Psychology has always prided itself on being a science, as having earned its emancipation from “metaphysics” (meaning philosophy), though not without controversy (DeRobertis & Iuculano, 2005). Since the time of Wundt, debates have raged over the extent to which psychology is or ought to be distinct from philosophy (Lamiell, 2013). History has also seen the emergence of voices advocating that psychology is more of an art than a science, some combination of the two, or some version of the humanities (Drever, 1940; Meier, 1987). Sentiments such as these are more common among the clinically inclined, or else they are inspired by the controversy over psychology’s lack of paradigmatic integration and/or its various “crises” (replication, generalizability, etc.). All in all, there is a continuum of viewpoints on the matter, with dissenting voices (that is, those who veer away from a strict science position) being the historical other, a minority voice.
Without minimizing or demeaning the voice of the other, I would venture to say that humanistic psychology has mirrored the discipline-wide historical narrative and embraced the view that humanistic psychology is and ought to be a science, albeit of an unconventional sort. In doing so, most humanistic psychologists have been following the example of the proverbial Big Four (Maslow, Rogers, May, and Frankl)—all of whom embraced the idea of the third-force revolution being a genuinely scientific revolution that would fulfill the promise of psychology and exemplify its true meaning and purpose. Maslow, Rogers, May, and Frankl all advocated for programs of disciplined, systematic research throughout their entire careers, rejecting the radical views of the “encounter” movement in psychology and the anti-science sentiment associated with that fringe. May lauded phenomenologists and conventional researchers alike (for example, Martin Seligman, see May, 1991); Frankl’s texts regularly included large bibliographic appendices citing various forms of research as support for logotherapy’s claims of efficacy; and both Maslow (1961, 1971) and Rogers (1955, 1985) spoke strongly of the need to support humanistic psychology’s revised image of human existence and the processes involved in clinical intervention with both conventional and revolutionary research tactics.
Within the call for a humanistic revolution in psychology, the debate over what constitutes psychological “science” thus takes on a new form implicating questions of method (DeRobertis, 2021b). Psychology has always had many methods, but the character and importance of methodological pluralism was amplified in humanistic psychology, and in a manner that threatened the status quo (and still does). In conventional psychology, what is traditional is the exaltation of experimentalism and quantification, those being the gateways to inclusion in Tier 1 journals (Marchel & Owens, 2007). Even as psychology has welcomed Division 5’s Society for Qualitative Inquiry in Psychology (SQIP), the striving for psychology to become a STEM discipline remains steadfast (Clay, 2022). It is my contention that the humanistic revolution, as theoretically conceived by Maslow (1961), proposed a hierarchical-integrative approach to psychology’s subject matter that turns traditional psychology’s methodological priorities on their head. Maslow (1971) spoke of third-force psychology as epi-behavioristic and epi-psychoanalytic. His hierarchical-integrative vision was that more theoretically reductive and restrictive modalities ought to be enveloped within a broader, more inclusive framework for doing psychological science (not rejected). This means that one cannot continue to unreflectively privilege physical science methodologies, which prioritize all-out objectivism (Maslow, 1966). For Maslow (1971), this meant that the very notion of objectivity itself would have to be revisited and reworked. Humanistic research must further be founded on a revolutionary reprioritization of values, placing the firsthand, living experience of persons at the top of the hierarchy.
It is against this background that one ought to put the emergence of phenomenology in American psychology in perspective. Without rejecting the pluralism of humanistic psychology stretching back to our roots in William James, the impetus that set the Big Four in motion as leaders of the humanistic revolution was seen quite clearly by Adrian van Kaam (1966) in founding the psychology department at Duquesne University, and especially in his recruitment of Amedeo Giorgi (1970, 2009, 2018) for developing the phenomenological method for use in psychological research. In harmony with Maslow’s (1961) landmark observations, psychology should become genuinely psychological by becoming hierarchical-integrative, but (putting aside the special nature of each research project, which is a given) lifeworld research, which would necessarily be phenomenologically driven, ought to sit at the top of the hierarchy (DeRobertis, 2017; DeRobertis & Bland, 2020). Such is the formidable, ongoing task of humanistic psychology in the new millennium (DeRobertis, 2021a).
Author Bio
Eugene DeRobertis has been a professor of psychology since 1996. He teaches at Brookdale College and Rutgers University in New Jersey. He received his doctorate from Duquesne University. In addition to his teaching, he worked for a number of years in human services. He has authored books in humanistic, phenomenological, and developmental psychology, some with the intention of integrating humanistic psychology into mainstream psychology education.
References
Clay, R. A. (2022, April). Promoting high school psychology as a science. Monitor on Psychology, 53(3). https://www.apa.org/monitor/2022/04/news-high-school-psychology
DeRobertis, E. M. (2017). The phenomenology of learning and becoming: Enthusiasm, creativity, and self-development. Palgrave.
DeRobertis, E. M. (2021a). Profiles of personality: Integration, paradox, and the process of becoming (2nd ed.). University Professors Press.
DeRobertis, E. M. (2021b). The humanistic revolution in psychology: Its inaugural vision. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 61(1), 8-32. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022167820956785opens in new window
DeRobertis, E. M., & Bland, A. M. (2020). Lifespan human development and “the humanistic perspective”: A contribution toward inclusion. The Humanistic Psychologist, 48(1), 3-27. https://doi.org/10.1037/hum0000141opens in new window
DeRobertis, E., & Iuculano, J. (2005). Metaphysics and psychology: A problem of the personal. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 25(2), 238-256. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0091261opens in new window
Drever, J. (1940). Sigmund Freud 1856-1939: A critical appreciation. British Journal of Educational Psychology, 10(1), 1-7.
Giorgi, A. (1970). Psychology as a human science: A phenomenologically based approach. Duquesne University Press.
Giorgi, A. (2009). The descriptive phenomenological method in psychology. Duquesne University Press.
Giorgi, A. (2018). Reflections on certain qualitative and phenomenological psychological methods. University Professors Press.
Lamiell, J. T. (2013). On psychology’s struggle for existence: Some reflections on Wundt’s 1913 essay a century on. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 33(4), 205-215. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0033460opens in new window
Marchel, C., & Owens, S. (2007). Qualitative research in psychology: Could William James get a job? History of Psychology, 10(4), 301-324. https://doi.org/10.1037/1093-4510.10.4.301opens in new window
Maslow, A. H. (1961). Health as transcendence of environment. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 1(1), 1-7. https://doi.org/10.1177/002216786100100102opens in new window
Maslow, A. H. (1966). The psychology of science: A reconnaissance. Harper Collins.
Maslow, A. H. (1971). The farther reaches of human nature. Esalen.
May, R. (1991). The cry for myth. Delta.
Meier, S. T. (1987). An unconnected special issue. American Psychologist, 42(9), 881. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.42.9.881.aopens in new window
Rogers, C. R. (1955). Persons or science? A philosophical question. American Psychologist, 10(7), 267-278. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0040999opens in new window
Rogers, C. R. (1985). Toward a more human science of the person. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 25(4), 7-24. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022167885254002opens in new window
Van Kaam, A. (1966). Existential foundations of psychology. Duquesne University Press.