.

References


Susan deMattos

demattos@ix.netcom.com

Innovation with respect for tradition

International • Innovative • Inspirational

The International Journal of Psychoanalysis

“Many of the ‘classical’ articles that everyone who is analytically educated reads have been published in the IJP as far back as its earliest days and this is a tradition that I feel is undiminished through to the present.”

Daniel Widlöcher,
President, International Psychoanalytical Association

“Analyst at Work: casework accounts with two commentaries from differing standpoints

Psychoanalytic Controversies: a position paper with a “face-off” reaction

Secure ordering for individuals and libraries via:

http://www.ijpa.org/subscribe _intermediate.htm

For further information please contact:
Tim Lynch, Subscriptions Officer,
Int J Psychoanalysis, 112a Shirland Rd, LONDON, W9 2EQ, UK
Fax: +44 20 7563 5014, e-mail: subs@ijpa.org
This is a major breakthrough book that integrates large sets of diverse studies that have preoccupied developmental psychoanalytic thinking for the past three decades. Addressing the age-old question of how the capacity to create an idea first came about, Greenspan and Shanker advance a new evolutionary hypothesis based on observations of human babies and nonhuman primates as well as fresh evidence from neuroscience, linguistics, anthropology, and paleontology. The importance of the book, however, is not simply that it brings together a rich array of findings from diverse fields. But rather that the authors place emotions and emotional signaling at center stage in the development of thought—in contrast to the general philosophical tendency to view the passions as enemies of thought. Greenspan and Shanker maintain that the complex human capacity for symbolic thought is not hardwired, but must be learned through human interactions. Six initial levels of emotional interacting and signaling are put forward as the foundation for 16 lifespan stages of thinking and learning. The authors’ views challenge the prevailing theory that the evolution of thought has proceeded predominantly through changes in genetic processes of natural selection, genetic mutation, and random genetic drift. They demonstrate that the origins of symbolic thinking and speaking depend on social transmission of cultural practices learned anew by each generation. In this way of approaching the origins of thought, basic biological processes are seen as necessary but not sufficient conditions for individuals to construct symbols and to engage in thought. The sufficient condition for the development of thought involves a series of interactive learning steps. And in humans, even the tools of learning must be interactively relearned each generation.

Central to Greenspan and Shanker’s thesis is that “our highest level mental capacities, such as reflective thinking, only develop fully when infants and children are engaged in certain types of nurturing learning interactions” (p. 7) and that children deprived of such interactions exhibit a variety of problems in their social, language and thinking capacities.

The authors see as incorrect the view held by many leading neuroscientists such as LeDoux that emotions are states of mind somewhat separate from and competing with logical thinking. Contrary to the ideas of Chomsky and Pinker on the origins of language, the authors hold that language and cognition are embedded in the emotional processes that give rise to symbols. They show that while Piaget and his followers conducted pioneering studies on how a child acts on his world in order to learn to think, they were unable to formulate the mechanism through which symbol formation and thinking actually occurs.

As a further critique, the authors add that since the days of Hobbes, social organization and political discourse has been widely viewed as a function of language that is basically genetically mediated. In contrast, Greenspan and Shanker maintain, “the growth of complex cultures and societies and human survival itself depends on the capacities for intimacy, empathy, reflective thinking, and a shared sense of humanity and reality” (p. 9). These capacities that allow human beings to work together cooperatively in larger and larger groups with a high degree of mutual empathy and trust are the same human emotional capacities that are required for the development of symbols, language, and thought. “The affective processes that orchestrate individual intelligence connect the individual to the social group and characterize the way in which the group functions” (Ibid.). While the stages of emotional and intellectual growth delineated by Greenspan and Shanker parallel in many ways developmental schemas put forward by other developmental specialists, the critical accent of their 16 lifespan stages of Functional Emotional Developmental Capabilities describes and defines emotions not simply as various affective states but rather as:

the child’s overall emotional abilities, such as her ability to engage with others and exchange emotional signals so that she can understand others and communicate her own needs, her ability to elaborate...
emotions in play and with words and pictures, and her level of empathy . . . . These overall emotional abilities are “functional” in that they enable the child to interact with and comprehend her world . . . . They are fundamental emotional organizations that guide every aspect of day-to-day functioning, unite the different processing abilities, and . . . orchestrate the different parts of the mind. (p. 53)

Tempting as it may be to discuss or even to list Greenspan and Shanker’s 16 lifespan stages of functional/emotional development, space permits only the briefest mention of the 6 initial stages because they are so crucial to the development of basic psychological and social skills:

Stage 1—Regulation and Interest in the World: Shared attention and regulation from birth on
Stage 2—Engaging and Relating: Growing feelings of intimacy from 2 to 4 months on
Stage 3—Intentionality: Two-way intentional, emotional signaling and communication from 4 to 8 months and on
Stage 4—Problem Solving, Mood Regulation, and a Sense of Self: Long chains of co-regulated emotional signaling, social problem solving, and the formation of a presymbolic from 9 to 18 months and on
Stage 5—Creating Symbols and Using Words and Ideas: Experiences, including feelings, intentions, wishes, action patterns, etc., are put into words, pretend play, drawings, or other symbolic forms from 18 months on
Stage 6—Emotional Thinking, Logic, and a Sense of “Reality”: Building bridges between ideas: logical thinking from 2 ½ years on

For personal reasons, this reviewer was particularly interested in Stage 16—Wisdom of the Ages: “The ability for true reflective thinking of an unparalleled scope or a retreat and narrowing of similar proportions. There is the possibility of true wisdom free from the self-centered and practical worries of earlier stages. It also, however, can lead to retreat into one’s changing physical states, a narrowing of interests, and concrete thinking” (p. 91). This summary definition of Stage 16 typifies the ways Greenspan and Shanker (in chapter two and throughout the book) attempt to conceptualize the overall conflicting functional emotional issues that characterize each of the 16 lifespan stages.

The book is replete with clinical observations from Greenspan’s many years of experience as a child psychiatrist working with autistic spectrum children who have, for whatever reasons, experienced a deprivation of functional emotional learning experiences. Also of particular interest is the detailed attention the book gives to the many fascinating emerging studies of pre-human primates and nonhuman primates—an expertise that philosopher-psychologist Shanker brings to the collaboration. He notes:

Just as the discoveries of the wheel and fire set in motion enormous technological advances, the learned ability to signal with emotions and progress through various stages of emotional transformation enabled the development of symbols, language, and thinking, including reflective reasoning and self-awareness. (p. 10)

The authors are concerned that emotional processes embedded in group behavior for millions of years may be in jeopardy in the twenty-first century, because the critical transformations in the mind and brain that support reflective thinking depend on the way humans interact emotionally with and learn from each other. The authors see these learned patterns as highly vulnerable and express concerns that misunderstandings regarding what is essential about human beings may increase that vulnerability in the modern age.

Lawrence E. Hedges
lhedges@pacbell.net

ICAFS
The Institute for Child, Adolescent & Family Studies is a unique postgraduate specialty program that focuses exclusively on the psychodynamic psychotherapy of children, adolescents and their families. All programs are designed to provide students with academic experiences relevant to clinical practice in today’s times, rigorous intellectual background and outstanding supervision, rich collegial opportunities, and a referral network.

ICAFS offers candidates a two-year child program devoted to the application of psychoanalytic/developmental theories to child development, diagnosis and treatment, as well as a one-year program in the treatment of adolescents. Candidates may enroll in either of these programs and receive separate certification, or take both together for a three-year combined certificate. All courses are taught back-to-back on Wednesday evenings to accommodate working professionals.

We are now accepting applications for the academic year, 2007/08. For forms or information about our programs, please contact:

Ava L. Siegler, Ph.D., Director
15 Charles Street, Suite 7E, New York, NY 10014
(tel: 212 255-9677, (fax) 212 989-0646
(e-mail) ICAFSals@aol.com
S
tefano Bolognini is one of the leading contemporary European psychoanalysts. Having met him and witnessed his superb clinical presentations, I tend to think about him as a latter-day Winnicott. Just like the old English artificer, Bolognini is a non-partisan psychoanalyst, who is at home both with the treatment of severe personality disturbances and with the turmoil of adolescence, and also a master of the middle ground. In his fascinating book, *Psychoanalytic Empathy*—an English translation of his 2002 original Italian edition, *L'empatia psicoanalitica*—the author rejects the facile criticism which claims that “empathy is not a psychoanalytic concept,” while traversing the narrow strait that lies between the Scylla of a monolithic and univocal system of thought, and the Charybdis of an eclectic plurality of theories in which anything goes.

In order to attain this juggling act, it is necessary to develop an adequate frame of mind:

In certain cases, knowing how to maintain a temporary suspension, when faced with the apparent irreconcilability of different models, may lead in time to a better understanding of when, how, where, and why a particular model is pertinent and suitable, what its sphere of application and heuristicistic are, how different models with intriguing similarities may overlap or be brought together . . . and so forth. A conscious suspension of the sense of incompatibility when assessing different models is quite another thing to the split use of various models by the analyst himself. (p. 16)

This is strikingly similar to Bolognini’s treatment of empathy. For instance, when reviewing Greenson’s conception of empathy, he points out, “the capacity to suspend judgment, to the very limit of credulity, is what makes empathy with the patient possible, and will eventually lead to an understanding of the underlying movements” (p. 47). True psychoanalytic empathy, however, requires both a sympathetic openness and an acceptance of the patient’s subjectivity and its impact on the analyst, and a relentless intellectual scrutiny that both differentiates the analyst’s mental processes, experiences, and views from those of the patient, and paves the way for another, and hopefully deeper, understanding. Consequently, the analyst must keep a dialectic tension—my term, not the author’s—between an uncritical empathic resonance and an analytical inquiry of the experience that is thus harvested.

Clearly, Bolognini is making a plea for a reading, both of psychoanalytic texts and of the patients’ manifestations, which keeps the balance between empathic acceptance and critical scrutiny. This is akin to the proposal of analogical hermeneutics. Since this has been for some time a focus of my theoretical interests, I will allow myself a little roaming into a sidetrack.

Analogical hermeneutics is the name given to the theoretical proposal put forward by Mexican philosopher Mauricio Beuchot (1997, 2003, 2004), which deals with a problematic that is widely coincident with ours. Hermeneutics is traditionally conceived as the interpretation of texts. A text is an organized set of signs that conveys a meaning, which has to be revealed by means of the work of interpretation. The contemporary conception of a text includes not only the spoken and written discourses, but also dialogue, relation, action, and cultural products such as images, ritual, mores, music, dance, fashion, or architecture.

There are three possible types of signification, which represent three forms of predicate distribution: univocality, equivocality, and analogy. Univocality maintains that, for every given text, there is only one valid interpretation, which is true, while every other possible one has to be false. Equivocality recognizes that there are many possible interpretations for every text—some say that they are unlimited and that there is no criterion for choosing between them; others say that it is personal taste or practical convenience. Analogy, a word that originally meant “proportion,” is multivocal, in as much as it accepts the existence of a plurality of interpretations for the same text, but it does not relinquish the effort to appraise them. There are many possible interpretations, yes, but they are not necessarily equivalent: some are better, others not so good; some are poor, and yet others are outright bad. The criterion for such a winnowing is to be found in ontology, that is, the intuition of the existence that lies behind the text and all its interpretations. In the case of psychoanalysis, this would...
be the direct experience of the personal encounter between patient and analyst, which is reflected over and over again in their interaction, their dialogue, and their many attempts, both conscious and unconscious, to represent and account for what is going on within and between them (Tubert-Oklander, 2006a, b, c).

Analogical hermeneutics consequently thrives in the middle ground between identity and difference, even though it leans more toward the latter. It implies looking for similarity in difference, and for difference in similarity, while giving each one its due. From univocality, it receives the belief that there is a truth to be found out, even though we may never be fully able to grasp it, which prevents us from falling prey to the authoritarian and dogmatic delusion that our present interpretations are Truth itself. From equivocality, it derives a clear awareness of the multiplicity of interpretations and frames of reference, but still striving to preserve a search for truth, albeit a partial and temporary one, to be compared with other versions of it, and yet sufficient to keep on thinking and acting on it, that is, an analogical truth.

Such willfulness to stay in between two apparently opposite and incompatible positions is what led Donald Winnicott (1971) to develop his concept of a “third area” between the internal and the external as well as to nurture his love of paradox. It is also Bolognini’s preferred approach to the dilemmas of psychoanalytic theory and practice. As we shall later see, this is not the only ground on which he adopts an analogical stance.

Now, going back to the book itself, it is worth noting that, after an introduction called “The Psychoanalyst’s Theoretical Models, Harmony and Consistency,” which states the author’s view of psychoanalysis and its plurality of theories and techniques, the rest is divided in two parts. The first one deals with a “Historical Review” of empathy in psychoanalytic literature, while the second is “A Contemporary Prospective,” in which he develops his own understanding of the concept, from the vantage point of his clinical practice. I shall now summarize and comment on their contents.

Part I comprises the first six chapters. Chapter 1 on “Romantic Empathy” presents a delicious glimpse of the Romantic’s conception of “sympathy,” understood as a deep and almost organic continuity between the individual and everything that is, one that covers both body and spirit. This way of looking at things was to be found not only in aesthetics and the arts (for instance in the work of Theodor Lipps), but also in science and philosophy (with Wilhem Dilthey), as well as in medicine, where it fostered the belief in a contagion of both disease and health.

Chapter 2, on “Freud and Empathy,” shows that Freud knew well and admired the writings of Lipps, while fearing that the philosopher might have preceded him in the development of metapsychology. However, he hardly used the term Einfühlung (empathy), a situation compounded by the fact that James Strachey’s translation almost drops the term completely. Although Freud (1913) stressed—in “On Beginning the Treatment”—the importance of keeping an attitude of “sympathetic understanding” (einfühlung), and privately endorsed in a letter, Ferenczi’s (1928) considerations on “tact,” he was suspicious of anything that might connect psychoanalysis with intuition, irrationality, or what he called “occultism.” This was certainly part of his obsessive traits, his positivistic education, and his ambivalence toward emotions. Such a stance may, of course, also be understood in terms of his need to defend psychoanalysis against dire criticism, by underscoring its scientific status. Chapter 3, “The Pioneers,” briefly reviews the contributions of Helene Deutsch, Sándor Ferenczi, and Robert Fliess. Perhaps Ferenczi’s major contributions would have deserved a more extensive treatment, but this opinion may be only a reflection of my own theoretical sympathies.

Chapter 4, “The Fifties: The Rediscovery of Empathy,” focuses on the contributions of American psychoanalysts, commenting on the work of Christine Olden, Roy Schafer, Ralph Greenson, Heinz Kohut, and Ping-Nie Pao. From these, Bolognini highlights the idea that empathy requires a dynamic balance between fusion and
separateness, that it offers the pabulum for the development of the patient’s self and self-objects, and that it takes a long effort to develop the network of communications that makes it possible.

Chapter 5, “The Kleinian and Post-Kleinian Conception of Empathy,” shows that, even though these authors do not use the term, the concept underlies the writings of writers such as Herbert Rosenfeld, Roger Money-Kyrle, Wilfred R. Bion, and James Grotstein. Bion, in particular, developed a concept of the mind that is both extended and relational, because it shows how the baby’s (or the patient’s) mind develops from the inner and outer responses of the mother (or the analyst) to their unconscious communications.

Chapter 6, “An Italian Contribution: Savo Spacal and ‘Comparative Analysis,’” draws heavily on the posthumous work of Spacal, an Italian psychoanalyst of Slovenian origin, who studied two different approaches to the understanding of other human beings—including, of course, patients—which are: a concordant identification with the other’s conscious experiences (“empathy”) and a complementary response toward his or her projections of rejected aspects of the self (“countertransference”). Even though individual analysts may lean toward one or the other pole, on the basis of their own personal cognitive-affective organization and the bias of the analytic school in which they trained, a deeper understanding must necessarily be based on a dynamic balance between the two. Bolognini clearly admires Spacal’s contribution, but takes exception at his identification of empathy with concordance, because he strongly believes that true psychoanalytic empathy should encompass all aspects of the patient’s personality, including those that have been repudiated, split-off, projected, or otherwise alienated, and that it takes a long time and a protracted effort to develop.

Part II, “A Contemporary Prospective,” includes Chapters 7 through 14. In Chapter 7, “The Analyst’s Internal Attitude: Analysis With the Ego and Analysis With the Self,” the author stresses the importance of affect and of making contact, both with the patient’s and with the analyst’s own emotional experiences. He defines the ego, for the purpose of his present analysis, as “a nucleus of consciousness and a set of active mental functions” (p. 70), and the self as “the internal reality (including object representations) which turns out to be a lasting, characterizing and constituent part of a person’s mental world, and which may be the object of his subjective experience” (pp. 70-71). The analyst may be working either with his ego or with his self, and he may enter contact with either the patient’s ego or self, thus defining four possible combinations that define the analytic dialogue. Even though any one of them may be germane at some given point of a treatment, the analyst’s deeper understanding of his patient happens when he is able to work with his own self, thus combining emotional and cognitive comprehension; true analytic developments come about when there is a dialogue between the patient’s and the analyst’s ego-selves. This kind of work is obviously more risky than that which ensues when the analyst keeps an intellectual detachment, because it implies that he cannot come out of a treatment unaffected, but it seems to me that it is the only kind of work that really makes a difference for patient and analyst alike, thus deserving the name of “psychoanalysis.”

Chapter 8, “Empathy and Countertransference: The Analyst’s Affects as a Problem and a Resource,” emphasizes the importance and value of the analyst’s emotional responses, which are both unavoidable and enriching for the analysis. Although in the first stages of the psychoanalytic movement a natural suspicion existed toward emotional responses, and a fear of the dire consequences that might result from the analyst losing his scientific cool, we have long since found that the perception of the analyst’s affects not only gives a natural sense of reality and truth to his work experience and interpretations, but it also significantly reduces the danger of acting out denied emotions in the session.

This chapter also begins the clinical part of the book, which is rich with Bolognini’s compelling case presentations—one per chapter. In these, not only does he include a thorough discussion of his subjective participation in the analysis, but he also makes an extensive use of metaphor in order to describe complex relational events. In this he follows Freud’s penchant for analogy, but sticking to the use of human and relational models, as the master did in Chapters 2 through 6 of The Interpretation of Dreams, and not that of physical and mechanistic models, as in Chapter 7.

The main part of the chapter is the case of Aldo “the Heartless Executive,” in which the author shows the evolution of a most conflictive and apparently sterile transference-countertransference relationship, toward a final recovery of the patient’s humanity. This was attained as a result of his being able to keep his neutrality, understood not as “non-affectivity, but [as] a temporary suspension of judgment and . . . keeping oneself open to complex perceptions and unpredictable developments in the field and process of analysis” (p. 90). Affects can never be decided or planned; they always come about as unexpected natural developments. They are also both an asset and a problem, and have to be dealt with by means of understanding.

Chapter 9 on “Empathy and Sharing: A Necessary Distinction,” elaborates the author’s contention, to be found throughout the book, that there is a clear distinction between empathy, which is a necessary prerequisite for psychoanalytic understanding, but which cannot be planned, and psychoanalytic empathy, which is always the end result of hard analytic work. But sharing and the corresponding
actions of the analyst are usually hard to communicate to colleagues. There seems to be a growing gap between the novelty of our analytic experiences and the conventional technical language that we use in order to communicate with other analysts and ourselves, that is, to think. This is clearly illustrated in the case of Sara, a reluctant patient that seemed to be impervious to psychoanalysis, who was finally reached by the analyst, after the latter painfully felt an utter lack of hope about the treatment, and innerly accepted that it should come to an end. This is presented by Bolognini as a case of sharing without empathy. But sharing is a much needed precursor of empathic understanding.

Chapter 10 is called “The ‘Kind-hearted’ Versus the Good Analyst: Empathy and Hate in the Countertransference”—an attempt to translate the original Italian pun, “L’analista buono e il buon analista,” something like “The goody analyst and the good analyst.” Here the author charges against a sentimentalist conception of psychoanalysis that relies on maintaining a blissful experience of love, care, and total understanding, and discusses the issue of what Winnicott (1949) called “hate in the countertransference.”

Empathy is not necessarily love, and there are some patients that systematically induce in the analyst hate toward them, as he shows in the case of a narcissistic doctor, who finally proved to be inaccessible to analysis. If the analyst represses or denies this hate, this would represent a lack of empathy on his part. This argument is continued in Chapter 11, “Empathy and ‘Empathism,’” previously published in The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis (Bolognini, 1997), which offers a subtle definition of empathy:

Empathy to me is properly a condition of conscious and preconscious contact characterized by separateness, complexity and a linked structure, a wide perceptual spectrum including every color of the emotional palette, from the highest to the darkest; above all, it constitutes a progressive, shared and deep contact with the complementarity of the object, with the other’s defensive ego and split off parts no less that with his ego-syntonic subjectivity. (p. 120)

Therefore, he takes exception to the view that identifies empathy with concordant identification, that is, with the patient as subject. From his point of view, complementary identification with the patient’s internal objects—which other writers call “countertransference,” as different from empathy—is also an essential part of psychoanalytic empathy, which is the final harmonious result of a long, difficult, and painful process. This is shown in the case of Alessandra, whose false self presentation of an aloof and artificial “refined young lady,” induced no empathy in the analyst, until an interpretation of the transference—“I feel that today you are asking me for complicity and not for understanding”—revealed the confused and persecuted little girl that hid behind the mask. Now the analyst was able to experience true empathy with her suffering. “Empathizing” should not be set as a task or a claim, since empathy can never be planned; it is a goal, not a method. The case of Ada, who seemed to have stifled all her drives and wishes, drove the analyst to despair, but he managed to come out of it by means of an inner reflection about everything he knew about her, which finally turned into an interpretation, of which he writes: “This intervention was generated not by empathy with the patient but by good inner attunement to what I was feeling and thinking at the time” (p. 131). Consequently, the analyst also needs to be empathic toward him- or herself. This brings the author to a conclusion, which may well summarize the intention of the book:

I believe that effective and genuine empathy is the fruit of a set of valid concordant and complementary identifications that are thoroughly elaborated and integrated and that sharing is a precursor of empathy, of which it constitutes the necessary crude experiential premise, but not the end-product, still less the guarantee. (p. 133)

Chapter 12, “Empathy and the Unconscious,” tackles the most difficult problem of the metapsychology of empathy. This was rather disappointing to me, because I felt that Bolognini pulled the brakes precisely when he should have upped the...
throttle. But this is perhaps only an expression of my own theoretical bent. I strongly feel that clinical experiences such as those depicted by the author urgently require a major overhaul of generally accepted theory; Bolognini obviously does not share my point of view, because he sticks by the traditional topographic and structural models. Although I fully endorse Winnicott’s (1971) dictum that “in any cultural field it is not possible to be original except on a basis of tradition” (p. 117), in the innovation–tradition continuum I lean heavily toward the former, while the author is nearer to the latter, at least in questions of theory.

But any disappointment I may have felt turned into outright admiration when he closed the chapter with the case of Anna, who kept a tight-lipped smile and demanded full self-disclosure by the analyst, while she utterly resisted any attempt to build an analytic dialogue. Bolognini’s delicate analytic work on a childhood memory—a mutual exhibition of genitals with her bother, traumatically interrupted by her father, surely analogous to her demands vis-à-vis the analyst—in which he focused on what was missing in her narrative—her feeling toward her father’s burst of anger—rather than following his patient’s defensive emphasis on the sexual aspect of the episode, finally arrived at a deep and empathic understanding. What was needed in a case in which the analyst seemed unable to empathize with his patient, was empathy with her defensive ego, which denounced her as a “collaborationist,” when she consciously decided to cooperate.

Chapter 13, “Empathy and Fusion,” is much nearer to the theoretical revision that I expected, because it expounds the subject of normal fusional experiences, both in everyday life and in analysis. Mental health requires the ability to alternate between moments of fusion and those of separateness. This is akin to the ideas of Hans Loewald (1951)—whom he does not quote—and José Bleger (1967)—quoted in a previous chapter—who suggested that primitive indiscriminate differences between spontaneous natural empathy and its theoretical bent. I strongly feel that clinical experiences such as those depicted by the author urgently require a major overhaul of generally accepted theory; Bolognini obviously does not share my point of view, because he sticks by the traditional topographic and structural models. Although I fully endorse Winnicott’s (1971) dictum that “in any cultural field it is not possible to be original except on a basis of tradition” (p. 117), in the innovation–tradition continuum I lean heavily toward the former, while the author is nearer to the latter, at least in questions of theory.

But any disappointment I may have felt turned into outright admiration when he closed the chapter with the case of Anna, who kept a tight-lipped smile and demanded full self-disclosure by the analyst, while she utterly resisted any attempt to build an analytic dialogue. Bolognini’s delicate analytic work on a childhood memory—a mutual exhibition of genitals with her bother, traumatically interrupted by her father, surely analogous to her demands vis-à-vis the analyst—in which he focused on what was missing in her narrative—her feeling toward her father’s burst of anger—rather than following his patient’s defensive emphasis on the sexual aspect of the episode, finally arrived at a deep and empathic understanding. What was needed in a case in which the analyst seemed unable to empathize with his patient, was empathy with her defensive ego, which denounced her as a “collaborationist,” when she consciously decided to cooperate.

Chapter 13, “Empathy and Fusion,” is much nearer to the theoretical revision that I expected, because it expounds the subject of normal fusional experiences, both in everyday life and in analysis. Mental health requires the ability to alternate between moments of fusion and those of separateness. This is akin to the ideas of Hans Loewald (1951)—whom he does not quote—and José Bleger (1967)—quoted in a previous chapter—who suggested that primitive indiscriminate experiences coexist all the time with that of individuation and separation. But Bleger, in particular, turned this into a major change in theory, when he suggested the existence of a third position that complemented Klein’s schizoid-paranoid and depressive positions, one characterized by indiscrimination and ambiguity. Bolognini, on his part, emphasizes the need to focus on normal healthy developments, and not only on pathology, in order to better understand fusional experiences.

The chapter ends with the analysis of Leopoldo, a narcissist with perverse traits, who evolves during a session from his usual enraged and defying position, to a regressive relaxation that allows a mutual immersion in a peaceful and calm atmosphere. The element that brought about the change was an interpretation reached by the analyst, but which he kept to himself, because he felt it was not yet the right time to voice it.

Chapter 14 deals with “Natural Empathy and Psychoanalytical Empathy.” The former is a spontaneous development, which is shown by quite ordinary people, who have had no training for this kind of understanding. Having this sort of natural skill is surely an asset for anyone who intends to become a psychoanalyst, but training surely develops more resources that facilitate the emergence of empathy, and help him or her to recognize when it happens. This is shown in a case supervised by the author, in which the patient’s spontaneous empathy toward a girl who feigned having fallen down, in order to attract her rather insensitive mother’s attention, is acknowledged and validated by her analyst, who then interpreted that she had used this account to make him see her own genuine deep suffering. The patient was moved by this interpretation. The supervisor then showed his young colleague how this incident was also a comment on his own lack of empathy, during the past week, when he had been rather insistently trying to analyze his patient’s efforts to control things. Therefore, the patient had managed to catch her analyst’s attention, just like the girl had done with her mother. The author uses this clinical episode, in order to show the similarities and differences between spontaneous natural empathy and its more cultivated psychoanalytic version.

In the final chapter on “Conclusions,” Bolognini stresses that, for him, “empathy [is] just one of the multiplicity of aspects, planes and sectors on which the theory and practice of psychoanalysis is based” (p. 175). He also emphasizes the “delicacy” of empathy, which is fleeting and spontaneous, and cannot be fixed or reproduced at will. It can, however, be expected, recognized when it happens, and cherished.

He also emphasizes the “delicacy” of empathy, which is fleeting and spontaneous, and cannot be fixed or reproduced at will. It can, however, be expected, recognized when it happens, and cherished.
an impending loss. In the session that Bolognini presents, the patient appears once again as the juggernaut that he had been at the beginning of the treatment. He tells a story about seeing a young woman in a restaurant, who had taken off her shoe, and he saw her little toes moving. This disgusted him intensely, but then he saw that she raised her foot and used it to lift her glass to her lips, since she had no arms! But then Mr. P. said something to the analyst, which was a mixture of supervision and interpretation:

I know you were laughing up your sleeve just now. But then you were left thunderstruck. Just like me. I think we understand each other you and me. You see, doctor, how easy it is to misjudge an apparently offensive gesture if you don’t know the situation properly. (p. 178)

Needless to say that the analyst was deeply moved by the subtlety and depth of this comment, which clearly referred to their own relationship. And with this last flourish, Stefano Bolognini bids us farewell, while musing about “our profession, so strange and unpredictable that we can hardly ever decide what is ours to experience next” (p. 179).

I can only recommend the reader to catch the opportunity to experience by him- or herself this fascinating book, which certainly deserves more than one reading (indeed, I could only write this review after reading it for a second time).

REFERENCES


Juan Tubert-Oklander
JTubertOklander@aol.com
**Hate and Love in Psychoanalytic Institutes: The Dilemma of a Profession, by Jurgen Reeder. New York: Other Press, 2004; 308 pp., $30.00.**

**Jane Hall, MSW**

Attack authoritarianism, dogma, and historical inevitability; stress tolerance, transparency and debate; embrace trial-and-error; distrust certainty; and espouse humility.

Karl Popper

Move On! is what I hear Jurgen Reeder say in his latest book: *Hate and Love in Psychoanalytic Institutes: The Dilemma of a Profession.* Here is a scholarly plea for wresting psychoanalytic institutes from the grip of “the third epoch” begun in Berlin about 80 years ago. This 3rd epoch is characterized as “a time during which the psychoanalytic project has both submitted to and suffered under its institutions,” (p. 224) with their authoritarian models of training.

Reeder conducts a thorough analysis of the Psychoanalytic Institute System. He presents a history, formulates a diagnosis, listens for conflict, explores the institutional object world, and identifies what he calls an “institutional superego complex,” (p. 91), a paranoid structure marked by a fear of moving beyond the authoritarian fathers in our profession. He sets about analyzing the system carefully, identifying resistance, all the while interpreting the roots of the complex, pointing out the defenses against anxiety, and by the end of the analysis he leaves it to his patient (the present training system) to use the knowledge gained in whatever way it can. The patient has been given new tools to restructure itself: ego strength originally depleted by denial, projection, and identification with the aggressor, and a more benevolent superego no longer burdened by its repository of hatred that has been killing the patient over its lifetime: hatred that causes splits, harsh criticism of new ideas, unfriendly behavior, instead of the generative, respectful atmosphere that supports growth and independence.

Why are institutes still stuck in the 3rd epoch? Why is the hatred so hard to let go of? The book presents a mystery and a courtroom-like drama. The crime: attempted murder of psychoanalytic institutional life; weapon: authoritarianism and organizational suppression of the individual; means: the training analysis system and the subjective judgment of evaluators that is often hidden; motive: quest for power. The plaintiff: those who wish to change the system; the accused is the Institutional Superego Complex; and the jury is you.

Reeder builds his case, against his concept of institutional superego, (he speaks of it throughout the book, while never giving a simple definition, but identifies it as fueled by hatred, breeding destructive tendencies) using front line counsel and expert witnesses like Kernberg, King, Arlow, Cremarius, Eisold, Dorn, Balint (notably missing is Kirsner’s *Unfree Association*), and so many others who join him in asking for a verdict of guilty as charged.

This 300 page book, 50 pages of which are notes, outlines the ways in which Institutes have continued in many ways to identify with Freud’s early need to control:

[T]he psychoanalyst would now obey a paternalistic authority… inculcated in the training candidate through active persuasion, with the aim of making him accept anything that his superiors taught him and that he would in the end identify with the authority itself.” (p. 68, and attributed to Michael Balint)

This is discussed in the chapter on the Central Functions of Psychoanalytic Training including selection and evaluation of candidates, the normalization of the analyst, the supervised cases (control, we call it), and question of just what a supervisor’s role is (p. 121). Here we find Reeder’s main critique of the system: the problems of educating psychoanalysts (power of the institute) and the maintaining of values that education is meant to instill while at the same time encouraging creativity and autonomy.

Jumping back and forth in this review, as Reeder does in the book, shuffling decades from the 40s through the 90s, and as the analysts do every day in their work, I single out the contributions that interested, moved, and inspired me, namely the praxis and the institutional superego complex, the latter needing resolution in order to find one’s own creative voice, which enriches the praxis. According to Reeder, “To assimilate the language of theory is part of the important but difficult endeavor of liberating oneself from
the psychoanalyst’s professional superego and... finding one’s own voice as an analyst” (p. 48). Only with such assimilation and liberation can the analyst listen to her own presence in each analytic dyad. Such assimilation lays the foundation for creative thinking and provides freedom to listen to each patient without pre-formed ideas.

Reeder views institutions (IPA or others) as they stand today, as inhibiting creativity and relying on doctrine. Through identification with the aggressor and idealization of “received wisdom” (the curriculum) and the TA system, institutes are squelching the creativity so badly needed in this field while planting more seeds for the continued growth of the veiled hatred amongst ourselves.

While the praxis of psychoanalysis is fueled by “loving,” Reeder sees the institutional functions that are meant to safeguard it (the superego complex) fueled by hatred. We have all experienced and/or witnessed the abominable overt and covert cruelty to which we subject each other. I have seen close up what Reeder speaks of as pursuit of the psychopath (p.178) and rejection of those who may show the spirit of originality and inquiry; graduating only those who conform, expelling those who do not; talking secretly behind a candidate’s back; evaluating each other ad infinitum. A particularly blatant expression of hatred, symptomatic of a long-standing split, came when my society (NYFS) joined the IPA. The policy at that time had been five years of membership and one was automatically a TA. Mysteriously, those in control at that time excluded several members in good standing, including a former president from being interviewed by the IPA evaluators, ostensibly a form of grandfathering themselves in. A lawsuit resulted and the repercussions echo today.

Exclusion versus inclusion is a topic that is mentioned throughout the book, but I would have appreciated a chapter dedicated to it with a fuller discussion of the analyst’s untamed narcissism and envy as contributing to the hatred Reeder discusses. The original exclusion of non-medical analysts by the American Psychoanalytic Association still reverberates and in fact may have sown the seeds of its present state where a large percentage of its members are senior citizens. To this day, APsaA hangs onto its authoritarian model, demanding certification of training analysts by the Board of Professional Standards. Most importantly, however, the institutional superego complex, says Reeder, thwarts new and creative ideas. How many of our esteemed theory builders, including Freud himself, would be admitted to join our IPA institutes today?

Reeder’s message, as I read it, is that identification with the aggressor and idealization of theory (received wisdom) squelch autonomy, thus breeding more conformity and more animosity. Many analysts keep to themselves rather than debate and contribute ideas; and Reeder is to be commended for his bravery. As each of our analysands shows us, the ability to move beyond the status quo is hard won. Rather than keep our members on a strict diet, we must find ways of nurturing and learning from each other without making some of us into authorities! Patients are the only real authorities and they make their own individual theories.

In his message to candidates and new graduates, Reeder speaks of the fear of loss of love and castration anxiety that fuels the identification with the aggressor. I would have appreciated the addition of separation anxiety as a way to understand the efforts to control and the difficulty in letting go on both sides of institute life. Candidates are ambivalent about stepping out of the sheltered institute atmosphere, and some remain attached to the authority role by serving on gate-keeping committees instead of training committees too quickly after graduation. Educational committees or training committees are often composed of like-minded keepers of the flame and would do well with the experience of recent graduates. Allegiance from graduates to the institute keeps it going and their ideas for reform and original thinking must be cherished. The doctoring of case material presented for graduation or certification is a well known phenomenon due to the need many feel to appear kosher and that plays right into the problem of institute paranoia. On the positive side, M. Klien, Bion, and others are no longer read secretly: they are in the curriculum!

Reeder shares his thoughts on praxis (the love part of the book) by presenting a vignette about his patient, Eve, which can be seen as the major metaphor for the book and as an example of Reeder’s personal voice. It occurred to me that the name assigned by Reeder to his patient might stand for either a pre-holiday celebration or the time before the dark of night. (Will our institutes be able to see a new dawn or will they succumb to the darkness of hatred?) Eve is struggling with owning her adulthood, on the brink of leaving her “shitty,” hungry littlegirlhood (p. 24). Reeder explores and interprets this dilemma, in a playful, concerned way, allowing us a glimpse of how he thinks and works. In my mind, it sets the tone of his book, a tone of respect and hopefulness and even a bit of daring, while letting us hear his own voice. I

The roots of all this destructiveness lie in the soil of identification with the aggression of the external authority. Hatred is passed on from generation to generation culminating in poor morale, which contributes to the difficulties in attracting members, candidates, and the public.
The colorful picture on the cover of Alex Holder’s scholarly and practical perspective on the roots, controversies, and relevance of child psychoanalysis to the field of psychoanalysis as a whole, conveys the heart of this book. It was drawn by an eight and a half year old girl named Monica at the end of her five sessions a week analysis with the author. Monica titled the drawing “posh lady.” This child’s fantasy of what an elegant, grown up woman looks like is the embodiment, so to speak, of the tremendous growth and change that took place in her during her treatment. Monica began her analysis as an obsessional, difficult to manage, school phobic child. With pertinent clinical descriptions, the author shows how Monica’s initial constricted behavior in the play room, (partially out of fear of disapproval) gradually unfolded to an expression, in play and in the transference, of her anxieties and fears, along with accompanying aggression. Alex Holder describes this gradual (but sometimes sudden) deepening of the analysis, in showing how he tried to understand Monica’s play and verbalizations in the context of her psychosexual development and the dynamics of her anxieties. At the end of her analysis, as her drawing suggests, Monica emerged as a decidedly more confident girl, much more at ease with her feelings. This is a very interesting case to read, and the reader feels joy at the transformation that takes place with this child.

Preceding this clinical case, the author sets the stage for exploring the origins of child psychoanalysis, delving into what constitutes an analysis including technique. In carrying out this goal, Holder tries to understand and contrast the contributions of the two major pioneers in the field, Anna Freud and Melanie Klein. The author is a Child and Adult Analyst, and Training Analyst presently working in Germany, with forty years of clinical experience in both Great Britain and Germany. He is very conversant with the early writings on child treatment during the first two to three decades of the twentieth century. In considering the early work with children, Holder is careful to distinguish between what is actual child psychoanalysis, and other forms of helping a child that are more pedagogical in nature. Holder is firm in his conviction that it is the high frequency of sessions per week, over an extended period of time, which constitutes a child analysis. Only this lengthy process allows the child to safely loosen defenses to reveal less conscious conflicts and fantasies, while the analyst in his awareness of his countertransference reactions can keep in mind and try to piece together the often nonverbal expressions of the child’s concerns. The author states that even in the more short-term successful treatment of Little Hans, the child’s overcoming of the symptom was only possible because the authority of the father and the physician were united in a single person. It was the father, in his daily care and love of the child as well as his scientific interest in the child’s anxieties, who made the cure possible. However, it should be mentioned that at some point in the book, Holder indicates that there are a few other countries, such as France, where child analysis is carried out on a less frequent basis, as three times per week. The practical obstacles to finding cases where the parent is agreeable and the child can be brought five times a week are very difficult everywhere.

The author believes that both Anna Freud and Melanie Klein, who were influenced by the theories and work of Sigmund Freud, set the structure and theoretical underpinnings of child psychoanalysis. The two of them believed that training in adult psychoanalysis should come before the technically more difficult arena of child psychoanalysis, so that the analyst in training would have had his own analysis, and would be familiar with the psychoanalytic theories regarding psychosexual development, the working of the mind, and repression. Holder notes that it took about forty years from the time Anna Freud first recommended it before the International Psychoanalytic Association granted official recognition to training as a child analyst (2000). There were many in the psychoanalytic community, and perhaps still are, who believed that child psychoanalysis was not truly analysis. The need for, efficacy of, and relevance of child psychoanalysis to the field of psychoanalysis as a whole appears to be the underlying aim of this compact book.

As suggested above, frequency of sessions and aims of child psychoanalysis, (that is, to help the child work through the anxieties, fixations, and inhibitions that hindered development) were points of accord between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein. Holder also shows how Anna Freud was
most likely influenced by Melanie Klein (for example, by eliminating the introductory phase of the analysis for a child, and realizing the value of play as a means for understanding the child). However they appear to diverge significantly in crucial ways. Melanie Klein, for example, thought that child psychoanalysis could be helpful for all children as an aid in the modulation of their anxieties, while Anna Freud felt that analysis is only appropriate when a child had developed an infantile neurosis. Interestingly, earlier in her work, Anna Freud felt that psychoanalytic principles could be incorporated prophylactically into child rearing, but later concluded this was overly optimistic.

In addition to Sigmund Freud, Melanie Klein was also very much influenced by the theories and work of Karl Abraham on the oral phase. As a result, Klein was interested in child and adult development from its earliest beginnings, that is, from infancy. She had direct infant observation with her three children, and shared perspectives and ideas with other analysts and, I believe, pediatricians who were conducting observations and theorizing on infant development. It is an informative experience to read Klein directly, as in her 1952 paper, “On the Behavior of Young Infants,” and “On the Psychoanalytic Play Technique: It’s History and Significance” (1955). These papers are very trenchant, particularly the first mentioned, as one can see the development and value of her observations describing how aggression and libido co-mingle in the sucking phase and how infants vary in their sucking capacity. Klein also addressed what mothers do to assist the child in the development and elaboration of this earliest object relation. As a result of her interest and observations of the oral phase, Klein posited an early defense of the infant to split its good and bad experience of the mother. She also theorized that, as a consequence of the sadistic cannibalistic phase that occurs in the second half of the first year, rudiments of the superego were already established at this time of life. This view contrasts with the one held by Anna Freud that the superego comes into being in the third to fifth year of life with the resolution of the Oedipal complex.

One might consider that these two very different points of view with regard to the superego, are perhaps describing two different parts, or aspects of this concept, and within the superego there could be an earlier, nonverbal part. Holder does say that Klein sheds light on the “earliest object relations, and the origins of anxiety, guilt and conflict.” Holder also suggests that Klein may have seen more manifestations of an early superego in the children whom she treated, as they may have been “more psychically ill children “ where “an archaic super-ego” dominated.

The theoretical underpinnings for technique were also dissimilar between these two. Melanie Klein thought that children’s play was like free associations. Therefore, if a child opened a pocketbook in play, Klein might make an interpretation related to the child’s curiosity about the mother’s womb. Of course, one does not know what else Klein might have known about the child that prompted her to say this. Anna Freud did not believe that a child’s play could be considered the same as an adult’s free association. She felt that the analyst was required to build up an understanding of what the child is expressing over many play sessions, considering the child’s verbalizations as well, before making an interpretation.

They also differed significantly in how they regarded transference, and the role and need for working with parents. As Holder suggests, perhaps one does not have to be divisive about these two major perspectives, but instead consider ideas selectively, as to what applies most in understanding a child, and how to work with him or her.

The next two chapters in the book, though the smallest, pack in a good deal of important thought and information. In the chapter on adolescence, Holder strongly advocates adolescence as a distinct phase with its own developmental hurdles and risks. The author, as well as others, feels that the field of child psychoanalysis has neglected adolescence, so much so that in the 1990s the European Association for Adolescent Psychoanalysis was established to further understand some of the problems of adolescence and the technical issues that come up. It was interesting, for example, to read that in adolescence there is a waning of the grandiose self-representations, superseded by actual gratification in professional and sexual experiences. For an adolescent, psychoanalytic treatment may exert a regressive pull, so that the analyst needs to be more flexible with regard to frequency and length of treatment.

The last chapter in this book, “The Significance of Child Analysis for Adult Analysis,” is unique as the ideas do not seem to have been so clearly illustrated elsewhere. Holder (along with Kernberg and Peter Blos, Jr.), recommends that adult analysts have experiences analyzing a few children of various ages and pathologies. This could sensitize and deepen the adult analyst’s understanding of the dynamic unconscious, and preverbal world of their patients, with the accompanying pressures and conflicts. Holder provides a clinical example, cited by Peter Blos, Jr., that the latter was able to stay with an adult patient’s “strong but not yet understood need to move about the consulting room, an action often inhibited on the grounds of fantasized disapproval by the analyst.” Blos indicates that because he understood from his child analytic work with children walking around the room, he could help the adult patient get to unconscious fantasies regarding the meaning of “action, inhibition, and prohibition.”

Holder also recommends that adult analysts consider engaging in infant observation for at least a year, as he feels it could assist in empathizing with a preverbal
world, not only with the baby, but also with the mother. It is interesting that this idea of Holder dovetails with the establishment of Infant and Child Observation programs at a few institutes in New York City. Though not mandatory for analytic training, they provide an opportunity for those interested to add to their knowledge of this important developmental phase. Holder ends by making the point that despite some of the strenuousness and technically difficult aspects of child psychoanalysis, the gratification lies in the awareness that “one is dealing with a human being who has almost all his life ahead of him, and who still is in the early stages of developing his potentialities.” For this, and other aforementioned reasons, this book is a rich resource, particularly for those involved in child clinical work, and for those thinking of doing so.

REFERENCES

Carol E. Lachman
Lachcpysch@aol.com

REVIEW OF REEDER - CONTINUED FROM PAGE 61
See Eve as representative of candidates and recent graduates whom he encourages to be creative, curious, and attentive to the cotransference (p. 21). He reminds us that there is life beyond father and mother (institute and received theory).

In summary, the roots of all this destructiveness, says Reeder, lie in the soil of identification with the aggression of the external authority. “The hate animating the superego complex is not something that spouts out in instances… but is rather an integrated (and definitely deplorable) aspect of a way of organizing the psychoanalytic institution during the third epoch,”(p. 175) which we are trying to move beyond. Otherwise, hatred is passed on from generation to generation (p. 177) culminating in poor morale, which contributes to the difficulties in attracting members and candidates, not to mention the public, today.

Reeder’s energy, scholarship, and courage shine through on every page. The book seems supportive of the NYFS’s change in its TA selection policy (on April 11, 2006, after intense discussion among members) from an evaluatory and subjective one to an experienced based one, where a member, after five or more years of documented analytic work, proof of immersion in psychoanalytic thought, and an inner readiness to supervise and treat candidates, chooses two TA colleagues to talk with about a case. This type of meeting with its collegial atmosphere encourages the new TA to speak in her own voice. A year of seminars in supervision is required, as is a statement that there have been no ethical violations, and a willingness to serve the society. Respect for integrity is the hallmark of the process. Reeder goes so far as to suggest that the term training analysis and the category of TAs should be abolished and quotes Lew Aron (p. 228) “What honesty is there in going along with [the institution of training analysts] if it is divisive, causes animosity, reinforces a feeling of failure, and is a factor producing society ‘splits’?” He concludes, “The idea that a candidate gets a training analysis due to a requirement and not because of her awareness of personal difficulties in living life is a poor prognostic indicator for a would be analyst” (p. 231).

Like a long analysis (308 pages) Reeder’s book is at times exciting, difficult, moving, but always interesting. It must not be ignored. I recommend reading it in small discussion groups and what lively juries they would be!

Jane Hall
janeshall@earthlink.net

Rochelle G. Kainer, PhD

There was a once-upon-a-time in the history of psychoanalysis when the findings gained through a self-analysis were cloaked in the anonymity we grant our patients, and no mention was made of the author’s true identity. Freud is perhaps our most notable example, and we have come far with some of his disguised self-disclosures. Even in contemporary analytic writing, it has been said that Kohut was actually the Mr. Z of his groundbreaking paper, “The Case of Mr. Z.”¹ The frank autobiographical stories that make up Power Games in this important volume serve as a reminder that we have become increasingly comfortable with self-revelation both culturally and professionally.

Analytic stories of the self are often twice-told tales. First, we tell the tale of our becoming, and then we write the sequel of our analytic re-making. The nature of the revelations in this volume makes them serve as cautionary tales. Power Games supports revealing our troubled stories in the public good, especially when attempts to re-make us were harmful. When I first heard Richard Raubolt, the book’s editor and contributing author, present a paper on the disastrous course of his immersion in a training institute² headed by a charismatic but deeply controlling psychiatrist (who was shockingly later killed, in his office, by a former patient, who then shot and wounded members of his past therapy group before he committed suicide), I was impressed with his important and very well written account of his journey.

His own story was complemented by the paper of Linda Raubolt told from the viewpoint of a wife deeply affected by her husband’s withdrawal into the malevolent aspects of his group supervision experience. That they have survived and flourished is an important part of the tale, and gives it its satisfying ending. These tales gave the momentum to Power Games, which also includes a variety of papers from colleagues on the power issues in their own supervisory, therapeutic, and institute experiences.

Power Games reminds us that we are no strangers to destructive situations: Freud has helped us understand that we have an all-too-human instinct for destructiveness alongside our instinct for love; the psychology of the self helps us better understand the crushing disappointment and harm we suffer because of the pathological narcissism of our authority figures, and our knowledge of masochism (particularly through the work of Esther Menaker) helps us understand why, in defense of the ego, people find and keep themselves in abusive situations, and may in turn abuse others.

Many of the papers are about the destructive aspects of situations that were initially entered into voluntarily, and in eager anticipation of the good that could come of it: therapeutic healing, enhanced professional identity, and a thirst for increased knowledge and skill. The more interesting question, answered somewhat indirectly by the various papers, is what are we really seeking when we enter into an alliance—be it therapy, supervision, or an institute—that may demand a submissiveness that is not in the best interest of the individual?

Is it connection that we seek when we give ourselves over to the Other?³ Certainly, this need is a core part of our being. The papers speak to a human wish to connect and belong, as well as to master our craft and learn from the wisdom of others, and to avoid the pain of isolation. We do fear exclusion, and it is usually the condition of not belonging that leaves us hungry and in discomfort. But in this volume of essays by analytic practitioners in a variety of training situations, we are presented with the vulnerable underbelly of connectedness to an institute, analyst, or supervisor that becomes coercive and ultimately, stifling.

The important message of these papers is that the desire to belong can do damage to one’s mental well being and, and as both Linda and Richard Raubolt attest, to the structure of one’s family life. When belonging to a training institute that reflects the pathological narcissistic features of an all too charismatic leader (to the detriment of the students), the picture drawn is not pretty. The same situation may prevail in individual supervisory and therapeutic undertakings as well. The crossing of boundaries, the blurring of the lines of self and other, all result in the giving up of the self to no good purpose or end.

By inference, the essays underscore the fact that there is no substitute for healthy self-determination, no matter how compelling the comfort or security of belonging with the Other. The papers make clear that, if belonging necessitates the giving up of one’s own creative will, good judgment, and peaceful mind, then one cannot be in a house of good. The

¹ In the analysis of Mr. Z, Kohut discovered the important “idealizing transference” that Mr. Z experienced during his period of waiting for Kohut to have the time to work with him. It is puzzling however, if Mr. Z were Kohut, why he had to wait three months for a self-analysis!

² A paper given at a meeting of the International Federation of Psychoanalytic Education, Queretero, Mexico, 2006.

³ The great novelist E.M. Forster has said, in his own search for his authentic sexual self, “connect, only connect.”
In his detailed study of the philosophical underpinnings of the developments in analytic training, it is clear that Kavanaugh never bought the philosophy of the institute medical model. He was part of the history of the movement led by analytic psychologists to be autonomous (helped in great part by the strength gained from the formation of Division 39). Some of us were part of the scene when non-medical people were denied access to analytic institutes; and for some it proved a fortunate road to independence and creativity. The earlier exclusion of psychologists from analytic institutes had the paradoxical effect of strengthening their wills (the famous Lawsuit) and fostering a spate of less constricting training situations, although any organization with a hierarchical structure has a potential to create the very problems addressed in the book.

In the finding of one’s authentic voice and inspiration, Gershon Molad and Judith Vida tacitly address issues of the intimacy, comradeship and connection that we seek, and feel that it does not have to be at the cost of losing one’s individuality. They make open use of their individual and joint selves—becoming “Gersh” and “Judy” to their public. While their autobiographical accounts avoid the blatant “ME” of Juney B. Jones (now popular in children’s literature), it has clearly been to their creative and personal advantage to feel free to express themselves openly and in the manner and style they see fit to do so. They show, correctly, that love is more authentic than submission.

The inspiring nature of comradeship in creative endeavors has a long and positive history in literary and artistic undertakings, and Molad and Vida’s work is in this spirit. Its success is probably based on being able not to blur the outlines of the self, and having well-defined boundaries. Informality and intimacy with another is then not only possible, it is the condition for creativity.

The French analyst Michael Larivièré assessed the effect of Lacan and Lacanian training, especially among those followers who strove to imitate him. His strong message is that one should not mimic the Master and his paper was especially delightful in its indignation. How is mimicry to be avoided?

I had once turned to Lacan in the course of developing my own clinical metapsychology; and that was for his poetic, but extremely lucid distinguishing between the Imaginary and the Real. I did not mimic Lacan by becoming in any sense a “Lacanian” but rather, used his imagery to describe the terror of abandonment that a patient of mine could sometimes feel if her husband just went into the next room. His going into the next room could be as terrifying to her as his going away on a trip. At that moment, her Imaginary became the awful Real. But generally, I had not turned to Lacan because I found him too obscure for comfort.

Larivièrè addresses the “mimetic” (i.e., imitative) quality of Lacanian followers. He complains that they all began to sound like him, as Lacan predicted, and dress like him; and while strongly objecting to these trends, Larivièrè delighted me with this passage in an otherwise well-written essay:

Lacan strove, through the use of deliberately arcane, sometimes seemingly almost amphiborical, indeed often baroque, magniloquent, euphistic language, to incessantly dismantle the implied unity of meaning, because the truth of the unconscious was in his view incompatible with monolithic, indivisible, indiscernible sense. (p. 164)

It made me laugh, and wonder if he were pulling the reader’s leg?

Power Games presents essays and commentary by other distinguished colleagues. The book confirms some of my previously held notions: it is easier not to bend to a theorist if one does not strive to totally belong to their school. There are only a few truly brilliant ideas that succinctly hit the nail on the clinical head, and those are to be found widely scattered among the different (often non-communicating) schools of thought. It is also incomprehensible to me that only one school of thought could help us understand the complexity of the psyche. It is also almost a miracle for one’s analysis to be the source of true personal growth and deep satisfaction. There are only a few master analysts who can read and confirm your subjectivity while helping you re-structure the pathological part of the self so that you may fulfill your ideal self. One is lucky to find such an analyst. Also, there are probably not enough gifted supervisors for all the students that need one. Pick and choose wisely; keep in mind that one can also learn much from one’s patients. Every time a patient is disappointed in us, and we can contain its expression, we learn a truth.

Coercive aspects of psychoanalysis are not limited to American brands, as Larivièrè’s paper suggests. Nor

4 When I once asked her why, in all the time we had worked together, she had not once spoken of having anxiety when she left the hour. She replied that after she left the hour, and had perhaps a momentary discomfort until she got outside, she “always knew I would be there.” She never needed to telephone in between sessions. In this case, the Real triumphed over the Imaginary.

5 Brothers, Dorpat, Fuqua, Gray, Harwood, Lecomte, Leszcz, Livingston, Richard, Sarnat, Shaw, Strozzier, and Wolf.
Both the cover and the title of Shari Thurer’s book may strike the reader as provocative, offensive, confrontational. As I read the book, I found myself challenged, provoked, and grateful. I imagine that most readers, if not grateful, will be challenged and provoked too.

A characteristic of psychoanalytic thinking is a tolerance for ambiguity, which made it a revolutionary and mind altering theory. That was true of psychoanalysis during the first half of the last century, says Thurer, but since then, when it comes to thinking about gender, psychoanalysis has had little tolerance for ambiguity. Her combination of irony, humor, empathy, conversational language, and accessible writing is irresistible, making this brilliant feat of scholarship a pleasure to read. The End of Gender challenges us to examine our thinking about sex and gender, because as the title suggests, we are witnessing the end of gender in the way it has customarily been defined.

The book was conceived when Thurer discovered that her patients’ dreams and fantasies did not conform to traditional psychoanalytic concepts of gender. They were often genderless, or what might be more accurately characterized as omni-gendered. This in itself should have posed no problem, as the unconscious is polymorphously perverse. But it was problematic because Thurer found that Freud’s revolutionary theory of sexuality had hardened over the years into a theory that endorsed only a heterosexual line of human development and nothing else. Thurer dedicates her provocative book to “everyone on the gender continuum” and raises some provocative questions: Does a sexual act have a fixed sexual orientation? Are insertion and aggression male, and passivity, receptivity, and masochism female? Should we define sexual conduct by measurable, observable behavior, or by what is going on in the minds of the participants?

Thurer faults psychoanalysis with adhering to outdated binaries of male/female and gay/straight, conflating the shape of one’s genitals with one’s sexual orientation, or as she puts it, “vaginas exclusively seek penises and vice versa.” She faults psychoanalysis, which was once a liberating paradigm, for becoming a repressive one. While the rest of the culture began acknowledging in the sixties that gender categories are blurring not only at the “fringes” of society but in mainstream lifestyle, media, fashion, and art, psychoanalysis buried its head in the sand, ignoring the findings from the fields of neurophysiology, genetics, and hormonal studies. “Not only is each sex playing with each other’s toys, wearing each other’s clothes, and adopting each other’s neuroses—each is usurping the other’s lovers.” She points to the new visibility of homosexuality: many bisexual young women on college campuses who are “LUGs,” or “lesbian until graduation,” when they marry a man; or individuals who insist they not be categorized as male or female because they really are some mix of both. She points out the familiar phenomenon of gay commitment ceremonies which are now routinely announced in The New York Times, of apparently heterosexual woman marrying, having children, and in middle age, finding themselves sexually drawn to women. Gender identity or sexual identity is not always congruent with society’s expectations for that individual’s biological sex. She defines the term “gender-bender” as an inclusive term which refers to anybody who defies gender expectations, including female body builders, the straight male lovers of men who cross-dress, the transgendered people whose mental gender does not synchronize with their congenital anatomy. As she puts it, what was deviant for baby boomers has become far more mainstream for their offspring.

Thurer claims that it is an error to presume that all such individuals suffer from serious psychopathology, as psychoanalysis has done and continues to do. Ever since the 1980s, many psychoanalysts recognized that the level of a patient’s personality organization was independent of his sexual orientation. Even mainstream psychiatry, which lagged behind the culture, was ahead of psychoanalysis when it removed the description of homosexuality from the DSM in 1973. It is only recently that psychoanalytic institutes have begun to accept homosexual candidates for psychoanalytic training.

The cause of the problem, she claims, comes from a slavish adherence to Freudian theory about gender, a kind of psychoanalytic chutzpah in failing to recognize that while psychoanalytic theory is the story of human functioning, it...
is only one story of human functioning. And it is a story whose trajectory is quite inconsistent and contradictory, leading psychoanalytic thinking about sex/gender astray. “Freud’s genius was to create a box; unfortunately, it was a box outside of which later analyst’s tend to think. Or more accurately, later analysts focused on only a part of the box, the part that emphasized the importance of the body on sexuality.” In addition, claims Thurer quite convincingly, Freud’s theory of sexuality changed remarkably from the early to the later years, a shift that has barely been noted or considered. Early on, Freud recognized that all perverse behaviors are normal to the child at some time in childhood, making a disposition to perversions a fundamental human characteristic (Freud 1905). He presumed an innate bisexuality in human beings and noted that adult perversions, such as spanking, coprophilia, and so forth, resemble the polymorphous perversion of childhood, which Thurer calls “that blissful Arcadian period in human life when sexuality might be enacted via many means and erotic value could be freely and flamboyantly attached to any object” (p. 175). Following Freud’s early theorizing, either we harbor perverse wishes or we enact them in one form or another, making the line between the abnormal and the normal, the creative and the perverse, an ambiguous one indeed. At this time, Freud did not regard male homosexuality as a perversion but as a naturally occurring peculiarity of object choice, an alternative outcome of the Oedipus complex, as natural as a heterosexual outcome.

That was in the good old days when psychoanalysis was about ambiguity. Had Freud stopped theorizing in 1905, says Thurer, he might now be considered more “queer friendly.” But Thurer clearly points out, that later in Freud’s (1927) thinking he elaborated at least four theories of male homosexuality, which have all been used to imply that something has gone very wrong in their development to result in their being so damaged. For Freud, resolving the Oedipus complex with a heterosexual outcome had become the best resolution, necessary for the survival of the species.

Queer theory, on the other hand, emphatically denies that any one sexual orientation is more appropriate than another, and rejects the universality and importance of the Oedipus complex, with its valorization of the penis. Queer theory regards the centrality of penis envy and castration anxiety as arrogant male chauvinism and offensive. Freud, who openly was puzzled about just what it was that women wanted, had conspicuously little to say about lesbianism, and wrote about it in only two places, in the footnotes of his famous Dora case, “Fragment of Analysis of a Case of Hysteria” (Freud 1905) and in “The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman” (Freud 1920). And what Freud did have to say about lesbianism did not disguise his distaste for such women. Until recently, it was presumed in the psychoanalytic literature that any woman who had erotic desire for another woman wished to be a man, a presumption that reflected Freud’s bias. What psychoanalysis has inherited from Freud, says Thurer, is the implicit belief in the sex/gender binary. This binary does not allow for the recognition that an individual can want both to be a woman and to have a woman. Or that the same person who is glad to be a woman, and wants to have a woman, can want to have a man tomorrow or the next day.

Freud engaged in a conservative sex/gender stereotyping, painting the topic of fetishism with a phallic brush. That is, the fetish is a substitute for the mother’s missing penis that the little boy believed was there. It is a denial of her castration, reassuring him that he need not worry about losing his penis. According to this logic, the fetishism saves the boy from becoming a homosexual by endowing women with a characteristic that makes them tolerable as sexual objects. As Thurer says, when Freud saw the vagina as a wound of castration instead of seeing the penis as an enlarged clitoris, he was using a stereotyped binary logic and elevating the male organ.

Thurer argues persuasively that a new sexual revolution is occurring and that it is time for psychoanalysis to lift its head out of the sand and look to other disciplines, such as biology, neuroscience, sociology, literary and cultural studies, queer theory, and feminist theory to become more informed about constructs of sex and gender. If you have dipped into postmodern theory and been intrigued but irritated by the inscrutable writing style and endless droning in French, you might stand up and cheer Thurer for her chapter called “Postmodernism for Those Who Missed It.” Calling postmodernism “the theory you love to hate,” she tells us that while postmodernists are politically correct, they all too often live in an academic ivory tower of theory, which makes them lack plain common sense and empathy for people in pain. In other words, they do not deal with actual patients, only “positions in discourse.”

Despite this objection, Thurer urges us not to be put off by postmodernism, because psychoanalysis has been cut off from the real world too, and should take advantage of what postmodern theory has to offer. By using queer theory in selective ways, we might make psychoanalysis’ brilliant insights about the unconscious more relevant to the twenty-first century, and help us to make it more possible for all potential patients, wherever they may be on the gender continuum, to have increased access to their sexual selves.

A tolerance, for and even an embrace of, ambiguity are hallmarks of postmodern thinking, from which psychoanalysis can learn a good deal, says Thurer. The virtue of postmodern theory is that it entails the systematic questioning of existing categories and even of the process of categorization itself. She observes,
Hence, queer theory has no truck with fixed sex/gender identities. It transcends labels of male, female, homosexual, bisexual, heterosexual, transsexual, etc., opting instead to consider gender identity and sexual orientation as culturally invented, fluid, eternally unstable constructs that derive what meaning they have from their context. (p. 97)

With delightful irony and humor, she tells us, “Queer theory is best understood as an intellectual movement that is in the business of perpetually doubting the Grand Narratives of Sexuality, the ever-mutating “operating instructions” for gender identity and sexual orientation (p. 99).” She explains queer theory in clear and understandable language, and illustrates how useful it can be for psychoanalysts in understanding and treating patients. Although Thurer does not present a theory of gender and sexuality by which psychoanalytic clinicians may formulate workable hypotheses for use in clinical practice, she raises critical questions about the commonly held views regarding gender and sexuality. She finds that traditional psychoanalytic theory is too value-laden, and postmodern gender theory, which is presumably value-free, ultimately does away with the patient. The best that we can do right now regarding explaining sex and gender, is not to try to figure it all out, but to mix and match theories. She reminds us of what many who have been doing this work a long time have discovered, that in the end, good treatment seems to preclude theoretical purity. Thurer urges us to maintain an actively skeptical stance, allowing ourselves to remain uncertain and tolerant of ambiguity. She has found that ironically, it is the postmodernist theorists who provoke us to reread Freud.

The organization of the book reflects Thurer’s intellectual journey in synthesizing and critiquing the various theories about sexual orientation and gender identity. Chapter 1 is an overview of the crumbling of sex/gender categories, and introduces postmodern gender theory as a possible way of sorting out some of the contradictions in our understanding of sexuality. Chapter 2 looks at postmodernism, recent queer theory, and the cultural scene more closely, introducing a compelling case description in which she incorporates some postmodern concepts. In Chapter 3, she critiques some of the premises employed in the “harder” sciences—neurophysiology, genetics, hormonal studies, anatomy—as well as the “softer” ones—data-based psychology, anthropology, sociology, and evolution, finding them too reductionistic. (I found this to be a particularly dense and difficult chapter to read, unlike the others.) In chapter 4, Thurer presents a history of queer theory, from its origins in feminism, gay theory, and French philosophy, to its status today in literature, arts, and philosophy departments. In Chapter 5, she reviews psychoanalytic theory, incorporating some ideas from postmodern theory. While understanding that the differences between the various schools of psychoanalysis are more apparent than real and often blur in clinical practice, she has found the relational model to be more compatible with postmodern theory than the more classical models, specifically because they think more deeply about the relationship between patient and analyst and their mutual influence. Thurer shows us how it is the relational school that began incorporating a sense of fluidity about gender into their theorizing in the past decade. She cites the work of Jessica Benjamin, who recently suggested that the sex/gender possibilities of our early bisexual period need not be given up, even after we discover the reality of anatomical sex difference. Such attachments and identifications may be revived later on without troubling consequences. That is, ambisexual feelings may oscillate in and out of people over their lifetime.

This is a fascinating and thought-provoking read, thoroughly enjoyable. Notable is Thurer’s ability to present so much in so little space, in seemingly effortless fashion. That takes a tremendous effort indeed.

Sharon K. Farber
Sharon_farber@psychoanalysis.net

**Review of Raubolt - Continued from page 66**

is coercion and destructive narcissism limited to analytic institutes. Shaw’s paper mentions its presence in the religious organization, Siddha Yoga and its current leader, a beautiful woman named Gurumai. She herself was the hard-won disciple of a charismatic Guru, beating out her brother who was his first favorite. The practice there has been to urge the therapists who come to learn to meditate to influence their own patients to join the organization, among other serious offenses. If true, it made me sad, for I have so loved the record of Gurumai’s soothingly beautiful chanting, but it is clear that the group overstepped its boundaries. A 12-Step principle comes to mind that helps with these inevitable disappointments: keep the best and leave the rest.

This also brings up the issue of authority, which is an unspoken underpinning of the book. What is the nature of our own authority and how do we come by it? Otto Rank said that both the hero and the artist must be self-appointed. Self-appointment is most likely based on our capacity for authenticity. Probably it is in our ability to affirm our subjectivity that gives authority to the self. We can be wrong, and we may come to understand something in another way, but at each moment of our subjective development, we are nonetheless authentic. It is up to our transitional figures of authority to honor and give words to the “unthought known” of our subjectivity, both emotional and intellectual. We probably should accept no less. This book may well be a manifesto to that end.

Rochelle G. Kainer
Kainer3@aol.com
Lucy Daniels is a gifted novelist with a psychological ear and mind for tracking the unconscious. Or is she really a psychologist with a novelist’s gift for capturing character and weaving vivid and fascinatingly complex plot lines? Does it matter which identity prevails? In fact the author is both a licensed clinical psychologist and an extraordinarily gifted writer. With every page the reader is engaged in a depth psychological adventure so movingly written the reader can barely put down the book. Two stories unfold: about a young talented artist, Camilla “Lily” Price, and Grace Babcock, an independent-minded seventy-something—Lily’s sexy landlady and distant relative. Daniels deftly weaves their narratives together intertwining them as they draw closer to each other.

The main character, Lily, is the daughter of a mixed race couple. A rich white boy who is a gifted jazz pianist rebelling against his family’s staid values meets Marion, an attractive black girl from a conservative family—a preacher’s daughter at her most revolutionary moment. The girl is musical, and she sings well. The two are instantly drawn together and head off to Los Angeles without looking back. Once there, they marry, make music together and have a daughter, Camilla Price.

Lily, as her adored and adoring father calls her, has her father’s red hair and blue eyes (, the eyes of the father). But she has her mother’s black skin and when her charismatic cocaine-using father dies in a car accident when she is five, her charmed life quickly deteriorates. Without her free-thinking husband’s support and encouragement, Marion’s musical ability seems to dry up and she is forced to take her daughter and return to her family in Millboro—a town somewhere in the South. Marion’s prissy preacher father, Reverend Roger Tower, rules the family as well as much of the local black community with an iron and punitive superego. Marion, the shimmering vibrant singer, becomes a ghost of her former rebellious self and reverts to being a completely compliant servant in the family living on their charity and forbearance.

Having landed in the home of her ancestors—her maternal great grandparents were slaves in or near Millboro—Lily slowly works her way out of the repressed and repressing atmosphere through her multiple talents and the vivid recollections of her freedom-loving father whose eyes look back at her every time she sees herself in the mirror. Like her father, she is a gifted pianist, a talent her grandfather is glad to exploit when she plays the organ in his church. He has no similar tolerance for her musical ability when she plays at The Purple Onion, a popular club in town where Lily can more freely exercise her talent and bring her identification with her father to new life.

Lily’s unfolding story of growing up in Millboro carries the reader into life of the black community in a somewhat integrated southern town. Through Lily’s painful discoveries we learn both about her mealy-mouthed grandfather and his flock of compliant parishioners and relatives and about how an unconventional and gifted person can and must find her way out of the confining narrowness of her family’s limited expectations for her. When Lily discovers that she has additional talents as a visual artist, even greater than her musical gifts, she begins to find her way.

In the course of the narrative, the reader meets Lily’s inner life in italics. A caged yellow canary is the author’s principal metaphor for Lily’s cramped creativity as well as her hostile feelings toward her family or lover. When first invented the canary was “little and lonely looking, at first, his beady eyes fixed directly on Lily, staring her down from between the bars of that big old fashioned cage.” (p. 1) When complimented by her mother who presses her to play at church on the Sunday of the weekend of her first really big success in the art world, we immediately hear how Lily’s canary self responds:

Like an actor to a cue, that bird starts to swell even before the last word leaves Mama’s mouth. In seconds it puffs up so large that the bars of the once-too-big cage rumple its feathers and collapse its feet. Next the cage begins to squeeze tighter and tighter like a round grill determined to make canary juice, until the bars themselves are no longer visible because of being fluffed over by the mangled bird’s yellow feathers. (p. 1)
The eloquent metaphor for the gifted girl’s narcissism is handled with such acerbic wit and wily imagination we subliminally get the author’s knowledge of how mixed the burden of talent can be—squeezing the gifted one into making canary juice while fluffing with pride over every accomplishment and compliment. 

Grace Babcock is one of the few relatives Lily can bear, and when her own living situation with prissy roommates has tried her patience once too often, she accepts Grace’s offer of a rented room. Grace has her own motives for reaching out to Lily and as the plot unfolds we gradually learn about her touching history. Slim, elegant, lithe and sinuous, Grace has more than the usual number of admiring men friends who regularly visit the 71-year-old widow. Going every so often to Reverend Tower’s church keeps Grace just within the social circle of her family—most of whom she rather dislikes but tolerates. Her unconventional nature, along with her steadfast admiration, gradually wins Lily’s confidence and the two women become friends as well as landlady and longtime tenant. Both women need a supportive family, which they clearly never had. And both women need a trusted witness to their sorrows and triumphs. Daniels expertly introduces their doubts about each other and the gradual thawing of Lily’s reserve.

All the characters in this moving novel are deftly drawn. Chauncey Bledsoe, the red-haired architect from Scotland and colleague of Lily’s at the college where they both teach, is Lily’s lover and insistent mentor in the art world. The yellow canary speaks loudly and persistently when Chauncey is around. As the novel begins, Chauncey is Lily’s most serious boyfriend so far. But her pleasure and comfort in the relationship are alternately marred and maddened by his arrogance and bossiness or thrilled by his unstinting admiration for her gifts. Daniels’ gift for capturing dialogue is astonishing and we become witness to Lily’s encounters with the Scotsman, her southern relatives, her artist and musician friends.

Tom Perkins, the owner and sole proprietor of the furniture store where Grace had worked is the love of the older woman’s life and Lily’s observation of their alliance opens the door to a possibility she had never encountered, much less imagined. Her memories of her parents loving relationship had faded in the light of her mother’s transformation into colorless compliance.

Despite the title, this book is as much a story about mothers and their daughters. We are invited to understand Lily’s relationship to Grace as the true passing of maternal wisdom on to the younger generation and to see Lily’s relationship to her own mother as an unwitting effort to achieve the independence and artistic maturity her mother only momentarily achieved.

Daniels brilliantly portrays Lily’s inner life as well as her main character’s awareness of her own conflicts and the range of ways she had and could respond to her feelings. The emotional intertwining of the two main protagonists comes together at a moment of emotional crisis for Lily. Chauncey has gone with Lily to a nearby city where an exhibition of her sculpture is met with triumphant success. Her simmering ambivalence toward Chauncey ebbs and flows during their trip but when they return to Millboro it erupts once again. Lily reluctantly accompanies Chauncey to a particularly noxious Sunday supper after her Grandfather’s church service. Observing what she perceives as an unholy alliance between her lover and hypocritical grandfather pushes her over the edge.

Lily continued watching the two men chat comfortably and recognized that their bond was “stronger than ever”:

Chauncey’s patronizing tone seemed to mix his Scottish accent with Grandfather’s holy drawl. The whole nature of this conversation made it clear that the brotherhood between Chauncey and Grandfather couldn’t be thicker… At that point the hurt and mad in her body came together so strong that Lily could no longer stand it. The canary in the cage confronts her eye-to-eye. She sees it begin to swell. But as the cage’s grid eases tighter around the yellow feathers… Lily made herself stop and wait a few minutes while straining to determine whether the problem was really an outrageous alliance between Chauncey and Grandfather, or something in herself. The feeling that gripped her was, like this morning’s a combination of hurt and ripped-off, rage over cruel unfairness. But she was not going to ignore it… Lily’s effort to be reasonable only fanned her outrage. Finally the continuing conversation between Chauncey and Grandfather but so much fire in her heart and sour in her mouth that she stood up and walked out, determined to march all the way home without saying goodbye to anybody. (p. 91-92)

When Lily finally arrives at Grace’s home she is still enraged at Chauncey’s most recent betrayal of her personhood. Instead of being ignored she is met by unaccustomed support. Grace comments:

“Lily, I am so proud of you! I want you to come back when you have more time and tell me about each and every piece. Will you do that soon?”

Lily’s drained-away weakness had faded by

The Wimp Factor by Stephen J. Ducat is a timely and fascinating study of the manner in which male anxiety has come to define our political culture. In Ducat’s intuitive and well-researched writing, a strong link is demonstrated between macho strutting, the macho strutting of male politicians, and the fundamentalist’s holy wars. In Ducat’s excellent and thoughtful analysis of the contemporary American political situation, he suggests that our culture, and in particular our leaders, vacillate between their own insecurity as males, their insecure masculinity, and the appeal of the image of the lonely cowboy superimposed upon the image of a decisive, gun-toting, aggressive leader.

Some may love Ducat’s views and his politics (as I did) and some may disagree, but none can fail to appreciate his vignettes and his quotes from the media, as well as his use of language. For many, the book will be an “Aha” experience, solidifying what they have been thinking for a long time. Ducat’s view of the injection of testosterone into American politics is demonstrated by the current administration, with their clever turning of a “cowardly” president into a war hero, and the subsequent turning of his opponent, who truly served in the war, into a “flip flopper,” connoting a feminine or nondecisive person. It is of particular interest to view the factors at play in the media, and how they influence our thinking. I guarantee that no one will ever watch the evening news without thinking of quotes from this opinionated book.

Before writing this review, I looked at Amazon to see what online reviewers thought of the book. Most found it be excellent and appreciated Ducat’s credentials as “a genuine psychologist talking about psychology.” The reviews were interesting, with one dissenter claiming that “Ducat’s positions are stereotyped and full of hackneyed emotions.” To refute this, I ask the reader to turn to Bob Herbert’s (2006) op-ed column “Why aren’t we shocked?” in the New York Times. Herbert hypothesizes that in the recent shootings at an Amish schoolhouse in rural Pennsylvania and at a large public high school in Colorado, the killers went out of their way to separate the girls from the boys, and then deliberately attacked only the girls. Ten girls were shot and five killed at the Amish School, with sexual molestation part of the mixture. One girl was killed and a number of others were molested in the Colorado attack. In the widespread coverage that followed these crimes, very little was made of the fact that only girls were targeted. Herbert asked us to imagine what would have happened if a gunman had gone into a school, separated the kids on the basis of race or religion, and then shot only the black kids, or only the white kids, or only the Jewish kids. There would have been calls for action and reflection, and the attack would have been seen for what it really was: a hate crime. None of that occurred because the victims were “just girls,” and we have become so accustomed to living in a society saturated with misogyny that violence against females is more or less to be expected. According to Herbert, “Stories about the rape, murder and mutilation of women and girls are staples of the news, as familiar to us as weather forecasts. The startling aspect of the Pennsylvania attack was that this terrible thing happened at a school in Amish country, not that it happened to girls.”

The Wimp Factor is divided into seven chapters: I. From Mama’s Boy to He-Man: Developmental and Cultural Paths to Anxious Masculinity; II. The Miss Nancy Man in Nineteenth-century America: Historical Roots of Anxious Male Politics; III. The Wimp Factor: Performing Masculinity in the Presidential Career of George Herbert Walker Bush; IV. Vaginas with Teeth and Castrating First Ladies: Fantasies of Feminine Danger from Eve to Hillary Clinton; V. Permutations of the Presidential Phallus: Representations of Bill Clinton, from Emasculated Houschusband to Envied Stud Muffin; VI. Voting Like a Man: The Psychodynamics of the Gender Gap in Political Attitudes; and VII. Gender in a Time of Holy War: Fundamentalist Femiphobia and Post-9/11 Masculinity.

The Preface, “Fear and Phallus,” poses the question of why testosterone is a coveted elixir of political power and proceeds to discuss the anxieties that have made the “Wimp Factor” one of the most important variables in determining the outcome of an election. The author posits that much of the outcome of a presidential campaign involves hiring spin-doctors and handlers to
inject “unseemly quantities of Viagra” into the candidate’s rhetoric and to reassure the male electorate that the candidate likes to kill things. The group that determines the outcome of an election—the soccer moms, the office park dads, the security moms, the NASCAR dads, and the religious fundamentalists and all who are concerned about gender, fear the wimp factor.

The book attempts to understand the powerful role that unconscious fears and fantasies play in politics by using psychoanalytic concepts (as well as such diverse sources as the Sambia tribe in the Eastern Highland of New Guinea and Terri Schiavo) to explain the main characters in the morality play of contemporary society. According to the author, Sambian men are raised by their mothers until age 10, forcibly removed and then subjected to violent male oriented rituals for the next 15 years (p. 40). Sex is primarily between men, and men are forbidden to interact with women until they are expected to choose a woman at the end of this time, and to father a child. The author points out that Sambian men echo their western counterparts in the way they respond to the traumatic rupture of the maternal cocoon and ensuing demands by repudiating the feminine in all of its forms. They are fearful of being feminized or re-feminized and thus, endure and celebrate the painful and traumatic rites of male initiation in order to revile all that emanates from women. This behavior is understood by the author to be an indication of an unacknowledged, if not unconscious, identification with, and envy of, a number of female functions, which are subsequently managed by appropriation.

The author proceeds to write about the demonization of powerful women such as Hillary Clinton and discusses her in chapter four, “Vaginas with Teeth and Castrating First Ladies: Fantasies of Feminine Danger from Eve to Hillary Clinton.” Ducat hypothesizes that women who lust too much invoke terror in the male unconscious, and thus the conflict of misogyny is viewed as a conflict, rather than as a simple hatred. According to the author, over the millennia of anxious masculinity, various mythical women have figured prominently in the pantheon of anti-female demonology: Eve, Lilith, Pandora, Diana, Kali. These characters appear to be derivatives of a pervasive and primordial image of feminine monstrosity—the vagina dentata, or vagina with teeth. Derivatives of this fantasy have been a recurring motif in the folklore of an astonishing range of cultures. Today we see the symbolism in many cultures of the vagina and the clitoris being unsafe, and the fantasized destructive impact on men of the woman’s capacity for pleasure. All of these stories involve men being emasculated, eaten, poisoned, infected with disease, rendered impotent, and turned into women; this myth is present in our fairy tales, which frequently involve a male hero making a perilous journey to gain a woman. Male insecurity about their masculinity grounds them in a paralyzing conflict: they desire women as sexual objects, but fear them as sexual subjects, as creatures of desire, and it is the woman’s amorous appetite that men find so threatening.

Christian-right crusaders Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson agree with Osama bin Laden on one key theological point: America had it coming. “The pagans, and the abortionists, and the feminists, and the gays and lesbians . . . and the ACLU . . . helped make this happen,” explained Mr. Falwell. Moreover, he warned shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, “What we saw on Tuesday, as terrible as it is, could be minuscule if, in fact, God continues to lift the curtain and allow the enemies of America to give us probably what we deserve.”

A further aim of this book is to shed light on the links between anxious masculinity, the external holy wars of fundamentalists, and the internal wars of femiphobic men. Of particular interest is the correlation between the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the war in Iraq, and the continued over-valuation of masculinity in American politics and culture.

We turn then to Hillary Clinton who said, “The idea that I would check my brain at the White House door just does not make any sense to me.” However, Bob Herbert in his editorial “Why aren’t we shocked?”(2006) described the disrespectful, degrading, contemptuous treatment of women as being mainstream, and described a message on an ad for Abercrombie & Fitch T-shirts for young women, “Who needs a brain when you have these” as well as an ad for a major long distance telephone carrier showing three apparently naked women holding a billing statement from a competitor. The text asks, “When was the last time you got screwed?” Ducat presents example after example describing the attempt to repackage Hillary, but the inability to find a way to render her self-authorizing intellect acceptable to the femiphobic right has now resulted in male political hysteria. Hillary was referred to in a national review as a smiling barracuda in a series of cartoons, lampooning Hillary and Bill in response to Paula Jones’ sexual harassment suit against Bill Clinton.

Chapter four is an ode to Hillary and celebrates her energy and self-determination in a description of her transgressions of “First Lady” comportment. In spite of a slanderous campaign against her, Mrs. Clinton earned a 62% approval rating, which resulted in a gap in her support between men and women, and Democrats and Republicans. Hillary’s intelligence and her achievements were spun out into public perception by her opponents as a punitive hunger for power in the White House. An anti-Hillary crusade developed that reached across the Atlantic,
with British labor candidate Tony Blair having to reassure voters that his own wife would know her proper place. Similar views were presented by Bob Dole. Jokes are reported in this book such as “Why did the Clinton’s have only one child?” Answer: Because Hillary had a vasectomy (p. 141), or “Why does Hillary Clinton not wear mini-skirts?” Answer: So her balls do not show. In attempting to switch Hillary from Lady Macbeth to Betty Crocker (p. 144), she had to undergo an extreme makeover, which was described in the book as a recipe from the “Stepford Wives” playbook. Hillary’s conflict between her ambitious, intelligent, self-authorizing self, and the requirement that she enact the deferential wife of a man to buy political experience has been an area of constant stress for her and has resulted in her continued name-calling by femiphobes in government.

As a conclusion to his book, Ducat discusses the demonization of powerful women and contrasts this with the deification of powerless women. Although Hillary Clinton remains the poster child for feminine danger, Terri Schiavo is described as a great political issue and opportunity for the Republican Party. According to Ducat, the right wing debate for Terri Schiavo’s tragic predicament became a great political issue for the Republicans: an opportunity to shore up their Christian Right base, a precursor to the debate on abortion and a chance for one GOP Representative, Tom Delay, to play a brazen ethical shell game to keep the public eye away from an ongoing investigation into his own sociopathic conduct. Bush’s ratings were falling and the author questions why the same White House that has officially sanctioned the torture of prisoners of war and promoted those whose policy memos gave the green light to the actual perpetrator, as well as their enthusiasm to develop a new generation of nuclear weaponry, would cast a woman in a persistent vegetative state as a main character in this histrionic morality play. To answer this question the author finds that conservative and misogynistic men, especially of this fundamentalist variety, have always had a special affection for women without mind. The history of patriarchal culture is saturated with ambivalence about the talking, thinking, and self-authorizing female head—women who can speak and act for themselves. The author concludes with a discussion of Medusa as an example of cephalic malevolence; he concludes that men fear women who have a head on their shoulder and have not been confined to the mythic world, as we have seen that the most fundamental version of most patriarchal religious traditions mandate that women cover their heads or shave their heads, mute their voices, forsake their autonomy, and trammel their sexuality to gain acceptance by men.

According to the author, Terri Schiavo was the paradigmatic example of a woman who knew her proper place and stayed there, in bed, without agency or any sense of self. She had no will to interfere with the desires and plans that the men in her life made for her, and especially the plans her would-be saviors in Washington had for her. Forever voiceless, she could put up no resistance to those who sought to hitch their ideological and political wagons to her pale star—a star, which had faded into oblivion 15 years previously.

I would like to close with observations from Bob Herbert who pointed out that a girl or woman is sexually assaulted every couple of minutes or so in the United States. The number of seriously battered wives and girlfriends is far beyond the ability of any agency to count. We are all implicated in this carnage because the relentless violence against women and girls is linked, at its core, to the wider society’s casual willingness to dehumanize women and girls, to see them first and foremost as sexual vessels and never, ever as the equals of men. “Once you dehumanize somebody, everything is possible,” said Taina Bien-Aime, executive director of the women’s advocacy group, Equality Now. According to Bob Herbert, pornography has spread like nuclear waste across the mainstream in America and is now a $7 billion mega-industry where one can watch real women being beaten and assaulted. In addition, the video games and gangsta rap attest to the fact that there is a devastating continuum of misogyny at work in our culture and this book is a fascinating exposé of how misogyny affects whom we choose to lead us. This book helps the reader to understand some of the fundamental reasons why this misogyny is rampant in our culture and in our political system.

REFERENCES

Marilyn Newman Metzl
marilynewm@verizon.net

SEIDEN ON HAIKU - CONTINUED FROM PAGE 21

REFERENCES

Henry Seiden
hmseiden@verizon.net
Gilbert Cole’s, *Infecting the Treatment: Being an HIV-Positive Analyst* is a thorough and well-reasoned discussion of the personal, relational and political ethics of disclosing serostatus as an HIV positive person. A main theme of Gilbert Cole’s thought-provoking book is the complexity of disclosure of HIV status in the analytic treatment. At one point, he discusses the desire to keep vestiges of the disease hidden for fear of being discovered. At the same time he struggles with the implications of keeping hidden an essential part of his own subjectivity, especially if it is to be discovered later in less forthright ways. As he adeptly puts it,

> When the serostatus of the analyst is revealed after the symptoms are observable, the question from the analysand’s point of view might be, “How could you have conducted my analysis while keeping this from me?” Conversely, in the event that the analyst reveals seropositivity to the analysand before any apparent physical change, the question might be, “How can you expect me to continue in treatment while knowing this about you?” (p. 81)

He later goes on to understand this conflict using Ehrenberg (1995) and Greenberg (1995) to point out, “The salient question in the relational–conflict model is not whether or not to make a particular disclosure—or, once one is (inadvertently or otherwise) made, how to correct this mistake—but what is the best use that can be made of that disclosure” (p. 89).

It is within this context that I thought of how powerful is the topic upon which Cole embarks. At points when I was reading the book, I found myself self-conscious. How would it be interpreted that I had a copy of a book about an HIV-positive analyst? In fact, the author speaks of the powerful nature of “guilt by association” in considering how this taboo topic is handled gingerly in analysis when he discusses the implication of leaving a book on his side table that discusses HIV health. He wondered if there was some unconscious motivation in leaving this book out; however, he also considered how the same question goes unanalyzed for books of a different nature. For me, I found that topic stimulating my own fantasies of what I was trying to convey or hide in different settings: in my office, on the train, at the coffee shop. Elements of my professional as well as social self were challenged by books about HIV unlike the thousands of other books I have toted around everywhere I go.

On one occasion, I had the book out a few minutes prior to seeing a particular patient who has struggled both with issues of loss and with issues of my sexuality. We have worked with how this discovery impacts him and how it challenges his ability to idealize me as a man. It has also provided an opportunity to learn more about my humanity, and I am certain it had the effect of enriching the relationship rather than tainting it. Given this context along with a significant history of loss of significant relationships, I was aware of the possible impact of the patient seeing a book about a very particularly dangerous and meaning-laden virus out as my current reading material. With this in mind, I discreetly put the book away minutes before the session began but was not unaware of the compromises I was making in doing so.

> It was this vignette that made me consider two key elements in discussing Gilbert Cole’s dialogue about HIV. The first, the meaning of taboo in relation to illness, is wonderfully laid out. The second is the inherently political nature of HIV.

The idea that HIV and its disclosure are a potential contaminant in the treatment is ably discussed. Chapter 1, “Knots of Meaning,” unpacks associations with certain subjectivities of the analyst including sexual orientation and HIV status as well as the impact of disclosure, both overt and inadvertent, on the therapeutic relationship. He continues with this discussion in a more personal way in Chapter 2, “The HIV-Positive Analyst.” Cole explores HIV positivity as a mark of vulnerability as well as a sign of the sexualization and, in fact, penetration of the individual. Themes of infection, penetrated barriers, and invasion of foreign bodies into the self are explored, as in the following passage, “The phenomenon of AIDS forms an intersection with masculine fantasies concerning interiority that carry particular salience in the question of the construction of identity. Anxieties about the other that is inside have long been a masculine preoccupation” (p. 41). He proceeds to discuss, in a more classically analytic vein, that this may represent an envy of the generativity of women. In fact, it could also be understood as a representation of the male way of relating that is particularly autonomous and boundaried when compared with “woman’s ways of knowing” (Jordan, 1997; Belenky et al., 1986).

In a particularly interesting section, Cole examines the potential stigma and/or identity that form(s) in relation to one’s serostatus. In expanding the discussion from binary opposites to ranges of meaning that fluctuate (positive/negative vs. non-progressive, asymptomatic, on medication . . .), the meaning of the disease is understood to encompass not only sexuality but also masculinity, virulence, passivity/activity, immunity and even one’s status as of, or above humanity which is often so important in treatment. It is here where the idea of identity in its full form is best illuminated in a discussion of HIV. Dr. Cole does an excellent job of articulating Goffman’s ideas about
stigma and reinterpreting them within a relational context to comprehend the importance of HIV status in outlining a personal element of the analyst’s subjectivity and in turn provides an important contribution to the understanding of the transference.

The rest of the book is dedicated to exploring the implications of HIV status on identity and relational dynamics within the treatment. As Cole suggests, the project he embarks upon explores the personal, the social, the sexual, and the political nature of identity and meaning within the transference. Chapter 3 more fully discusses the ethics and implications of disclosure in the analytic situation, and Chapter 4 advances the ethical argument as is implied in its well-conceived title, “A Duty to Disclose?” As such, it speaks to an understanding of ethics that is complicated. To come out as HIV positive to a patient may lead to undue burden injected by the analyst; to abstain could be tantamount to betrayal where the essence of one’s being and the promise that the analyst will be fully human with respect to his role in the relationship is challenged. One way of understanding this is the fear of the “other.” In this case, death is an “other” as is HIV or sexual orientation. What is at play is a connection between the otherness of death and the otherness of HIV. In order to navigate this foreign land, therapy must involve an “ethics of mutuality” that mediates between the parts that are familiar and the parts that are foreign (Shabad, 2001). It suggests that we are not given the luxury of deciding if we disclose our subjectivity without paying an ethical consequence. In our work, if we are truly considered to be experts in relatedness and stimulating agency, it is also our ethical responsibility to refrain from protecting others from their own perceived fragility. Cole’s handling of this dilemma is adept. While he seems at times to spend too much energy detailing the history of transference and disclosure, he can be forgiven for what feels somewhat like defensiveness in outlining his position. That is, psychoanalysis has always tread lightly regarding the analyst’s own subjective desires. This is true to a far greater extent when those desires are same-sexed (p. 20). Dr. Cole astutely points out that the connection between viral infection and same-sex sexuality is charged for psychoanalysis.

It is here where HIV status and discussion of disclosure traverses the personal to land squarely in the political. This book makes a political statement: one suggesting that gay people, after a long struggle to hold a place at the table, now must demand the full respect and range of human experience, from the bedroom to the treatment room, from the cradle to the grave, just as our straight colleagues have asserted in their radical transformation of the analytic situation as a relational endeavor (Mitchell, 1988a). Gilbert Cole has furthered that argument in his openness to analyzing his subjective experience and respecting his patients for their ability to accept him as part of the full range of humanity. What might be further explored is the explicitly political nature of this disease. While the social implications are clear, there is an element of activism in the utterance of one’s serostatus that must also be interpreted.

In Chapter 5, Dr. Cole invites a small group of colleagues to share their experience of being HIV-positive analysts. There is not space in this review to fully consider his contribution to hermeneutic research as a natural extension of analytic thought. In this limited space, however, it is important to note that psychoanalysis is at its core concerned with meaning making. Work like Cole’s, with small Ns that are analyzed narratively, provides a needed infusion of empirical data beyond the analytic treatment situation. Those of us dedicated to qualitative analytically informed research should applaud the extensive literature and conceptual framework for this project.

The final chapter is an ambitious attempt to tie together many themes within a western philosophical tradition dating to Plato. It comes off as a bit confusing and tangential as probably would necessarily be the case when trying to achieve this type of project within one final chapter. Again, I forgive some confusion for the thrill of contextualizing this debate as part of the long history of philosophical and analytic thought rather than allowing it to be dismissed as marginalized.

What Cole is able to do with his work is impressive. He makes meaning out of the intimate connection between an HIV-positive analyst and his patients, he describes how the meaning of this experience differs from patient to patient yet vitally informs his work regardless, and he outlines how differences in the way he discloses information are analyzable and speak to the relational, the political, and the ethical domain. His work is an important contribution to the literature of psychoanalysis and sexual orientation. In writing about issues of illness, life and death, and intra-group difference among gay men, it forges past issues of sexual identity and bravely offers his own experience as valuable data for furthering the relational mission of psychoanalysis.

References

Andrew Suth
asuth@argosyu.edu
This book is thought-provoking, sometimes disturbing, and very beautifully written. In the Introduction, Michael Eigen tells us:

Lust, one of the seven deadly sins, is part of what gives life luster, heightening existence. It can be degrading and part of a will to power, an assertion of dominance. An act of self-affirmation, it can take many forms. It can foster links between people or destroy links. It melds generative and destructive modes of linking into kaleidoscopic amalgams, some finer, some grosser.

Since childhood I’ve wondered why “evil” is “live” backward. Why is it that people are so afraid of living, so much so that the devil comes to be a symbol of aliveness? Lust plays no small role in this fear.

My approach is to vary aspects of lust, moments of lust in different contexts, and dialogue with different approaches to lust. A good way to read this book is to find fragments that do something for you and stick with them. I mean this book to speak from self to self, make direct emotional transmissions, open possibilities of experience. My intent is not to control or dissolve lust but to vary it in reflective imagination and see what happens when it enters larger associative tapestries. These tapestries are necessarily selective, as I draw from personal experience, art, cinema, literature, psychoanalysis, religion, biology, and history. (p. ix-x)

Thus, the introduction does what a good introduction should do: it sets the stage for what follows. The book is not organized into chapters, nor, it seems, organized into coherent sections or topics with a table of contents. I do not mean, however, to imply that it is disorganized. Rather, it flows from one idea to the next, like a beautiful analytic hour, one association to the next, with lust as the thread. So, for the reader who requires or is looking for an organized treatise or a simple explanation of what lust is and is not, this is the wrong book. However, a reader who is comfortable following the thread of a good analytic hour will delight in finding him- or herself immersed in what often feels like Eigen’s associations. This book is Eigen’s ideas, musings, and thoughts about lust—multifaceted and complex.

Eigen discusses lust as a powerful life force, and also a potentially destructive force. Lust is “associated with vigor, life drive. Linked to the pleasure of the senses but also the will: lust for power” (p. 1). He provides numerous examples to illustrate this point. Lust takes many forms. There are vignettes, which take us into Eigen’s consulting room and into his own personal life, past and present. Interspersed with these he draws from a variety of sources including psychoanalytic theory, classical and contemporary art and literature, and the Bible. The book flows from one topic to the next, each written as an essay or vignette, sometimes quite brief, sometimes a few pages long. I particularly enjoyed Eigen’s vignettes about his patients and himself. Among the many very compelling patients are:

- Sparrow, whom he described as “lust surfboarding” (p. 40) “Lust enabled her to enjoy intensity without dealing with difficult feelings” (p. 44).
- Kyle, for whom there is no lust in his marriage. He lusted for his wife early in their marriage and he wonders if she ever lusted for him. He has a girlfriend—there is lust in that relationship. He says, “It’s not just ‘hedonistic’—a word putting down aliveness of life. And it’s not just dirty, illicit. It’s transcendent. A naughty treat, like ice cream. The best sex. A taste of goodness of life” (p. 50).
- Lee, just out of the hospital, heavily medicated with antipsychotics, “uncertainty about what’s real, uncertainty about reality… Only his cock is real. It must be real. But his ideas about it are unreal. A ghastly, awesome predicament. Trying to nail the world to his cock. ‘I fuck, therefore I am’” (p. 51).
- Bernadette who “came anywhere, everywhere—a man’s touch. The touch of the wind, her thoughts could set her off. Orgasm was cellular. She came in therapy when she shared fantasies… Being with a man made her whole” (p. 51). On the other hand, “She did not know when fucking started to disorganize her… ‘Fucking broke her open, broke her down’” (p. 52).

CONTINUED ON PAGE 80
Special Offer for APA Members!

Subscribe to *JAPA* for 2007 (Volume 55) at the regular individual rate ($135/year, $175/year foreign) and receive Volume 53 (*JAPA* 2005) free! Or, subscribe for both 2007 and 2008 ($270 for two years; $350 foreign) and receive both Volume 53 (*JAPA* 2005) and Volume 54 (*JAPA* 2006) free!

**Volume 53 JAPA 2005**
- 53.1 Hypocrisy, Intuition, Child Development
- 53.2 Love, Shame, Revenge, and Forgiveness
- 53.3 Clinical Theory
- 53.4 Gender

**Volume 54 JAPA 2006**
- 54.1 Interdisciplinary Studies, Theory, Education
- 54.2 Pluralism
- 54.3 Clinical Innovations
- 54.4 Gender: Masculinity

**Order Form**

- Enter my subscription for *JAPA* 2007 with the free bonus volume 53 for $135 ($175 foreign).
- Enter my subscription for *JAPA* 2007 & *JAPA* 2008 with free bonus volumes 53 & 54 for $270 ($350 foreign).
- Charge my credit card: ☐ VISA ☐ MasterCard ☐ AMEX
  - Acct.#: ___________________________ Exp. Date: ________ Signature: _______________________
- Check enclosed for: ☐ $135 ☐ $270 (Make checks payable to Mental Health Resources.)
- Name: ___________________________________________ Address: ___________________________
- City ______________ State _________ Zip ___________
- Email: ___________________________________________ Phone/Fax: _______________________

Please send payment to: *JAPA* c/o Mental Health Resources, 44 Bridge St., Catskill, NY 12414

Email: japa.dennis@verizon.net • Toll Free: 877-647-0202 • Fax: 518-943-7793
COMMITTEE REPORTS: PUBLICATIONS

The Publications Committee recommends policy affecting our journal, Psychoanalytic Psychology, our newsletter, Psychologist-Psychoanalyst, our review of book and journal synopses, Psychoanalytic Abstracts, and our electronic communications. Members meet in person annually at the Spring Meeting and otherwise conduct business by phone and email. The related Editorial Board of Psychoanalytic Abstracts meets annually at the APA Annual Convention, and the Editorial Board of Psychoanalytic Psychology meets at the Spring Meeting.

Committee members have six-year terms and may be reappointed once. If a proposed change in the Division by-laws is accepted in 2007, those terms will change to five years, as will that of the editor of Psychoanalytic Psychology (as recommended by Gary VandenBos of APA Publications). The outgoing and incoming chairs (McWilliams and Seiden) have proposed minor changes in the by-laws that will make committee members’ terms consistent with most other APA publication committee terms, ensure that each section can be represented on the committee, add the chair of the Internet Committee, and change the inaccurate terms used to describe our Psychoanalytic Abstracts positions. The proposed changes are intended to bring the by-laws into agreement with much that is already happening.

Current committee members, followed by the year their term ends (in December), include:

- Henry Seiden, Chair 2012
- Mary Gail Frawley O’Dea 2007
- Frank Lachmann 2007
- Silvia Gosnell 2007
- Ricardo Ainslie 2009
- Frank Summers 2011
- Sara Kowal (Graduate student) TBD
- Joseph Reppen (Journal editor) 2007
- Bill MacGillivray (Newsletter editor) 2011
- Johanna Krout Tabin (Abstracts liaison) 2012
- Larry Zelnick (Internet Committee Chair) 2010
- Division President ex-officio
- Division Treasurer ex-officio

Karen Maroda retired as of the end of 2006, after participating actively and helpfully. Arnold Schneider concluded his term as liaison to Psychoanalytic Abstracts and was commended by David Ramirez for his diligent service. Heather Pyle will assist Johanna Tabin as liaison to the Abstracts Board (Alvin Walker of APA is the Editor). William Gottdiener has replaced Hedda Bolgar, whose thoughtful voice on the board will be missed at the Abstracts Board meetings.

Psychoanalytic Psychology

The bombshell for the Publications Committee this year was the editor’s announcement of his intention to retire at the end of 2007. Dr. Reppen has greatly improved the quality of the journal, the breadth of its readership and submissions base, and its international reputation. He will be hard to replace.

We have named a search committee, chaired by Maureen Murphy, to find a successor. Members include Robert Bornstein, Kimberly Leary, William MacGillivray, Stuart Pizer, Stephen Seligman, and Doris Silverman. Every section is represented by one of these members, as are all the main constituencies of the Division. In the last newsletter, I reported on the rationale for the committee’s composition and procedures.

Our relationship with APA Press continues to be excellent. Net income from the journal in 2006 was $50,493, half of which comes to Division 39. This growth in income represented a 38.8% increase in electronic licensing revenue. Our contract with APA comes up for renewal in 2009, and should be carefully reviewed before then. I am not aware of any complaints, however, about our contractual arrangements.

The journal’s recent special issue commemorating the 150th anniversary of Sigmund Freud’s birth has drawn particular praise from readers. A special section on Theodor Reik in the most recent issue has focused attention on a currently neglected but seminal figure in psychoanalysis. A sensitive issue involving comments published in the non-peer-reviewed section of the journal this past spring was satisfactorily resolved.

Psychologist-Psychoanalyst

William MacGillivray was appointed for another six years at the January 2006 Board meeting. He received an increase in his stipend and a letter of commendation from David Ramirez, thanking him for his many improvements in the newsletter, the energy with which he has pursued writers, reviewers, and columnists, and his general reliability and conscientiousness.

Dr. MacGillivray has suggested that Division subgroups, as a way of being accountable to the membership, be expected to report to the newsletter. As president, I will implement his recommendation.

Psychoanalytic Abstracts

The Psychoanalytic Abstracts Board met in New Orleans on August 13 and opened with acknowledgment of the devoted service of Arnold Schneider and the incoming service of Johanna Tabin. New journals were considered for inclusion. Interdisciplinary issues and hot topics in psychoanalysis
were discussed. William Gottdiener contributed several new ideas, especially about making the *Abstracts* better known in scholarly communities. Efforts to increase subscribers—and marketing in general—are ongoing concerns despite repeated advertising efforts.

Although there is a trend for journals to be available in electronic formats and through open-access protocols, the available print journals that are abstracted have not declined, and there is no plan to discontinue the print version of *Psychoanalytic Abstracts* in the foreseeable future.

**INTERNET**

Our Web presence continues to expand. Online membership application and payment are now possible. Electronic registration for the Spring Meeting was available for the first time in 2006. Links exist on the Web site to numerous Division activities, including section Web sites, section newsletters, the Outreach Committee, and other areas. Our newsletter is now online in both current and archived forms. A collaborative effort with The Psychoanalytic Connection has allowed Division members access to free CE credits through a link, and a CE handbook is accessible as well. Full membership information is available. The Internet Committee is quick to respond when officers ask for new features or request that information to be added to the site.

**MISCELLANEOUS**

The Publications Committee is quite concerned about the steep decline in psychoanalytic publishing. One bright star on the horizon, however, is Art Pomponio of Rowman & Littlefield, which now owns the old Jason Aronson line (they have kept the name “Jason Aronson” because of its recognition factor). Pomponio is interested in collaborating with the Division in publishing projects. He is willing to publish books that are not expected to be big sellers if the Division is willing to share some initial costs; he has already set up such an arrangement for a book on the Austrian Embassy celebration of the 150th anniversary of Freud’s birth.

This is my final report as Publications Committee chair. I have greatly enjoyed the role and the people with whom I have worked.

---

**REVIEW OF EIGEN – CONTINUED FROM PAGE 77**

Equally fascinating and compelling are Dr Eigen’s passages about himself, women he has known, been with, lusted for, and musing about the many and various aspects of lust. There are some wonderful descriptions of himself as a boy, teenager, and young man—challenging us, the readers, to see the ways lust is omnipresent, inescapable, and essential in our lives. And throughout, he is provocative, for example:

> To masturbate is to see God. All through childhood I masturbated, day and night, many, many times a day, constantly. This means I was a sick child. Only sick children masturbate all the time. “(p. 17)

> Sick kids don’t have a latency period. Something I learned when I was studying psychoanalysis. Analysts claimed there is a period in childhood when kids aren’t too interested in sex. They study numbers and other things in school. Me? I was always getting crushes on girls… (p. 18)

Lest you think the book is only the personal and the clinical, there is more. In discussing, among other things, classical and current literature and art, religion, psychoanalytic theory, Eigen is stimulating, challenging, provocative, and scholarly. For example, he provides a wonderful account of the story of Dinah—Jacob and Leah’s daughter—providing an interpretation that goes well beyond what one learns in traditional religious education. Similarly, students of classical literature will likely have their thinking expanded by his interpretations, for example, of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.

Throughout, we explore with Eigen the many facets of lust, both positive and negative, procreative and fatal, for example: sexual lust, essential for the survival of the species, although also potentially destructive; lust for achievement or power; and lust connected to hate, jealousy, and revenge. However, we inevitably come to the conclusion that without lust, life and living cannot be possible. I found the book captivating and a real treat to read.

*Barbara Zimmerman-Slovak  
bzlovak@comcast.net*

---

**2006 GRADIVA AWARDS**

Each year, the National Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis presents its Gradiva Award to “poets, artists, producers, directors, publishers, etc., who have created works that advance psychoanalysis.” Two Division members, Jon Mills (for “A Critique of Relational Psychoanalysis” [Psychoanalytic Psychology, 2005] and Arnold Bernstein (for “The Practice of Wisdom: A Contribution to Clinical Philosophy” [Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 2005], shared the award for Best Article for 2006. Among the nominees were Peter Buirsiki, for Practicing Intersubjectively, (Jason Aronson, 2005), Stanton Marlan for *The Black Sun* (Texas A&M University Press, 2005), Beatrice Beebe (along with Stephen Knoblauch, Judith Rustin and Dorienne Sorter) for *Forms of Intersubjectivity* (Other Press, 2005), Jon Mills for *Treating Attachment Pathology* (Jason Aronson, 2005) and Nancy Burke for her poem “Long Division” (Rhino, 2005).
CONTINUING EDUCATION

The Continuing Education Committee has grown! Laura Porter, a psychologist in Tennessee, was recently appointed as co-chair; together, we have worked hand-in-hand to organize a rich array of continuing education opportunities for the 27th Annual Spring Meeting of Division 39. While CE credit has long been available through the extremely popular Master Classes on Wednesday prior to the official start of our Spring Meeting, this is the first time that CE credit is offered for attendance at panel presentations and keynote addresses—60 programs in all!

Descriptions, learning objectives, and faculty of each presentation for which continuing education credits are available can be found in Appendix 1 of the Meeting brochure, which will arrive in your mailboxes soon. Each panel is identified by a letter/number code (i.e., T-01, F-03, S-05, SN-02) based on the day of the presentation and its order in that day’s schedule. This code will match the panel’s listing on the Continuing Education Credit Log; the CE Credit Log lists all of the CE-approved sessions and will be located in your Annual Meeting Registration Packet. This Log is each participant’s official record of attendance at CE programs; keep your one-and-only Log throughout the Meeting to document your program attendance.

With topics ranging from trauma to politics and transference to attachment, there will undoubtedly be many presentations to stimulate your “big picture” thoughts and conceptualizations. However, to meet APA’s requirements for CE, participants must become a bit more, in Rorschach language, “Dd” to take full advantage of this one-stop shopping opportunity to earn CE credit. To receive credit and a certificate of attendance for any given program, it is necessary to register for the Spring Meeting, attend the entire presentation, and submit a completed evaluation form. Use your personalized Continuing Education Credit Log to document your attendance at each presentation, and return the Log to the Registration Table at the end of the Meeting. The CE Credit Log will serve as your documentation of attendance and record of the CE credits earned. Once your Log has been verified, it will be returned to you via mail.

In other news, the Online CE Project continues to attract Division 39 members and non-members alike. Text versions of two panels from the Spring 2006 Annual Meeting in Philadelphia, “EST, EBT, EBPP: What Might This Alphabet Soup Spell for Psychoanalysis?” and “Strengthening Relationships in Couples,” are currently available. Division 39 members can access these presentations, complete the associated online tests, and receive 2 CE credits at no charge. Non-members must pay $25.00 for each CE credit. When logging-in to take advantage of these CE opportunities, please be certain to indicate your degree/profession: it is required. Just go to www.division39.org and click “Online CE Project” located on the right-hand side of the page.

The Section V (Psychologist Psychoanalyst Clinicians) Web site provides another exciting opportunity to receive CE credits and can be accessed through the Division 39 Web site. Once on the Section V Continuing Education Web page, the text of the “Turning Point” papers (Winnicott, Levenson, Rubenstein, Kestenberg, Des Pres, Ferenczi and Freud) are provided, each with introductions and commentaries by distinguished teachers. The Section V site also provides follow-up references, a link for purchasing the texts, and an online list, which allows Section members to continue to dialogue further about the readings. Three CE credits can be earned by reading each paper.

Local Chapter participation in our CE program has grown. Both The Indiana Society for Psychoanalytic Thought and The Arizona Center for Psychoanalytic Studies are now offering CE credits (workshops, conferences, etc.) through Division 39. We welcome these groups and encourage other Sections and Local Chapters to take advantage of this CE service. Our other Local Chapters remain amazingly active, sponsoring calendars full of enriching and informative programs; why not create a vacation around a seminar in California, Tennessee, New Mexico, Connecticut, or Arizona, to name just a few? To learn more about the excellent programs offered by our Local Chapters, please contact Dr. Pat Strasberg at 520-247-0064.

While documentation of CE events can be challenging, Division 39’s “Quick Check” CE tool has clarified the requirements for our Local Chapter CE coordinators, who now meet the Standards and Criteria of the Sponsor Approval System with greater consistency. So useful is the Division’s Quick Check Tool that it is also being used by APA’s Sponsor Approval Committee, and is included with application materials sent to organizations, institutions, and individuals interested in becoming Sponsors or in renewing their applications.

The Continuing Education Committee is delighted to offer these varied and plentiful opportunities for psychoanalysts and psychologists across the country to receive the CE credits required by their state licensing boards.
Liaison to CAPP and IG

This is a report of the Spring and Fall meetings of the Committee for the Advancement of Professional Psychology (CAPP). The Implementation Group for Integrating the Diverse Practice Agendas, (IG) a sub-committee of CAPP also met in the Spring and Fall. I am the Division’s observer to CAPP and representative to the IG. I am also the chair of that committee. After having completed my second term, Jaine Darwin is now the Division’s Observer.

This is a summary of the main issues from the Spring and Fall meetings that I think will be of interest to the Division’s members.

- The lawsuits that the Practice Directorate (PD) has been involved in over the past several years have been successful. A total of $1.5 million has been spent on lawsuits. Approximately $15 million has been recovered in judgments from insurance companies. The Humana settlement will be finalized in the near future. Practitioners who have worked with Humana should look for instructions from the PD on how to apply for their share of the settlement.

- APA has a few dozen Web pages that are not connected. These Web pages have grown within APA with no overall coordination. This is currently being remedied which will result in a much better APA information system. However, this will not be completed until December 2007. It is a very expensive conversion.

- Psychologists that pay the practice assessment will be able to not only be listed in the psychologist locator system, but will now be able to have their own Web page. This will permit people to click on a psychologist’s name and go directly to a personally designed Web page. Each psychologist will be able to set up and maintain his/her own Web page and select downloads from the PD to post on there. Psychologists will also be able to put into the Web page information about themselves and their practices. The demonstration given at the Fall CAPP meeting was very impressive. The system is user-friendly, and could be a great marketing tool for practitioners as more and more patients are searching the Web to find a psychologist.

- The APA Committee on Early Career Psychologists reported at the Fall Meeting. They have done an outstanding job of developing materials to help ECP’s establish their careers and enter governance in APA, its Divisions and State Associations.

- The PD and its Government Relations office is working very hard to get the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) not to institute the proposed reimbursement cuts that are scheduled for January 1, 2007. Additionally the PD is vigorously working with CMS to permit reimbursement using testing codes that were previously approved. The use of codes that permit technicians to administer tests and to bill for these services separately from the professional time that psychologists put into the assessment processes was previously approved and is now being denied by CMS. The effort that went into getting these codes approved, and a work value established, was extensive. This is a significant setback for neuropsychologists and others who do assessment.

- Many of the CMS issues will ultimately have to be decided by Congress. Thus the Association for the Advancement of Psychology (AAP/PLAN) with the APA Practice Organization will be asking for contributions to support these political efforts. Your contributions assist organized psychology to gain access to legislators. Talking with members of Congress and their staffs is important so we can educate them about the consequences of these cuts on the Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries and on the psychologists who provide these needed services.

- Last year AAP gave over $200,000 to the PACs of members of Congress. Although that is an impressive number, it pales in comparison to what other health care professionals contribute to PACs. Contributions to PACs of legislators help facilitate access. Access to members of Congress permits us to educate them on issues that are important to our profession. CAPP was told that in spite of the changes in Congress, legislation directly affecting mental health issues like parity is not initially likely to be high on the agenda of the next Congress.

- Division 39 members are encouraged to respond to calls to contact legislators regarding specific issues. Last year’s CMS cuts were rolled back. This was in part due to the large number of psychologists who contacted their legislators and informed them of their concerns about cuts in reimbursement. The PD Web page feature: “Legislative Action Center” is very easy to use. In minutes one can send e-mails or letters to one’s Congressional delegation. The
demonstration of the Legislative Action Center, given at the Fall Meeting of CAPP, was very impressive. Not only can you contact members of Congress very easily, you can look up their voting records on various issues and other information about them including a list of contributors to their PACs.

- Psychologists in Ohio and Massachusetts have been getting letters from insurance companies announcing reimbursement reductions or other changes in their plans that ultimately will affect the bottom line of the practitioner. The PD and State Associations are coordinating their efforts to respond to these cut backs. Clearly, non-governmental insurance plans do follow the lead of the CMS.

- The Public Education Campaign (PEC) received a good deal of publicity when the results of the stress survey were reported to the media. The PEC will continue to emphasize its campaign titled: “Mind/Body Health: For a Healthy Mind and Body, Talk to a Psychologist.” The focus in 2007 will be on women because research has demonstrated that women are the family health managers and decision makers. Two topics will be emphasized in that PEC: Stress and Heart Disease. The 2008 PEC will target adolescents and young adults.

- In 2007, each practitioner will need to have obtained a National Provider Identification number. When you apply you must list your areas of specialty from a list of psychological specialties that they generated. Information on this has been sent to all psychologists who pay the practice assessment. One of the specialties is psychoanalysis. The definition of psychoanalysis provided to APA; however, was not a very good descriptor. The PD is trying to get it modified.

- An APA Model Act Revision Task Force has been appointed. This task is to revise the model licensing act to reflect current practice such as the need to have the licensing sequence revised, as well as recognition of scope of practice and licensure mobility. These are a few of the many aspects that need revision. The work of the Task Force will be monitored by the PD. All practitioners should stay informed about the Task Force’s work. Hopefully when the model act revision is completed, it will reflect current training and practice in our profession.

- More information on any of these items can be obtained from the APA Practice Directorate.

On almost every page of this book, Daniels’ deep understanding of human beings shines through. We read about Lily’s struggles to make sculpture that is vivid, moving, and the result of craft combined with spontaneous originality. We hear her thoughts and feelings when she plays the piano, her sense of herself as an artist with a career and a teacher. Daniels’ profound understanding of creativity vies with her ability to tell a story of human beings struggling to be fully and proudly themselves.

The author’s greatest gift to the reader is her exquisite representation of the burdens and joys of creativity. Early on we are made aware of Lily’s dilemma, which stemmed from her childhood experience.

From the start—probably as early as Daddy’s nightclub playing and their moon watching—Lily had known that feeling special was what she most needed in life. But growing up in Millboro continually threatened this perspective… (p. 97)

Mastering the piano was so wonderful compared to the drabness of the rest of their life that it seemed the one thing that could save them [her and Mama]—almost like a part of Daddy being with them, herself being a little like him. (p. 111)

Reading this extraordinary novel, we are with Lily and learn to see world she comes to see through the eyes of her father.

Laurie Wilson
ljwl@nyu.edu
SECTION REPORTS

V - PSYCHOLOGIST PSYCHOANALYST CLINICIANS
JOHANNA KROUT TABIN, PHD, ABPP

The newly streamlined Web site (http://www.sectionv.org) is now interactive, allowing members easy posting of their comments on previous postings and articles, and any other thoughts they wish to share. The Student Committee under the co-leadership of David Kemmerer, Elizabeth Hahn, and Eric Peters has compiled a list of psychoanalytically oriented graduate programs and internship sites, available on the Web site. Toronto will be a busy time for Section V. The Section V Invited Panel is “Inconvenient Truth: Knowing about Trauma.” Ghislaine Boulanger will present an original perspective in “I Don’t Want this Knowledge!': Struggling With Adult Onset Trauma”; Spyros Orfanos will offer “The Three Lives of Mikis Theodrakis: A Case Study of Adult Onset Trauma and Its Transformation”; and Robert Prince will discuss the insights from the two contributions. At the annual Section V reception, the award-winning student essay on “Encountering the Unconscious” will be honored. Section V is cosponsoring with Section I a Division-wide reception for candidates in formal psychoanalytic training, to encourage early career psychologists in the Division and give them a chance to learn about the functions of these Sections.

VI - PSYCHOANALYTIC RESEARCH SOCIETY
PAMELA A. FOELSch, PHD

There are many exciting changes to Section VI that I want to let everyone know about. First, we have successfully launched a new Web site! Our new address is www.division39section6.org. Soon, we’ll have the membership directory online. We have been collecting information regarding people’s research and clinical interests and now this information will be available to facilitate increased knowledge of the varied current areas of psychoanalytic research and contact with individuals working in a specific area of interest. We are hoping that this change will help reinvigorate the Psychoanalytic Research Society and facilitate our mission, to promote psychoanalytic research of an empirical, theoretical and clinical nature. Specifically, Section VI works to further the development of a variety of research activities including the planning and conducting, as well as the dissemination of research findings. Our new Web site will help stimulate and support communication among researchers, and announce professional meetings and publications. In addition Section VI facilitates 1) the continual development and training of psychoanalytically oriented researchers (e.g., providing a student research award); and 2) the broadening of the role that psychoanalytic research plays in general psychology, with other related professional disciplines, and the public.

During 2006, Section VI met our mission goals by providing a panel during the Spring Meeting in Philadelphia. I chaired this panel on “Assessing Personality Change in Long-Term Psychotherapy” that was presented by Jonathan Shedler, Fonya Helm, and Woody Waldron. A summary of this panel is in the Section VI Newsletter (which will be online soon). This past summer in New Orleans at the APA Convention, we also provided a forum for people interested in doing psychoanalytic research to discuss how it’s done, especially ways to get funding. This was successful in linking people up with others doing research, established a working alliance between two groups, and was especially helpful to students who wanted guidance in how to shape a career in psychoanalytic research.

At the Division 39 Spring Meeting in Toronto, Section VI will have two sponsored panels. The first panel will be on Evidenced-Based Practice, in which Joel Weinberger, Ken Levy, and Andrew Gerber will present and I will chair. Section VI will also be co-sponsoring the Presidential Roundtable titled “Can Psychoanalytic Research Survive in Departments of Psychology?” William Gottdiener (CUNY) will chair the panel and Nancy McWilliams (Rutgers) will moderate. Ken Levy (Penn State), Mike Nash (Tennessee), Joni Mihura (Toledo), and Joel Weinberger (Adelphi) will present. For more information, please go to the Web site, www.division39.org, for more information and to download the program. We look forward to seeing you there!

For psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic psychotherapy to continue as viable treatments, research that documents its effectiveness is necessary, as is dissemination of this information to the public and health care providers. To work toward the goals of conducting and publicizing psychoanalytic research, Section VI needs more members. Our incoming president, Nancy McWilliams, is supportive of research and has made it part of her platform. However, if we do not have the membership numbers to maintain our vote on the Board of Directors, we will not have a voice and she will lose the support she needs to implement her plans, not just within Division 39 but within APA as well. I encourage everyone who supports the role of research, even if you are not a researcher, to join now. With your membership, you indicate you value the role of research in strengthening psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic psychotherapy as a viable treatment! Membership applications are online, www.division39section6.org. Thank you and best wishes for 2007! See you at the meetings.
VIII - COUPLE AND FAMILY THERAPY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

Antonia Halton, PhD

The Section has been reaching out to new groups to further our efforts to promote the understanding and treatment of couples and families, within a psychoanalytic framework. Our Committee on Children in the Family is working together with Section II (Childhood and Adolescence) in a number of ways, under the leadership of Phyllis Cohen, Roanne Barnett, Susan Shimmerlik, and Chris Bonovitz (from Sec. II). In New York, they have been meeting together for case presentations and discussions about different approaches to the treatment of children. They are presenting a panel at the Division 39 Spring Meeting titled “At the Interface of Child and Family Therapy: A Clinical Dialogue Across Disciplines,” with Phyllis Cohen, Richard Fulmer, and Lawrence Zelnick. A joint Conversation/Social hour hosted by Sections II and VIII is planned for the 2007 APA Annual Convention in San Francisco, on the topic of “High-Risk Passages: The Influence of Adolescent Development on Families.”

In another exciting venture, Section VIII is participating in a weekend meeting in London on February 24-25, 2007, with the Society of Couple Psychoanalytic Psychotherapists (SCPP) from Tavistock. We will be discussing some couple cases at Tavistock on Saturday, February 24, and exploring the possibility of co-sponsoring a joint international conference on psychoanalytic couple therapy with SCPP. On Sunday, February 25, SCPP and Couples Centre Stage will present “Couples in Counterpoint,” a musical-psychological evening at the Royal Opera House. West End actors will rehearse marital scenes, and senior members of the SCPP will comment on and contribute to the process, focusing on the couple dynamics.

Section VIII hosted a Conversation Hour in August at APA Convention in New Orleans, led by Marilyn Metzl, our new president-elect. The topic was “Fertility Issues in Traditional and Nontraditional Families,” and we explored the unusual genetic relationships that arise as a result of the new technology of reproduction. Section members continue to discuss clinical questions on our list serve, sharing our viewpoints and learning from each other about treatment and theoretical ideas.

We were happy to award two excellent dissertation proposals with grants of $500 each last year. They were of equally fine quality, and interestingly, both examined the impact of therapy on relationships outside the therapy room. One of the grants went to Sara Murray at Rutgers University, for “The Relationship of the Significant Other to the Therapeutic Change Process,” and the other to Trysa Shulman Shy at the Massachusetts School of Professional Psychology, for “Responsibility’s Reach: Examining How Psychodynamic and Contextual Therapy Theories Inform the Therapist’s Ethical Stance Toward Nonpatient ‘Stakeholders’ in Treatment.” They will be honored at Section VIII’s Conversation/Social Hour in Toronto in April, where we will be talking about “Culture, Values, and Countertransference,” led by Shelly Goldklank and Susan Shimmerlik. We look forward to seeing you there.

Our Fall newsletter focused on treatment of older couples, and our Invited Panel in Toronto continues this theme. Barbara Pizer and Gerald Stechler will present papers on “Working With Older Couples: Internal and Contextual Aspects of Aging,” discussed by Mary-Joan Gerson. Barbara’s title is “What Happened to the Magic,” and Gerry’s is “Inevitable Losses and Reawakened Narcissistic Injuries.”

IX - PSYCHOANALYSIS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

Lu Steinberg PsyD

Section IX co-sponsored with Division 48 (Society for the Study of Peace, Conflict and Violence) a panel titled “Psychopolitical Dynamics and Consequences of Torture” at the August APA Convention in New Orleans. Neil Altman, treasurer of Section IX and Linda Wolfe, President of Division 48, were co-moderators. Neil Altman spoke of the “Psychodynamics of Torture,” in which he argued that the prevalent discourse on torture neglects discussion of the underlying psychodynamics, including feelings of helplessness and rage, which can then get enacted by those directly involved in torture and by those that tolerate it. Nina Thomas discussed the repression and denial prevalent in dealing with psychologists’ participation in torture. Dr. Thomas further discussed the consequences of torture in terms of the dehumanization of the other and the self on individual and societal levels, with the ensuing effects on us of living in a society that condones and even authorizes torture. Wells Dixon, a lawyer from the Center for Constitutional Rights, then described his experiences legally representing clients who are inmates at Guantánamo Bay. He provided documentation of abuses taking place there, including those involving psychologists.

In addition, Steven Reisner, a member of Section IX, spoke at the Council of Representatives meeting about psychologists’ particular contributions to interrogations, the need for clearer ethical guidelines. He stated why he thought that psychologists should not participate at sites like Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib, and stressed the need to refine the Ethics Code. He asked Council to undo what appears to be a single position, and pointed out that these decisions can have detrimental effects in a variety of ways for years to come. Steven’s article summarizing his testimony is on pages

CONTINUED ON PAGE 88
LOCAL CHAPTER REPORTS

AUSTIN SOCIETY FOR PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOLOGY  NAOMI FREIREICH, LCSW

In 2006-2007, our program theme is “Internal Worlds, External Conditions, and the Psychological Society.” ASPP continues to explore the role of culture, how we recognize it and/or resist it, within the psychoanalytic world. To date, we have had a number of fascinating presentations and engaging discussions around such topics as “Elitism in Psychoanalysis,” “Selfishness vs. Self Desire,” “Impasses Resulting from Different Cultural or Political Beliefs,” and “Political Activism.” The spring topics will explore the role of “Groups in Psychoanalysis,” “Culture and Grief,” and “Love, Hate and Authenticity.”

In October 2006, Christopher Bollas came to Austin for a clinical conference, “The Unconscious and Free Association.” Our spring clinical conference will be held February 10th with a case presentation by Nancy McWilliams on the 11th. In May, Rion Hart will be in Austin to present a 3-hour clinical workshop on ethics.

THE ONTARIO SOCIETY FOR CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOANALYSIS  BRENT WILLOCK, PhD, CPsych

This past year and a half has been another productive and rewarding one for our chapter, institute, and society. Two stimulating weekend workshops were held. In September 2005, Dr. Susi Orbach (London) commenced our new year’s visiting scholar series with her presentation: “How Can We Think about the Body? New Psychoanalytic Approaches.”

In October, for the Annual Stephen Mitchell Memorial Lecture, Drs. Gianni Nebbiosi and Susi Federici Nebbiosi (Rome) presented two stimulating papers titled: “A Contemporary Reconceptualization of the Concepts of ‘Merger’ and ‘Symbiosis’” and “Bion after Mitchell: The Theoretical and Clinical Significance of the Concept of ‘Common Sense’ in Bion’s Work.”

On May 6, our Second Annual Symposium concerned “The Psychology of Terrorism: Psychoanalytic and Social Perspectives.” Prof. Jessica Stern (Harvard) opened the event with a stimulating presentation, “Terror in the Name of God: Observations in the Field.” Dr. Neil Altman (New York University) spoke next on “The Roots of Terrorism: Through the Psychoanalytic Lens.” In the afternoon, Dr. Sue Grand (New York University) presented “The Twinned Body of Terrorism: Torture’s Sexual Transmission.” Following these presentations, a lively discussion between panelists and audience was chaired by Dr. Gary Rodin (Toronto). Ontario’s educational television network (TVO) approached us for permission to broadcast these talks. We were pleased to contribute to their programming in that way.

Our monthly scientific meetings were thoughtfully coordinated by Dr. Gary Rodin. In November, Dr. Josh Levy presented his “Reflections on the Journey of a Psychoanalyst.” That Saturday morning also served as a celebration of Dr. Levy’s 75th birthday, honoring him for his many contributions to the TICP in particular and to psychoanalysis in general.

In December, Dr. Dan Merkur discussed “The Transference Onto God.” In January, Dr. Clive Thomson shared his work on “Psychoanalysis, Countertransference, and the Dialogical Principle.” Dr. Sam Izenberg discussed “How to Teach Psychoanalysis” at our February Scientific Meeting. In March, Dr. Keith Haartman presented “Metaphor and the Relationality of Meaning.” May’s talk by Dr. Judi Kobrick concerned “Culture, the Body and the Unreflected Self: Attack and Restoration.” In June, TICP at the Movies featured Caché (directed by Michael Haneke, 2005) at the Private Screening Room of Varsity Cinemas. Discussants were Dr. Gail White (TICP), Mr. Thom Ernst (Producer and Interviewer for TVO’s “Saturday Night at the Movies”), and Dr. Eric Cazdyn (Professor of Film Studies, University of Toronto).

We continue to collaborate with a number of other psychoanalytic groups, both locally and abroad. In September, we cosponsored the Tenth Annual Day in Applied Psychoanalysis with Trinity College, University of Toronto, the Toronto Psychoanalytic Society, and the Psychotherapy Program in the Department of Psychiatry of University of Toronto. This year’s topic was “The Use of Humour in Art, Medicine and Psychoanalysis.” The keynote speakers were Dr. Frank Lachman (New York), Dr. Robert Buckman (Cancer specialist, Toronto), Prof. Larry Horowitz (School for Performing Arts, Humber College), and Prof. Bernard Warren (Dramatic Arts, University of Windsor).

Drs. Hazel Ipp and Judi Kobrick have been working very hard with their planning committee to make all necessary preparations for hosting the April 2007 Annual Spring Meeting. The theme of this always exciting conference is “On Clinical Momentum: Time, Process, and Complexity in the Psychoanalytic Arena.” Drs. Irwin Z. Hoffman and Adrienne Harris will be keynote speakers.

Plans are underway for our Fourth Joint International Conference with the psychoanalytic societies of the William Alanson White Institute, New York University’s Postdoctoral Program in Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy, and Adelphi University’s Postdoctoral...
Program in Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy. After our last two successful symposia in Dublin and Cape Town, our next one returns to Canada where it all began several years ago in Niagara-on-the-Lake. This next conference will take place in Vancouver in the summer of 2008, co-hosted with colleagues from the Vancouver area.


Our study groups for graduates, faculty, candidates, and guest members continue to go very well, providing yet another mode for continuing education. Monthly meetings were held on: Relational Psychoanalysis (Dr. Hazel Ipp); Winnicott and Post-Winnicott (Dr. Ann Baranowsk); and Cinema and Psychoanalysis (Dr. Deborah Levine). In Fall 2006, a new study group on neuropsychoanalysis will be inaugurated by Dr. Scott Bishop.

For their diligent, creative efforts over the past year, great thanks are due to all members of our Executive Committee: Drs. Hazel Ipp, Judi Kobrick, Sam Izenberg, Gary Rodin, Gary Taerk, Nira Kolers, Gail White, Sarah Turnbull, and Brent Willock.

In sum, the past year has witnessed a large number of meaningful and exciting developments for our chapter, institute, and society. Our Board, committees, faculty, graduates, candidates, and others have given generously of their time, energy, and thoughtfulness to make all this happen. Their contributions are deeply appreciated. These spirited efforts have sustained the high quality of our endeavour, helping us progress to the next stage in our evolution. Everyone can feel proud of all that has been accomplished.

**Oklahoma Society for Psychoanalytic Studies**

This past fall has been another busy one for the Oklahoma Society for Psychoanalytic Studies in Oklahoma City, as we have hosted presentations by several old and familiar friends as well as a new one. In September, Gerald Stechler gave a Saturday workshop on two topics: “Ethics in Couples Therapy” and “Affect Based Couples Therapy.” Dr. Stechler has been to Oklahoma several times before and his presentations have always been well received, this one being no exception. In October, Charles Brenner gave several presentations over a weekend on Compromise Formation Theory and his new book, Psychoanalysis: Mind and Meaning. In November, a frequently sought-out teacher and supervisor, Elliot Adler came into town to present on “Men Who Will Not Love,” graciously agreeing to combine a presentation with a teaching assignment. In January, there will be a Saturday meeting titled “Clinical Conversation: A Case Study with Dialogue from Three Theoretical Perspectives.” There, Anne Early, will discuss from an Object Relational point of view, Stephen Miller from an Ego Psychological perspective, and Joseph Couch from a Relational view. This will be the first time OSPS has sponsored an event of this type, and it is being eagerly anticipated.

**Western Massachusetts and Albany Association for Psychoanalytic Psychology**

Our association is growing both in numbers and representations from adjoining areas. Our Executive Committee meets four or more times a year to share ideas, work out kinks, and to plan our course of providing educational events for the professional community. We present both large programs for area professionals about once a month and study groups for members in our three areas of the Berkshires, The Pioneer Valley, and Albany and Columbia County.

During the past year we have been most fortunate to present our large programs at the Red Lion Inn in Stockbridge. Going back to 2005, in April, Lora Tessman honored us with a talk on her research leading to her book, Analysis Ending and Unending. In May, Dr. Axel Hoffer spoke to us about “Free Association.” Our last program before the summer was in June when Anna Ornstein spoke to us on “The Significance of Narcissistic Rage in the Clinical Situation.”

In October 2005, Lucy La Farge presented her paper on “The Wish for Revenge.” November 2005 brought us an extra event, when Françoise Davoine and Jean-Max Gaudilliére, visiting from Paris, spoke to us on their recent book, History Beyond Trauma. Taking a break to avoid travel in bad weather and the holidays, our next large program in February 2006 was with Marie Rudden, psychoanalyst and author, who gave a most informative talk, “Conceptualizing and Treating Depression.” Sandra Buechler, psychoanalyst and author who spoke on “Can Our Love for Psychoanalysis Last,” followed in March. Also in March, Alan Roland spoke to us on “Psychotherapy
and the Artist.” Our final program in Spring 2006 was a most relevant and timely presentation by James Gilligan and Charles Strozier titled “Terrorism, Fundamentalism and Nihilism: Analyzing the Dilemmas of Modernity.”

The first program in Fall 2006 was a most instructive and lively talk by Diane Barth on “Thinking About Eating Disorders from the Perspective of Attachment Theory.” Scheduled for the rest of this year is a presentation by Eric Plakun on Tibetan Psychiatry: Madness and its Cure.” Marilyn Charles, Paul Lippmann, and Tom Kohut will be our next speakers.

In our executive meetings we struggle with issues of member fees, fees for our programs, CE credits, professional confidentiality in our study groups, working therapeutically in small towns and other organizational matters that I imagine we all confront. We are planning a reading group and a panel on “working in a rural area where your neighbor not only knows you and you him/her, but may also become your patient.”

WASHINGTON SOCIETY OF PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOLOGY

The Washington Society of Psychoanalytic Psychology is well into its annual series of Friday seminars. The year began with Rochelle Kainer presenting “In the End is the Beginning: Issues of Termination for Patient and Analyst.” In November, Bruce Wine and Joyce Lowenstein presented their model of group supervision with a case supplied by our Vice President, Bonnie Eisenberg. Both these events were well attended and very well received. There is a core group of attendees, which has led to there being a comfort in discussing sometimes difficult material with the group.

Our upcoming seminars include: Richard Chefetz on “Abandoning Ship: Depersonalization - When the Body is Too Much of a Burden” in January; Michal Gorman on countertransference issues in working with suicidal and despairing patients in March; and Macario Giraldo in May with “Mourning and Desire: What We Learn from Hamlet,” discussing this theme from a Lacanian perspective.

Our Society continues to be involved with other psychoanalytic organizations and institutes in the Washington area in sharing information about programs and resources. We are in the talking stages about hosting some joint events.

SECTION IX REPORT - CONTINUED FROM PAGE 85

23-29 of this issue.

The second annual “Ideology and the Clinic” online conference organized by Lynne Layton (from October 4–November 1), co-sponsored by Section IX and PsyBC was titled “Thinking Critically in the Midst of the Maelstrom: Can Psychoanalysis Help Us Stay Sane in an Insane World?” The conference featured groundbreaking papers by Neil Altman (“Psychoanalysis and War” and Nancy Hollander (“Psyche, Trauma and the Creation of the Political Subject”). Drs. Altman and Hollander explored how the psychic-social split is no longer tenable as we try to cope with the destabilizing impact of dread and insecurity fostered by an increasingly violent, polarized and nihilistic world. Panelists for this conference were Neil Altman, Philip Cushman, Ruth Fallenbaum, Stephen Hartman, Nancy Hollander, Lynne Layton, Jennifer McCarol, Andrew Samuels, Stephen Soldz and Annie Stopford. A description of the conference is at http://www.psybc.com/confer_detail.php?sem_id=61.

For more information about Section IX please contact Lu Steinberg at lu2steinb@hotmail.com or Neil Altman at neilaltman@hotmail.com.

STEPHEN MITCHELL AWARD

Papers are invited for the annual Stephen A. Mitchell Award. Established by Psychoanalytic Psychology and the Board of the Division of Psychoanalysis, the award honors our esteemed colleague as well as a graduate student whose paper is deemed exemplary by a panel of judges. The award includes a $500 cash prize, airfare and registration for the Division Spring Meeting, at which the paper will be read, and publication in Psychoanalytic Psychology. Deadline for submission is July 1, 2007, and presentation of the paper will be at the 2008 Spring Meeting in New York. Five printouts of the paper should be submitted to me according to the procedure for submission to Psychoanalytic Psychology and should include a cover letter indicating that the paper is being submitted for the Stephen A. Mitchell Award. Division members, especially those with academic affiliations, are strongly encouraged to invite graduate students to submit papers. There are no restrictions as to topic or theoretical orientation, although the papers must be of a psychoanalytic nature. Manuscripts and questions should be addressed to the editor: Joseph Reppen, PhD, ABPP, 211 East 70 Street, New York, NY 10021-5207, 212/288-7530 (voice), 212/628-8453 (fax), jreppen@datagram.com (email).

DEADLINE: JULY 1, 2007
The *Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual (PDM)* is the result of a unique collaboration among the major psychoanalytic organizations. The PDM covers adults, children, adolescents, and infants and systematically describes:

- **Healthy and disordered personality functioning**
- **Individual profiles of mental functioning**, including patterns of relating, comprehending, and expressing feelings, coping with stress and anxiety, observing one’s own emotions and behaviors, and forming moral judgments
- **Symptom patterns**, including differences in each individual’s personal or subjective experience of his or her symptoms

For the past two years a task force selected by presidents of the psychoanalytic organizations listed above systematized the descriptions of both the deeper and surface levels of an individual’s personality, emotional and social functioning, and symptom patterns, emphasizing individual variations as well as commonalities. The PDM describes the whole person and complements the DSM and ICD efforts in cataloguing symptoms and behaviors.

The PDM opens the door to improvements in diagnosis and treatment of mental health disorders and to a fuller understanding of the functioning of the mind and brain and their development.

---

**To order the Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual**

Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual (PDM), 10125 Colesville Road Suite 194, Silver Spring MD 20901 - Phone: 301-789-1660 or visit our website at [http://www.pdm1.org](http://www.pdm1.org) for more details

| Name: __________________________ | Phone/fax: __________________________ | Email: __________________________ |
| Address: __________________________ | | |
| City: __________________________ | State: ____ | Zip code: ______ |

| Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual – 600 pp. - $35.00 each | Quantity | Total Amt. |
| Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual – Special Hardcover Edition – 600 pp. - $45.00 each | | |
| Shipping and Handling – (Domestic $6.00; International add $10 - 2-4 wks; $20 -10 – 12 days) | | |
| Maryland residents, please add 5% sales tax | | |
| TOTAL ENCLOSED: (credit card, check, or money order) | | |
SECTION OFFICERS 2007

SECTION I – PSYCHOLOGIST PSYCHOANALYST PRACTITIONERS
President: Mary Beth Cresci - mbresci@aol.com
President Elect: K. William Fried - billfried@hotmail.com
Treasurer: Helen Silverman - hsilver900@aol.com
Secretary: Stephen Miller - smillerphd@hotmail.com
Newsletter: Batya Monder - bmonder@rcn.com
Members-at-Large: Gemma Ainslie, Harriet Basseches, Helen K. Gediman, MAurine K. Kelly, Batya Monder, Jane Tucker

SECTION II – CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE
President: Christopher Bonovitz - Chrisfb@Attglobal.net
Past President: Peter Carnochan - pcarnochan@mindspring.com
President Elect: Richard Ruth - rruth@erols.com
Treasurer: Sophie Lovinger - sllov@earthlink.net
Secretary: Susan Fabrick - Sfabrick@aol.com

SECTION III – WOMEN, GENDER AND PSYCHOANALYSIS
President: Eileen A Kohutis - eakohutis@aol.com
Past President: Batya Monder - bmonder@rcn.com
Treasurer: Connie Halligan - challigan@comcast.net
Recording Secretary: Susan Varady - svarady@yahoo.com
Corresponding Secretary: Martha Temple - marthatemple@verizon.net
Members-At-Large: Mary Beth Cresci, Diane Ehrensaft, Helen Gediman, helengediman@aol.com; Debbie Greenberg, Lynne Harkless, Ma urine Kelly, Jane Kupersschmidt, Judy Logue, Jill Salberg, Jessica Zucker,

SECTION IV – LOCAL CHAPTERS
President: V. Barry Dauphin - barrydauphin@sbcglobal.net
Treasurer: Joseph Schaller - JGSchaller@aol.com
Secretary: Linda Rudy - DrLinda@ix.netcom.com
Membership: BillMacGillivray - dRNAeg@bellsouth.net

SECTION V – PSYCHOLOGIST PSYCHOANALYST CLINICIANS
President: Elgan Baker - EBLXA@aol.com
Past President: Mark Mellinger - markmphp@bellatlantic.net
Treasurer: Ghislaine Boulanger - Ghislaine_Boulanger@psychoanalysis.net

SECTION VI – Psychoanalytic Research Society
President: Kenneth Levy - klevy@psu.edu
Past President: Pamela Foelsch - pa1@tfptherapy.com

SECTION VII – PSYCHOANALYSIS AND GROUPS
President: Emanuel Shapiro - bandmshap@aol.com
Past President: Albert Brok - ABRiver@aol.com
Treasurer: Joseph Lynch - DrJlynch@Aol.com
Recording Secretary: Madalene Berley - Madapen@earthlink.net
Corresponding Secretary: Karen D’Amore - Karendam@MSN.com
Members-at-Large: Shoshana Ben-Noam, Martin Livingston, Susan Kavalier-A dler, Gladys Foxe

SECTION VIII – COUPLE AND FAMILY THERAPY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS
President: Antonia Halton - tonihalton@rcn.com
Past-President: Gerry Stechler - stechler@bu.edu
Founder: Mary-Joan Gerson - mjg5@nyu.edu
Treasurer: Mary-Joan Gerson - mjg5@nyu.edu
Secretary: Susan Abelson - sabelson@ahkx.com
Editor: Antonia Halton - tonihalton@rcn.com
Listmaster: Susan M. Shimmerlik - sms@psychoanalysis.net
Members-at-Large: Roanne Barnett, Lawrence O. Brown, Phyllis Cohen, Joyce Lowenstein, Carolynn Maltas, Justin Newmark, Fred M. Sander

SECTION IX – PSYCHOANALYSIS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
President: Nancy Hollander - nchollander@comcast.net
Past President: Rachael Peltz - rapeltz@earthlink.net
Secretary: Karen Rosica - Krosica@aol.com
Treasurer: Neil Altman - neilaltman@hotmail.com
Newsletter Editor: Steve Botticelli - srb224@nyu.edu
Members-at-Large: Lynne Layton, Cristopher Bonovitz, Susan Gutwill, Stuart Pizer, Stephen Seligman, Gary Walls, Rico Ainslie, Lu Steinberg
2007 Board of Directors, Officers and Committee Chairs

President
Nancy McWilliams, PhD
9 Mine Street
Flemington, NJ
Phone: 908-782-9766
Fax: 908-788-5527
Email: NancyMcW@aol.com

Past-President
David Ramirez, PhD
Swarthmore College
500 College Ave.
Swarthmore, PA 19081
Phone: 610-328-8059
Fax: 610-690-5724
Email: dramire1@swarthmore.edu

Secretary 2004-2006
Dennis Debiak, PsyD
300 South Chester Road, Suite 106
Swarthmore, PA 19081
Phone: 610-690-2442
Fax: 610-499-4625
Email: DDebiak@aol.com

Treasurer 2006-2008
Marsha D. McCary, PhD
431 Spicewood Springs Rd., Ste. C-3
Austin, TX 78759
Phone: 512-338-0708
Fax: 512-338-4752
Email: MDMcCary@austin.rr.com

Division 39 Office
Ruth Helein-Director
2615 Amesbury Road
Winston Salem, NC 27103
Phone: 336-768-1113
Fax: 336-768-4445
Email: div39@namgmt.com

Web site Address
www.division39.org

APA Council Representatives
Jaine Darwin, PsyD - JDarwin@aol.com
Laura Barbanel, PhD - lbarbanel@earthlink.net
Bertram Karan, PhD - karon@msu.edu
Dolores Morris, PhD - domorris@worldnet.att.net
Laurel Bass Wagner, PhD - lbwagner@tx.rr.com

Members - at - Large
Marilyn Charles, PhD - mcharles@msu.edu
Mary Beth Cresci, PhD - mbcresci@aol.com
Cristine Keiffer, PhD - CCKPhd@aol.com
Judith Logue, PhD - judith@judithlogue.com
Marilyn Newman Metzl, PhD - marilynmetzl@sbcglobal.net
William A. MacGillivray, PhD - drmacq@bellsouth.net
Henry Seiden, PhD - hmseiden@verizon.net
Jonathan Slavin, PhD, ABPP - JHSlavin@aol.com
Lawrence Zelnick, PhD - lzel@psychoanalysis.net

Section Representatives to Board
Section I - Albert J. Brok, PhD - ABRiver@aol.com
Section II - Jill Bellinson, PsyD - bellinsonj@nycc.rr.com
Section III - Ellen Toronto, PhD - eteronto@umich.edu
Section IV - David Downing, PsyD - ddwoning@uindy.edu
Section V - Robert Prince, PhD - rprincephd@optonline.net
Section VI - Andrew J. Gerber, MD, PhD - agerber@aya.yale.edu
Section VII - Tracey Ungar - Trungar@hotmail.com
Section VIII - Gerald Stechler, PhD - stechler@bu.edu
Section IX - Frank Summers, PhD - Franksumphd@hotmail.com

Committee Chairs, Liaisons, & Appointed Officers
Awards - Maureen Murphy, PhD - Pine93@earthlink.net
Candidates Subcommittee - Mary Beth Cresci, Phd - mbcresci@aol.com; Nancy McWilliams, PhD - NancyMcW@aol.com and Johanna Krout Tabin, PhD - jktabin@juno.com
Continuing Education - Patricia Strasberg, EdD, ABPP - pstras@cox.net
Education & Training - David Downing, PsyD - ddwoning@uindy.edu and Martha Hadley, PhD - marthahadley@earthlink.net
Ethics & Professional Issues - Karen Maroda, PhD - kmaroda@yahoo.com
Executive - David Ramirez, PhD - dramire1@swarthmore.edu
Federal Advocacy Coordinator - Frank Goldberg, PhD - Ifhgphd@optonline.net
Fellows Subcommittee - Open
Finance - Marsha D. McCary, PhD - MDMcCary@austin.rr.com
Graduate Student - Jonathan Slavin, PhD - JHSlavin@aol.com and Matthew Whitehead - mw0302@mail.widener.edu
Infant Mental Health - Stephen Seligman, DMH - seligmna@itsa.ucsf.edu
Internet - Lawrence Zelnick, PsyD - lzel@psychoanalysis.net
Liaison to CAPP and IG - Martin Manosevitz, PhD - mmanosev@earthlink.net
Liaison to the Board & Committees of APA, Interdivisional Task Force on Managed Care, & Federal Advocacy Coordinator - Frank Goldberg, PhD
Membership - Louis Rothschild, PhD - L_Rothschild@msn.com
Multicultural - Pratyusha Tummala-Narra, PhD - utummala@umich.edu
Nominations & Elections - Jaime Darwin, PsyD - jldarwin@aol.com
Outreach - Marylou Lionells, PhD - mlionells@psychoanalysis.net
Parliamentarian - Laurel Bass Wagner, PhD - lbwagner@flash.net
Program Committee - Elaine Martin, PhD - esmart@psychoanalysis.net
Psychoanalytic Consortium - Laurel Bass Wagner, PhD - lbwagner@flash.net
Publications - Henry Seiden, PhD - hmseiden@verizon.net
Public Information - Open
Sexual Identity and LGBT Issues - Dennis Debiak, PhD - ddebiak@aol.com
Specialization and Accreditation - George Goldman, PhD - drgdgoldman@aol.com & Nat Stockhamer, PhD - nstockhamer@earthlink.net
FROM THE PRESIDENT
Carrying On
Nancy McWilliams...........................1
IN MEMORIAM
Harry Sands....................................5
Hans Strupp..................................5
FROM THE EDITOR
Bill MacGillivray............................6
SPECIAL SECTION...On Sid Blatt
Blatt Wins Sigourney Award...............8
Congratulations to Sid Blatt........9
PSYCHOANALYTIC RESEARCH
Developmental Affective Neuroscience
Allan Schore................................12
Presence of Mind
Joseph Bobrow..............................15
INVITED ARTICLES
Old Pond, Frog Jump In...
Henry Seiden...............................21
Ethical Concerns about Psychologists’
Participation in Interrogations
Steven Reissner..............................23
Dangers of Universal Access
Peter Zelles................................30
Freud’s Place in Our Minds
Marielyn S. Jacobs........................32
PSYCHOANALYTIC BOOKS
Book Written/Edited by Members........36
John Auerbach et al.’s Relatedness, Self-
Definition and Mental Representation
Paolo Mignone................................37
Anna Ornstein’s My Mother’s Eyes
Hendri Parnes’ Renewal of Life
Sophia Richman.............................40
André Green and Gregorio Kohon’s
Love and Its Vicissitudes
Michael Diamond.........................44
Lewis Aron and Adrienne Harris’s
Relational Psychoanalysis, Vol. 2
Susan DeMattos.............................46
Stanley Greenspan and Stuart
Shanker’s The First Idea
Lawrence Hedges...........................52
Stefano Bolognini’s Psychoanalytic
Empathy
Juan Tuberant-Olender........................54
Jürgen Reeder’s Hate and Love in
Psychoanalytic Institutes
Jane Hall........................................60
Alex Holder’s Psychoanalysis with
Children and Adolescents
Carol Lichman..............................62
COMMITTEE REPORTS
Publications
Nancy McWilliams..........................79
Continuing Education
Pat Strasser and Laura Porter.........81
CAPP and IG
Marty Manosevitz........................82
SECTIONS REPORTS
Section V
Johanna Tarn.................................84
Section VI
Pamela Foelsch..............................84
Section VIII
Antonia Harlow..............................85
Section IX
Le Steinberg.................................85
LOCAL CHAPTER REPORTS
Austin Society
Naomi Freireich..............................86
Ontario Society for Contemporary
Psychoanalysis
Brent Wilcock.................................86
Oklahoma Society for Psychoanalytic
Studies
Michael Kampaschaefer....................86
Western Massachusetts and Albany
Association
Fran Lippman................................87
New York Society
Molly Donovan...............................87
DIRECTORY
Section Officers.........................90
Board of Directors.....................91

Division of Psychoanalysis
American Psychological Association
750 First Street, NE
Washington, DC 20002-4242

SPRING MEETING REGISTRANTS PLEASE NOTE
Beginning January 23, 2007, all persons including U.S. citizens traveling by air between the United
States and Canada will be required to present a valid passport, Air NEXUS card or U.S. Coast Guard
Merchant Marine Document or an Alien Registration Card, Form I-551, if applicable.