All reigns, whether a monarch's or a paradigm's, must eventually end; that is, as Kuhn (1970) contended, scientific revolutions are (as are anomalies) bound to occur. Given the inevitability of change, it is tempting to confidently proclaim that we are necessarily heading toward another scientific revolution. However, this seemingly self-evident statement ignores the many complexities that determine the who, what, when, where, why, and how of scientific revolutions, not the least of which are the two criteria Kuhn identified as jointly necessary and sufficient for revolutions (i.e., the simultaneous materialization of a crisis and a viable competitor). Part and parcel of these complexities, the scientific system reinforces itself through its conventions and institutions, hampering change. Further complicating matters, in psychology the intertwining of science and society may alter the object of study (i.e., the constitution and lived experiences of persons) over time, reducing any tensions between object and method, potentially eliminating the need for change. Moreover, the intertwining of the scientific enterprise and the larger socio-political system in which it is embedded adds to their respective inflexibility: each reinforces the other, obscuring the biases that underpin them both. To counter these impediments to change, Psychology's philosophers and theorists can attempt to reveal the hidden assumptions and values from which the existing scientific enterprise arises, as well as the socio-political inequities it perpetuates. Engendering change, however, begins with an understanding of how the system operates.
The Rise and Fall of Scientific Paradigms (Kuhn, 1970)
If we take Kuhn's (1970) theory as gospel, scientific pursuits alternate between two complementary phases: (1) enduring periods of normal science, in which a single paradigm predominates and knowledge accumulates under its governance, and (2) scientific revolutions, cataclysmic regime changes in which a new school of thought usurps the scientific paradigm now dwindling on the vine, transforming the whole scientific system in its wake. Each paradigm consists of a unique system of aims, concepts, foci, precepts, postulates, methodological commitments, theories, and facts, all of which constitute a shared understanding that frames and guides scientists' research activities. Working in tandem, the coordinated elements of the overarching scientific system—its infrastructure, which includes associations, curriculum, and specialized journals—disseminate the knowledge procured following the paradigm's dictates, reinforce its norms, and, ultimately, justify the scientific enterprise in its totality. Inevitably, scientists will encounter phenomena for which the reigning paradigm is ill-suited; over time, these anomalies—weighty research problems that resist resolution within the existing research framework—will accumulate. Scientific revolutions occur when the accrual of a critical set of anomalies (which engenders a crisis of faith in the reigning paradigm) coincides with the presence of a viable alternative (i.e., a competing paradigm that has been building in the background) that satisfyingly addresses those vexing problems in addition to the critical research questions that have been adequately resolved by the reigning paradigm. In the absence of either a crisis or a competitive alternative paradigm (i.e., both are necessary, and neither is sufficient), scientists predominantly rely upon the framings and strategies already established under the existing paradigm.
The scientific stranglehold
Scientists are motivated to operate outside of the paradigm's parameters only when worrisome anomalies accumulate (Kuhn, 1970). During periods of normal science, scientists use the prescribed conceptual and methodological puzzle-solving conventions on the research puzzles placed before them; in this phase of accrual, the testing of creative alternatives is unnecessary and costly (Kuhn, 1970). Although there may be small shifts in beliefs and procedures to accommodate the phenomena scientists are studying, little thought is given to fundamental questions such as: (a) what constitutes appropriate objects and methods of study, and why so; (b) who is granted epistemic authority and which peoples are routinely discredited; (c) how an irresolvable research problem is to be framed (i.e., under what conditions it should be categorized as an anomaly, non-scientific content, or due to a temporary methodological limitation); and (d) what constitutes a critical accrual of anomalies (i.e., how many is too many). Instead of contemplating such issues, scientists in the normal science period defer to the wisdom of the reigning paradigm and adhere to its protocols (Kuhn, 1970). The shared scientific infrastructure thus not only buttresses the work conducted under its auspices, but also constrains scientists' perceptions and practices. That is, rather than seek creative solutions when studying a seemingly-impenetrable phenomenon that does not conform to the reigning paradigm's legitimatized methods, scientists often work to preserve the scientific framework within which they toil -- they remain committed to that which is tried and true, questioning the legitimacy of the phenomenon rather than the method (e.g., when the phenomenal aspects of persons' experiences are treated as epiphenomena because scientists do not have first-person access to others' first-person experiences). Fundamentally then, scientific conventions erect barriers to the earnest consideration of alternatives, effectively putting a stranglehold on at least some competing frameworks. However, such efforts provide only temporary relief; inevitably, undeniable tensions will breach the paradigm's protective perimeter and, as anomalies accumulate, the door to innovation will swing open a little wider. In the interim, as they await the impending crisis, the proponents of alternative paradigms (i.e., would-be contenders to the scientific throne) must bolster their respective paradigms.
Science in the social context
Over the last century, the reach of science (and so its reigning paradigm) has extended beyond the proverbial ivory towers, with the perceptions and practices of scientists (including psychologists) increasingly influencing the conduct of daily life (i.e., initially through the introduction of various appliances, but increasingly through the propagation of another technology, namely the concepts and practices psychologists employ). Looking to 21st century Canada and the USA, some framings and methods of psychologists have clearly permeated routine social activities. Among these, the framing of knowledge-gathering as research appears in some non-academic searches for information; persons exploring a variety of pet food options, for example, refer to sifting through the information available online as conducting research. Consider, too, that the kinds of explanations employed by psychologists appear in casual conversations; to illustrate, imagine a friend's elementary-school-aged child, when asked why zie was afraid of spiders, responding—with zir finger pointing to zir skull—that it was because of zir amygdala (i.e., which the child had learned at school). The influence of Psychology's concepts also appears in the arts, including the liberal and causal interweaving of Freudian concepts into comedian's remarks, movies, and songs. The methods of scientists also have infiltrated casual social exchanges: when asked how they enjoyed a meal or movie, it is not unusual for persons, spontaneously and without explanation (i.e., revealing that it is a commonplace practice), to employ a 10-point rating scale to represent their pleasure or displeasure to their friend. Ultimately, the infiltration of scientific concepts and practices into common parlance strengthens the reigning paradigm's stranglehold: as particular concepts and practices are interwoven into the everyday engagements of persons, they may increasingly be perceived as inviolable truths rather than conventions, further closing scientists' eyes to possible alternatives in the conduct of normal science.
In more extreme cases, the infiltration of scientific concepts and practices into everyday life might fundamentally alter the constitution and lived experiences of persons. Just as persons can change in response to experts' characterizations of them (Gergen, 1973; Hacking, 1995), a reliance upon scientific methods in social exchanges might change the very nature of lived experience. Consider, for example, how the consistent, long-term employment of rating scales to describe one's enjoyment of meals, movies, and friends might eventually obscure, dampen, or extinguish some of the richer phenomenal dimensions of one's enjoyment. As persons' behaviors and lived experiences align with the concepts and methods utilized to study them, the possibility of crisis and the need for alternative paradigms will dwindle.
Influence also flows from society to science. The beliefs, experiences, interests, preferences, and values of a society's bearers of power and privilege are infused into, and propagated by, a society's principles, practices, and institutions. Given that the existing scientific enterprise arose within the racist, sexist, and classist ideology that underpins and has sculpted our socio-political landscape for centuries, it is not surprising (though deeply disturbing and disheartening) that scientific concepts, theories, practices, and findings reflect and reinforce (rather than deconstruct and dismantle) the systemic, systematic inequities and injustices found in society. For example, the theories and research findings of the early 1900s positioned a subset of people as superior in constitution and intellect to other groups of people (i.e., purportedly delineated on the basis of race, gender, or class, but essentially representing groupings of privileged and marginalized persons), findings that were then used to justify the very socio-political policies that had created the observed differences, ignoring that the findings and the methods used to obtain them were more socio-political weapons than epistemological tools.
The role of theory, philosophy, and ethics (Oh, my!)
Especially when aided by history [as was Kuhn's (1970) account], theorists, philosophers, and ethicists play important roles in either reinforcing or questioning (possibly eventually subverting) a given paradigm. For those hoping to engender a scientific revolution, there are complementary courses of action available. Among them, one might expose and explain the various forces that reinforce the reigning scientific system and thwart change. Such insights might equip scientists working in the normal period of science to recognize potential anomalies (i.e., rather than dismiss unruly phenomena as inappropriate fodder for scientific consideration), hastening the critical accrual of anomalies. Such efforts also might increase scientific curiosity about alternative paradigms, increasing the possibility that a revolution will take root. A second tactic is collaboratively developing coherent, compelling, well-established alternative paradigms that address the accumulating anomalies and already-resolved research problems, that they might be deemed viable should a crisis ensue. Third, building on society-wide efforts to de-colonize, others might ardently pursue the deconstruction of the colonized foundations of science, with the ultimate aim of collaboratively constructing an egalitarian, multi-perspectival epistemic system informed by a well-rounded variety of ways of knowing and being in the world. Conducting these efforts in a coordinated fashion provides the greatest hope for dismantling the entrenched system and might reveal additional aspects and processes of science not developed in Kuhn's (1970) account, thus expanding upon our existing understanding of the reciprocal relations between the scientific enterprise and the socio-political system onto which it was grafted.
Concluding remarks
Clearly, critics of the reigning paradigm cannot simply sit on the sidelines counting accruing anomalies. For those of us welcoming large-scale change, Kuhn's (1970) recipe identified two crucial ingredients: a crisis of faith in the reigning paradigm and a viable alternative. Augmenting it with the additional key ingredients gleaned from an informed, critical study of the system's workings, we must conscientiously contribute toward the as-of-yet-unsuccessful scientific revolution we desire. Although we cannot know with certainty if and when it will occur, it has not failed...unless, and until, we acquiesce.
References
Gergen, K. (1973). Social psychology as history. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 26, 309-320. doi:10.1037/h0034436
Hacking, I. (1995). Rewriting the soul: Multiple personality and the sciences of memory. Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd edition, enlarged). Chicago, IL, USA: The University of Chicago Press.
About the Author
Snjezana Huerta is a doctoral candidate in the History, Quantitative, and Theoretical Psychology program at Simon Fraser University; zir background includes developmental psychology and philosophy. Snjezana's doctoral work focuses on early psychologists' framings of idiographic inquiry.